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Executive Summary
In April 1994 the National Research Council received a request from NASA Administrator Daniel S.
Goldin that the NRC's Space Studies Board provide guidance on several questions relating to the
management of NASA's programs in the space sciences.1 The issues raised in the Administrator's
request closely reflect questions posed in the agency's fiscal year 1994 Senate appropriations report.
These questions included the following:
• Should all the NASA space science programs be gathered into a "National Institute for Space
Science"?
• What other organizational changes might be made to improve the coordination and oversight of
NASA space science programs?
• What processes should be used for establishing interdisciplinary science priorities based on
scientific merit and other criteria, while ensuring opportunities for newer fields and disciplines to
emerge?
• What steps could be taken to improve utilization of advanced technologies in future science
missions?
Since the creation of NASA in 1958, space science has been a key element of its mission. Indeed, the
Augustine Committee report,2 submitted at the end of 1990, asserted that science was NASA's most
important mission. The committee responsible for the present report has proceeded on the same premise.
A balanced and healthy program of space science is crucial to the future of NASA, regardless of the
overall level of support available to the agency.
The most important recommendations of this report are listed below. They are further elaborated
following the list.
1
 In this report, "space sciences" refers to all of NASA's science programs conducted in or from space, including space astronomy,
space physics, planetary exploration, microgravity research, space life sciences, and Earth science.
2Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, December 1990.
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• NASA should not establish a "National Institute for Space Science" that would pull together the
three present science program offices.
• NASA should augment the responsibilities and authorities of the NASA Chief Scientist.
• NASA should establish a set of fair, open, and understandable processes to be used in the
prioritization of space science research. These processes will ensure that major project proposals
considered at progressively higher levels within the agency have the heritage of scientific merit that
comes from a successful confrontation with competing proposals at lower levels.
• NASA should create a comprehensive strategy and plan for the technologies that support the space
sciences, with the responsibility for near-term technology development residing in the science programs
to be served and the responsibility for longer-term technology strategy and development residing in the
Office of Space Access and Technology.
• NASA should change the funding of its field centers to full-cost accounting ("industrial funding").
Cost accounting should be based on full program costs, including civil service salaries. The committee
endorses NASA's intentions to move in this direction.
• NASA should exercise caution in downsizing its Headquarters staff and transferring functions to
the centers; this process could be carried too far and have unintended consequences. The committee
identified a number of areas where it believes control should be retained at Headquarters.
• NASA science budgets should include a limited amount of dedicated funding for innovative ideas
in high-risk, high-return areas lying outside the current framework of inquiry or design.
• NASA should take a cautious approach to the recently proposed establishment of focused science
institutes. There should be a well-defined process for their selection and creation, and a clear plan for the
phased transfer of base funds to programmatic funding.
The following expands key recommendations of the report:
Institute for Space Science—In response to direction in the FY 1994 Senate appropriations report, the
committee considered a space sciences umbrella organization within NASA to coordinate and oversee all
space science activities, functioning like the National Institutes of Health (NIH) within the Department of
Health and Human Services. The committee reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of such a model
and concluded that the NIH model, while effective in the arena of health research, is not appropriate for
the space sciences. NASA space science benefits from close coordination with other elements of NASA,
such as hardware development, launch services, and tracking and data operations, which have no
counterparts in the NIH model. The committee believes the required coordination would be hampered by
the creation of a quasi-autonomous space science institute. The committee therefore does not recom-
mend establishment of such an umbrella institute.
The Role of the Chief Scientist—The role of the Chief Scientist was found to be a critical one from
many perspectives, leading the committee to recommend expanding the authorities and responsibilities
of this position. Despite the central role of the science associate administrators in the management of
their respective science areas, the committee finds a need for greater integration and coordination of these
programs. To achieve this, the position of Chief Scientist should be strengthened, particularly by the
addition of concurrence authority in key matters affecting space science. The Chief Scientist should be a
person of eminent standing in the scientific community with a significant record of accomplishment. A
proposed "functional statement" for the Chief Scientist is given in Chapter 4. A major component of this
official's integration responsibility is coordination and oversight of the recommended science prioritiza-
tion process. Another component is coordination of the technology development programs that support
space science.
The Prioritization Process—The committee believes that peer review is the most effective form of
merit review for the selection of scientific research. A clear set of criteria, known and understood by all
parties, is crucial to the prioritization of scientific goals. The relative ranking of science and mission
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plans will be most strongly affected by scientific factors at the entry level, where proposals from the same
discipline or subdiscipline compete against one another. As the arena of competition broadens to the
interdisciplinary and then to the agency-wide level, other programmatic and political influences become
increasingly important. It is essential, however, that all proposals being considered at progressively
higher levels retain the heritage of scientific merit that comes from successful confrontation with their
peers at lower levels. The office of the Chief Scientist should oversee these prioritization processes,
especially as they cross disciplinary boundaries. NASA management should cancel those programs or
projects that are failing or whose priority has dropped substantially in this prioritization process. The
committee found that peer review and the above corollary principles apply generally to technology
research as well.
Technology Planning—New technologies are important as agents of change, enhancing the quality
of scientific output and the ability to accomplish more with less. Technology development is undertaken
both by NASA's science program offices and by its Office of Space Access and Technology (OSAT).
The committee recommends that NASA establish an agency-wide strategy and plan for the technologies
that support the space sciences. These technologies may be characterized as near-term or far-term
technologies (the latter defined as requiring more than five years to be ready for flight demonstration).
The space science offices should have primary responsibility for identifying and reviewing near-term
technologies, giving them greatest control of the technologies that most immediately affect the success of
their programs. Each science office should allocate a significant fraction of its resources to Advanced
Technology Development activities and should be willing to pool resources to achieve shared objectives.
Most importantly, the implementation of all categories of technology development should be undertaken
by the best-qualified individuals or teams within NASA, other government laboratories, industry, or
academia, as determined by peer review.
Promising far-term technologies should be identified, funded, and managed by OSAT. Projects in
these areas should be reviewed jointly by the science offices and by OSAT. Like near-term technology
development, far-term projects should be carried out by the best-qualified individual or teams, as
determined by peer review. These projects should stimulate exploratory development of possibly
unconventional technologies having the potential of producing breakthroughs in capability. Finally, a
rigorous review process should be put in place to identify those projects that ought to be terminated in the
present constrained budgetary environment.
"Industrial Funding "—The committee examined the advantages and disadvantages of an explicit
full-cost accounting system in which all charges, including salaries and facilities, are charged against
projects (so-called "industrial funding"). This approach permits ready assessment of comparative costs
that might otherwise be hidden in an institutional funding environment. The committee endorses
NASA's decision (stated in the "Zero Base Review" briefing to the Congress) to identify, budget, and
manage by total program costs, including civil service labor costs. The committee recommends that
NASA change the funding of its field centers to an industrial funding arrangement. The committee
believes that decisions on program priorities and budgets would be more rational if based on full-cost
accounting, and program accountability and discipline in personnel management would thereby be
enhanced. A similar recommendation was made in the NASA Federal Laboratory Review report.3
The Downsizing of Headquarters—NASA is currently "re-engineering" its organization. This re-
engineering entails a very large downsizing of its Headquarters staff and a concurrent transfer of
functions to the centers. The result is expected to be the analog of a lean "corporate management" model.
While the committee endorses the intent, it notes that an unintended consequence could be a center-
dominated model as opposed to the desired enterprise-focused one. Several recommendations are
offered to avert this outcome. Not all program management functions should be transferred to centers.
3Federal Laboratory Review Task Force, NASA Advisory Council, NASA Federal Laboratory Review, February 1995.
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Those complex programs that cut across centers should be retained at Headquarters and integrated with
enterprise management. Support of scientific disciplines, management of peer review, and oversight and
integration across center boundaries should remain Headquarters functions. Likewise, creation of a
strategy and plan for the technologies that support space science should be a Headquarters responsibility.
The adoption of industrial funding will further emphasize the importance of a suitably strong Headquar-
ters organization.
Research in New Fields—The committee recognizes the competitive obstacles faced by smaller,
newer, or less well established fields of science. The committee recommends that NASA science budgets
include dedicated funding for innovative, high-risk, high-return ideas falling outside current frameworks
of inquiry or design. This research is highly important and deserves special management attention,
including that of the Chief Scientist. This recommendation is not intended to allow circumventing of
peer review for the major parts of any science program.
Science Institutes—Creation of contractor-operated institutes may be advantageous in specific
instances. However, the committee recommends that, as NASA proceeds with arrangements for the first
focused science institutes, it give due attention to the processes by which these institutes are selected and
created and by which, over a few years, their guaranteed base funding will be transformed into competed
programmatic funding. Further, there should be consideration of a review process that will ensure either
(1) that they compete successfully to maintain or increase their size, or (2) if less successful, that they are
phased down in an orderly fashion. The committee recommends that additional initiatives along these
lines be deferred until the above processes have been defined and the success of the two proposed
institute pilots can be evaluated.
The committee's recommendations are gathered together by main theme in Chapter 7.
The NASA space science programs, from the dawn of the space age to the present, have produced an
unprecedented flow of discoveries. The fiscal, political, and technological environment of the agency is
now in a state of rapid change. It is vital that NASA respond to its challenges and opportunities in the
most constructive manner to ensure the success of its future space science endeavors. The committee
believes that the recommendations made in this report, if accepted by NASA, will aid in this objective.
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GENERAL BACKGROUND
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established in 1958 to conduct the
civil space program of the United States in response to the challenge of the Soviet Sputnik, the first
artificial Earth satellite. In founding NASA, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 directed the
new agency to undertake the
• "expansion of human knowledge of the Earth and of phenomena in the atmosphere and in space"
and the
• "preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and
technology."
NASA was formed from the existing National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and
absorbed the bulk of the Vanguard Project and its staff from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). The
U.S. Army's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Redstone Arsenal were added shortly thereafter. Two NASA
program offices were established, Aeronautical and Space Research (oriented toward engineering
research) and Space Flight Development.1 One of four elements in the latter office, space science,
assumed responsibility for the agency's earliest endeavors in Earth orbital, lunar and planetary, and
suborbital research. A reorganization in late 1961 elevated space science to the level of a full program
office. It has retained this status since that time, with some variation in the disciplines incorporated in it.
In late 1963 the Office of Space Science and the Office of Applications were merged to create the Office
of Space Science and Applications, joining the Earth sciences with other sciences. Because of increased
emphasis on applications of space science and technology to terrestrial problems in the post-Apollo
period, the offices were separated again in 1972. In 1982, they were re-merged.
Life science elements (bioscience, space medicine, and exobiology), which had previously been
scattered across the agency, were consolidated in the Office of Space Science in 1975. Microgravity
science became part of the program of the Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications in the 1970s.
Thus, when science and applications were recombined in 1982, the reconstituted Office of Space Science
'NASA, The Evolution of the NASA Organization, March 1985.
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and Applications (OSSA) included all the science elements of the agency's program: the traditional
space sciences (astrophysics, space physics, and solar system exploration), the life sciences (bioscience,
space medicine, and exobiology), Earth science, and microgravity science.
On October 15, 1992, NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin announced a number of changes in the
NASA organization to "better focus NASA's programs, to streamline how we do business so we can meet
the challenges ahead." Among these changes was division of OSSA into two parts: the Office of Mission
to Planet Earth (OMTPE), including Earth science and applications programs, and the Office of Planetary
Science and Astrophysics (later renamed the Office of Space Science—OSS), consisting of the three
traditional space science programs, astrophysics, space physics, and solar system exploration. At that
time, no mention was made of the life sciences or microgravity science. Concurrently, the Associate
Administrator for Space Science and Applications was appointed to the position of Chief Scientist for
NASA, a position occupied during the 1970s and 1980s, but vacant since the late 1980s. Acting associate
administrators were announced for OSS and OMTPE.
These changes were formally implemented on March 11,1993, and an Office of Life and Micrograv-
ity Sciences and Applications (OLMSA) was established (effective March 8,1993). OLMSA incorporat-
ed life and biomedical sciences, microgravity science and applications, flight support systems, and
aerospace medicine and occupational health. With these changes, the NASA space sciences, which had
been collected within OSSA for the 10 preceding years, were now distributed among three program
offices—traditional space science in OSS, Earth science in OMTPE, and life and microgravity sciences
in OLMSA.
During the summer of 1993, the Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
(NASA's appropriations subcommittee), which had been a strong supporter of the unified OSSA science
office and its management prior to this reorganization, requested in the report accompanying its FY 1994
appropriations bill that the National Academy of Sciences "undertake a comprehensive review of the role
and position of space science within NASA." The subcommittee, citing as especially effective the
strategic planning, cross-disciplinary priority setting, and management controls of OSSA, directed that
the study consider the possibility of creating an "Institute for Space Science" within NASA roughly
analogous to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the Department of Health and Human Services.
(The following year, the subcommittee restated its concerns about a lack of new science missions in
NASA planning in the report accompanying the FY 1995 appropriations bill, and suggested that the
Academy consider this also in its study.) Appendix A provides the subcommittee report language.
On April 7, 1994, NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin wrote to the National Research Council
(NRC), the operating arm of the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering, to request initiation of
the study (Appendix A). Study responsibility was given to the Space Studies Board, which established a
"Future of Space Science" project. The committee structure proposed by the Board and approved by the
NRC was a steering group and three task groups charged with tackling specific aspects of the study. The
project statement of task and charges to individual task groups are provided in Appendix B.
The steering group of the committee met four times to review and guide progress on the study
(August 2-3, 1994; and January 4-5, June 9-10, and August 7-8, 1995) and to hear from a number of key
NASA managers on issues under study (Appendix H). The already-existing Joint Committee on
Technology for Space Science and Applications (operated jointly with the NRC Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board) was charged as a first task group with examining how to improve technology
development and utilization in the agency's science programs. A new Task Group on Research
Prioritization was established to analyze the general problem of research prioritization and to address the
problem of sheltering NASA's ability to promote and support highly innovative and unproven research in
a highly competitive funding environment. A Task Group on Alternative Organizations was also formed
to consider alternative organizations for the management of NASA space science.
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TASK GROUP ON ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
The charge to the Task Group on Alternative Organizations (Appendix B) encompasses a broader set
of issues and alternatives than those set out in the Senate subcommittee report. Specifically, the task
group felt that a number of alternative organizational arrangements employed in institutions other than
the NIH were also potentially relevant to NASA space science. In addition to details of science program
management in NASA Headquarters, the task group also identified as important to this study both the
overall NASA organization (Headquarters institutional and staff office management and field centers)
and the relationships of NASA with the external communities, including research performers, users of
NASA research results, educational institutions, and international organizations.
At its first meeting (December 8-9, 1994), the task group reviewed its charge, discussed with senior
NASA officials the current NASA science organization, reviewed the environmental drivers for change,
and established a plan for the conduct of its study. In four subsequent meetings (February 2-3, March 10-
11, March 27-28, and April 18-19,1995), the task group conducted interviews with science managers and
performers from both NASA and other institutions that use different management approaches. Those
interviewed are listed in Appendix H. These interviews were arranged to address three separate but
related aspects of scientific research: (1) how others manage research, that is, the approach to funding
and management of science of other research organizations, both in and out of government; (2) how the
performers of NASA-sponsored scientific research (both in and out of NASA) view NASA's manage-
ment of that research; and (3) how users of NASA's scientific research (e.g., the Department of Defense,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) interact with NASA. A final meeting devoted
entirely to writing took place on May 24-25.
Based on these interviews and the experience of its members, the task group identified key issues in
science management (both generic and specific to NASA), established a set of principles that embodied
the best and most successful elements of science management, and applied those principles to alternative
organizational arrangements for NASA. The result led to a recommended approach for NASA that
embodies the principles, applies them to the NASA context, and maintains a degree of continuity for
NASA, research performers, and users of scientific research.
While the present study was in progress, the NASA Federal Laboratory Review Task Force of the
NASA Advisory Council completed its report2 and submitted it to NASA. Responding to a Presidential
directive to the National Science and Technology Council to conduct an interagency review of research
and development at federal laboratories, this report addressed some of the same subjects as the present
study. There was substantial agreement in areas of overlap.
TASK GROUP ON RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION
The study history of priority setting in science is a lengthy one. In addressing its charge (Appendix
B), the Task Group on Research Prioritization examined the processes, past and present, by which NASA
priorities have been established and studied reports of other groups that have addressed the issue of
priorities in science. The task group met on November 28-30, 1994, and February 21-22 and June 5-6,
1995, to interview managers from NASA and other agencies about their approaches to prioritization
(Appendix H). Several task group teleconferences were also held to discuss findings.
TASK GROUP ON TECHNOLOGY
Unlike the other two task groups that were established specifically for this study, the Task Group on
Technology built directly on previous work of the Joint Committee on Technology (JCT) for Space
2
 Federal Laboratory Review Task Force, NASA Advisory Council, NASA Federal Laboratory Review, February 1995.
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Sciences and Applications operated by the NRC Space Studies Board and the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board. Of particular relevance was the 1993 report3 of the JCT-convened Committee on
Space Science Technology Planning (CSSTP, described further in Chapter 6). The Task Group on
Technology was composed of the eight members of the JCT, assisted by an advisor recently retired from
NASA.
At the beginning of its work, the task group found that its charge (Appendix B) had much in common
with the charge of the CSSTP and approached its task as an augmentation and update of the earlier work.
Unlike the CSSTP study, which was the product of a large workshop, the task group's current assessment
was based on meetings with NASA Headquarters personnel and on three fact-finding visits to the field
centers. To carry out its part of the study, the task group invited NASA Headquarters staff to discuss how
its review might be most effective (August 23-24, 1994) and then requested Headquarters management
briefings (November 14-15, 1994). The task group proceeded with site visits to the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (February 23-24, 1995), the Lewis Research Center (March 30-31, 1995), and the Goddard
Space Flight Center (April 25, 1995). After these visits the task group met with the associate administra-
tors of the three NASA science offices (OSS, OMTPE, and OLMSA) and of the technology office (Office
of Space Access and Technology) to discuss some of its preliminary findings and to receive an update of
the information presented by those offices at its earlier meetings (April 26, 1995). A list of individuals
interviewed by the task groups is provided in Appendix H. The task group also sent a letter (Appendix G)
inviting written comments from the discipline committees of the Space Studies Board and from the
representatives of the 79 member institutions of the University Space Research Association.
An acronym list is provided in Appendix I.
3NRC, Committee on Space Science Technology Planning, Improving NASA's Technology for Space Science, National Academy
Press, Washington, D.C., 1993.
Science at NASA
RATIONALE FOR NASA SCIENCE
Space Science Programs
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 directed NASA to expand human knowledge of the
Earth and space and to preserve U.S. leadership in space science and technology. Thus, although the
motivation for the space program was a forceful political reaction to the successful Soviet launch of
Sputnik, space science was from the very beginning a major element of the program. Indeed, the first
U.S. satellite, Explorer I, launched by the U.S. Army even before the establishment of NASA, was a
scientific satellite carrying micrometeoroid detectors and a Geiger counter as its payload. This first space
science mission discovered the Van Allen radiation belts and began an uninterrupted period of extraordi-
nary discovery and scientific advance that continues today.
Through its commitment to the Space Act goals, NASA ushered in an age of discovery in space
science and astronomy. Not since the pioneering voyages from Western Europe in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries has our understanding of the world we inhabit changed so profoundly. The space
around the Earth has been found to be an amazingly complex collection of fields and particles whose
behavior has significant impact on the Earth and its atmosphere. Humans have walked on a world other
than our home planet, and NASA robotic spacecraft have voyaged to all of the planets except Pluto.
High-resolution images have been obtained of Mars, Jupiter, Saturn and its rings, Neptune, and Uranus,
and the surface of Venus has been mapped by radar. The surfaces of Mercury and of many of the moons
that orbit the planets have been imaged, revealing each as a distinct and separate world with its own
geologic history. Understanding of the processes that have determined the evolution of the atmospheres
and surfaces of these planets can help us develop models of the formation and evolution of the Earth and
of the impact of changing conditions on the evolution of its atmosphere.
NASA has also reached far beyond the solar system in its exploration of the universe. From satellites
above the Earth's atmosphere, NASA has made it possible for the first time to explore the entire
electromagnetic spectrum, from high-energy gamma rays to long-wavelength infrared. The Hubble
Space Telescope has provided images of stars and galaxies unblurred by the Earth's atmosphere. The
Cosmic Background Explorer has provided hints of early density enhancements in the universe that were
the seeds of the structure that we see today. Observations with NASA satellites have given strong
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evidence for the existence of such exotic objects as black holes and have revealed disks of dust and gas
around very young stars that may evolve into planetary systems much like our own.
Equally impressive, space technologies have made possible our current scientific concept of the
Earth as a complex system. From Apollo photographs of the Earth as a blue marble to the recent Shuttle-
based radar images of rain tracks in the Midwest or ancient drainage structures under Middle Eastern
deserts, the space perspective has revolutionized our understanding of atmospheric, oceanic, and land
processes. We have measured centimeter-scale distortions of the Earth's crust associated with plate
tectonics; detected and understood the polar ozone holes; begun to understand the dynamics and
chemistry of the stratosphere and upper atmosphere; correlated climate variations with the Pacific El
Nino and with major volcanic eruptions; learned to use satellite radiometry to estimate global atmospher-
ic temperature and moisture profiles; bounded solar variability; measured the components of the Earth's
radiation budget; and used satellite observations to validate greatly improved atmospheric models for
prediction of weather and climate.
The life sciences, too, were an early element of the NASA program, both for supporting human
spaceflight and for studying fundamental biological processes that occur in the space environment.
When longer-duration operations at zero gravity became possible (Skylab, Shuttle, Spacelab), micro-
gravity science took its place among the space sciences of NASA.
But many challenges and new opportunities remain. It is because of these opportunities for
continued discovery and analysis that the place of space science in the program of NASA has been
repeatedly reaffirmed, both in agency planning and in external reviews. In 1983 the NASA Advisory
Council's Study of the Mission of NASA1 placed space science and exploration at the forefront of the
space mission of NASA (Appendix C). In its 1990 report,2 the Advisory Committee on the Future of the
U.S. Space Program (the Augustine Committee) recommended that, in a balanced space program, highest
priority be given to the space science program in the competition for NASA resources. The committee
ranked science ". . . above space stations, aerospace planes, manned missions to the planets, and many
other major pursuits which often receive greater visibility" (Appendix C). As the basis for its recommen-
dation, the committee cited the central role of NASA in enabling basic discovery and understanding;
gaining fundamental knowledge of our own planet to support improvements in the quality of life for
people on Earth; stimulating education of future scientists; and giving vision, imagination, and direction
to the space program. Subsequently, the NASA Advisory Council, in its 1994 Report on the Recommen-
dations of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program,3 reaffirmed the validity of
most of those findings—and, in particular, those associated with the priority of space science.
Technology for Space Science
Technology for space science includes not only the technologies related to sensors, experimental
apparatuses, and data analysis, but also those necessary for spacecraft and systems technologies such as
spacecraft power, control and structural systems, and information handling. The space sciences have
traditionally used new technologies to enable more ambitious missions for increasingly sophisticated
observations. NASA developed the technologies for large, capable spacecraft and for complex flight
operations for flagship missions like the Hubble Space Telescope and the Magellan Venus Radar
Mapper.
'NASA Advisory Council, Study of the Mission of NASA, October 12, 1983.
2Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, December 1990.
3NAS A Advisory Council, Report on the Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program,
October 1994.
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In general, performance has been favored over economy during most of NASA's history. But in the
1980s, the high cost of programs caused NASA to become increasingly risk-averse. New technologies
were perceived as risky and were avoided unless absolutely necessary to a mission. Recent recognition
that NASA budgets were not only unlikely to grow, but could be expected to decrease, has spawned an
emphasis on "smaller, faster, cheaper" missions. While the focus of technical development has shifted
from ever-increasing capability to cost control, new space science missions and experiments remain
critically dependent on the rapid deployment of new technology. Thus, the balance has shifted to place
more emphasis on technologies for enhanced economy.
NASA has viewed itself as both primary developer and customer for its space technologies. Unlike
its aeronautics programs, where industry and national security are the customers, NASA's spaceflight
programs develop technologies primarily for their own use. Many programs during the Apollo era
invested heavily in technology, and many of those technologies were developed in-house or by contrac-
tors who were closely associated with NASA field centers. At that time, NASA could be considered the
primary national provider of space technology. During the years since Apollo, NASA's emphasis on
operations has increased while its pursuit of new technology has narrowed to focus on specific mission
needs. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense (DoD) has aggressively funded industry, academia, and
government laboratories to develop a broad range of space technologies. As a consequence, DoD
became the primary agent of technological advancement, and industry and academia have become the
primary U.S. developers of new spacecraft technologies and some sensor technologies. Many sensors
used for space science today are the result of industry/university/national laboratory collaborative efforts
and are based on DoD technologies.
MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AT NASA
Space Science
The organization and management of aerospace activities at NASA, including scientific activities,
involve both program/project responsibilities and institutional responsibilities. Programs and projects
are the activities that are conducted to reach the goals and objectives of the agency, while the institution
comprises the academic laboratories, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and the aerospace industries
expected to build the hardware, as well as the NASA staff, facilities and equipment, and plant. Projects
are discrete activities with specific objectives, schedules, and costs. Programs are the broader, more
encompassing scientific endeavors, often including one or more projects, and often defined by scientific
disciplines (e.g., space physics) or narrower fields of science (e.g., Global Geospace Science). NASA
definitions of program and project4 are given in Appendix D.
Program management usually resides at NASA Headquarters within a program office. The program
manager is responsible to the program associate administrator for developing goals and objectives,
planning and defending programs and missions (to NASA and the Administration), managing and
disbursing resources, and administering Headquarters guidelines and controls under which the projects
constituting the program are implemented. Project management usually resides at a field center, and a
project manager is responsible for execution of the project plan by participants, both in and out of
government, and for reporting on status and performance.
Institutional responsibilities of the center director include providing the technical and support staff
for the project and the facilities and equipment needed for success. Field centers report to institutional
associate administrators, who may or may not be the same as the program associate administrator for the
4NASA, Management of Major System Programs and Projects Handbook, NASA Handbook 7120.5, November 22, 1993.
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program in question. Thus, a project manager at a field center reports to a program manager at
Headquarters for program/project matters such as R&D costs and schedules, but to his or her center
director and a (possibly) different institutional associate administrator at Headquarters for the staff,
equipment, and facility support needed to accomplish the project.
The roles and responsibilities of each of the NASA Headquarters offices and field centers are detailed
in NASA Handbook (NHB) 1101.3.5 The current version includes changes through November 22, 1994.
Appendix E gives a summary of the contents particularly relevant to the science programs of NASA.
Table 2.1 shows, for each of the four main science programs, the responsible program office, the field
centers responsible for major elements of that program, and the institutional offices for the centers
involved. There is considerable "cross-involvement," that is, major science activity in a center reporting
institutionally to a Headquarters office other than that responsible for the program. Note that JPL is
shown reporting "institutionally" to OSS. JPL is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) operated by the California Institute of Technology for NASA under contract. At JPL, unlike at
the civil service NASA centers, each responsible science program office funds not only its own
programmatic costs, but also staff, facilities, and equipment (institutional) costs.
These arrangements have changed over time. Table 2.2 shows the evolution of NASA's science
organization since NASA's birth in 1958.6 Highlights of organizational changes among the science
programs through NASA's history have been noted previously. These are shown here, along with
changes in the institutional reporting relationships of the centers. For the most part, but not always, the
centers have reported institutionally to the program offices with which they were principally involved
programmatically. But twice in the agency's history the centers reported to a central agency authority for
institutional purposes (personnel, facilities, general support) while maintaining their programmatic
reporting to the responsible program offices. For a brief period early in the Apollo era (1961 through
TABLE 2.1 Space Science Program and Institutional Management
Science Program Program Office Major Field Centers Institutional Office
Traditional Space Science Office of Space Science
(OSS)
Earth Science
Life Science
Microgravity Science
Office of Mission to Planet
Earth (OMTPE)
Office of Life and
Microgravity Sciences and
Applications (OLMSA)
OLMSA
Goddard Space Right Center
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Marshall Space Flight Center
Johnson Space Center
Ames Research Center
OMTPE
OSS
Office of Space Flight (OSF)
OSF
Office of Aeronautics (OA)
Goddard Space Flight Center OMTPE
Jet Propulsion Laboratory OSS
Stennis Space Center OSF
Langley Research Center OA
Ames Research Center OA
Johnson Space Center OSF
Ames Research Center OA
Marshall Space Flight Center OSF
Lewis Research Center OA
5NASA, The NASA Organization, NASA Handbook 1101.3, September 13, 1994, with changes through November 22, 1994.
6NASA, The Evolution of the NASA Organization, March 1985.
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TABLE 2.2 NASA Science Organization—The Big Picture
Period
Space/Earth Science and
Applications
Microgravity
Science Life Science Field Centers
1958 to 1961 Space Science (later Lunar
and Planetary, Satellites
and Sounding Rockets)
under Space Flight
Development program
office (AA level)
N/A Biology and Life Systems, Reported to
Biosciences Divisions
under Space Flight
Development ('58-'60)
Life Science program
office (AA level)
program
offices
1961 to 1963 Office of Space Science (OSS)
Office of Applications (OA)
OA OART (Biotechnology
and Human Factors)
OSS (Bioscience and
Exobiology)
OMSF (Space Medicine)
Reported to
Associate
Administrator
(Seamans)
1963 to 1972
1972 to 1981
1982 to 1992
Office of Space Science
and Applications
(OSSA)
OSSA
Office of Space Science
Office of Applications (later
Office of Space and
Terrestrial Applications,
OSTA)
Office of Space Science
and Applications
OA (OSTA)
OSSA (Shuttle
and Space
Station
Science)
Same through '70
Consolidated in '71 to
OMSF (except
Exobiology and Aero
Life Science)
Same to '75
Transferred in '75 to
OSS
Same through '92
Reported to
program
offices
GSFC, JPL, WFC
to OSSA
MSFC and JSC to
OMSF
Ames, LaRC, and
LeRC to OAST
Same
In '74 to A A/Center
Operations
In '78 to
Administrator
In '82 back to
program
offices as before
(WFC to GSFC)
1993 to date Office of Space Science
Office of Mission to Planet
Earth
Office of Life OLMSA
and
Microgravity
Sciences and
Applications
Same, but GSFC to
OMTPE
1963), all the centers reported to an associate administrator and secured institutional resources from that
office. Institutional reporting to appropriate program offices was reinstituted after 1963, and remained in
effect until 1974. From 1963 through 1974 the OSSA associate administrator controlled all the elements
essential to the management of space sciences, that is, the science program content, the budget, the
transportation system, and the institutions involved. Even tracking and data acquisition, though the
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province of another associate administrator, were managed by the OSSA centers, GSFC and JPL, giving
OSSA effective control of all the infrastructure required to conduct the science program.
This situation changed in 1974, when the Administrator placed the NASA field centers under an
Associate Administrator for Center Operations and transferred expendable (unmanned) launch vehicles
to another program office. The Office of Space Science (having relinquished Applications in 1972) now
had to secure institutional and other infrastructure resources from others. For the next eight years, the
centers reported centrally (from 1974 to 1978 to the Associate Administrator for Center Operations and
from 1978 to 1982 to the Administrator himself)-
The reorganization of 1982 returned institutional responsibility to the program offices, with OSSA
regaining responsibility for GSFC and JPL. When the science programs were split in late 1992,
institutional responsibility for GSFC went to the Office of Mission to Planet Earth and responsibility for
JPL went to the Office of Space Science.
Appendix J provides a current organization chart for NASA.
In May 1994, NASA published a new strategic plan. This plan was refined and re-released in
February 1995. A major feature of these new plans was the introduction of the "strategic enterprises."
These enterprises form the framework in which strategic planning for the agency is being conducted. The
division of NASA's programs into these separate categories explicitly reflects the new orientation toward
serving external "customers"—agency analysis concluded that different elements of NASA's overall
program served distinct external customer communities, and the enterprises are structured to focus on the
specific needs and interests of these communities. Thus, the enterprises were devised as a planning aid
for agency strategic planning. In the words of the 1995 plan:
The NASA Strategic Plan establishes a framework for making management decisions by separating key
Agency activities into the distinctly different categories of externally focused Strategic Enterprises and
internally focused Strategic Functions—ends and means Each of our Strategic Enterprises are analogous
to strategic business units, employed by private sector companies to focus on and respond to its customers'
needs. Each Strategic Enterprise has a unique set of strategic goals, objectives, and concerns with a unique
set of primary external customers.7
NASA's analysis of its "customer base" led to the definition of five strategic enterprises: Mission to
Planet Earth, Aeronautics, Human Exploration and Development of Space, Space Science, and Space
Technology. Three major supporting "strategic functions" were identified: Space Communications,
Human Resources, and Physical Resources. The strategic function and enterprise framework is illustrat-
ed in Figure 2.1, which also shows top-level results of the agency's customer analysis and its relationship
to the strategic enterprises.
The mapping of NASA's three major science offices and their flight projects and research programs
into the strategic enterprises is straightforward: the Office of Space Science into the Space Science
Enterprise; the Office of Mission to Planet Earth into the Mission to Planet Earth Enterprise; and the
Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications into the Human Exploration and Develop-
ment of Space Enterprise, which it shares with the Office of Space Flight. These two program offices
share Human Exploration and Development Enterprise leadership.
Initially, the enterprises were essentially a planning overlay onto the traditional program offices, but
NASA is using them increasingly as its primary management entities. The development and evolution of
the strategic enterprise approach are determined from, and in turn influence, NASA's relationships with
outside communities, and an understanding of this approach is crucial background to many of the
committee's findings and recommendations.
Establishment of the enterprises does not address split program and institutional management
7NASA, NASA Strategic Plan, February 1995, pp. 4 and 6.
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FIGURE 2.1 NASA strategic plan framework. SOURCE: 1995 NASA Strategic Plan..
responsibilities at field centers. While there is some move toward consolidation of individual science
programs at fewer centers, there is little likelihood that programs will be so concentrated as to be
conducted exclusively at one or more centers dedicated solely to that, program. In particular, Earth
science, astrophysics, and space physics are all expected to remain major elements at GSFC, a center
reporting institutionally to OMTPE; at the same time, no center reports institutionally to OLMSA, in
spite of its life and microgravity science programs. Thus, the question of center reporting and center
program alignment must also be addressed in examination of organizational alternatives.
Technology for Space Science
Technology development for the space sciences occurs in four NASA offices: the Office of Space
Access and Technology (OSAT), the Office of Space Science (OSS), the Office of Mission to Planet
Earth (OMTPE), and the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications (OLMSA). These
space science technologies in turn support all four of NASA's strategic space enterprises: Space
Technology, Space Science, Mission to Planet Earth, and Human Exploration and Development of
Space. The identification, development, and utilization of technologies for.the space sciences ultimately
depend on effective management and cooperation among these four offices.
Each of the four offices manages its technology development differently'.\ .OSAT is responsible for
developing generic space sensor, vehicle, and system technologies for OSS.and OMTPE. OSAT was
created in September 1994 by merging the Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology (OACT) with
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the Office of Space Systems Development. (OACT, in turn, had been formed in 1992 from the space
portion of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) and the Office of Commercial
Programs. Prior to this, OAST had received many of the remnants of the Office of Exploration when that
office was eliminated in 1993.) OSAT is now the only office in NASA's Space Technology Enterprise.
Its four goals are to "[1] reduce the cost of access to space; [2] provide innovative technologies to enable
ambitious, future space missions; [3] build capability in the U.S. space industry through focused space
technology efforts; and [4] share the harvest of space technology with the U.S. industrial community."8
The second goal is common to each of OSAT's organizational predecessors and is of primary relevance
to the present study. Within OSAT, the Spacecraft Systems Development Division has the responsibility
for developing space science technology.
OSAT projects may span the needs of more than one office or of multiple divisions within an office,
or they may address a specific need of a single science division. Until 1994, OSAT's strategy was to
dedicate 40 percent of its budget to near-term projects (less than five years to deployment) and 60 percent
to far-term projects. OSAT's current strategy is to devote 80 percent of its resources to near-term projects
and 20 percent to far-term projects. In spite of this, OSAT's work in technology development for space
science is, with a few exceptions, not tied to missions that are currently funded and under development by
a science office.
The three science offices—OSS, OMTPE, and OLMSA—and their divisions have disparate levels of
effort and organizational commitments to their advanced technology programs. In general, they under-
take two types of technology development—(1) that which is part of an approved flight project and (2)
Advanced Technology Development (ATD), which expands future capabilities or enables future projects.
Budgets and management of the former are submerged within specific flight projects, while ATD
projects appear under ATD accounts in OSS and OLMSA. OMTPE does not have a separate ATD
account.
The Office of Space Science produced the Office of Space Science Integrated Technology Strategy
(April 1994) to define its technology programs and plans. This strategy has been approved and its
implementation begun. Each of the three OSS divisions (astrophysics, space physics, and solar system
exploration) supports ATD projects that they have identified as necessary for future missions and works
with OSAT to ensure that OSAT projects are responsive to OSS needs. Each division has an individual
who is responsible for managing its ATD projects. OSS also has an assistant associate administrator
dedicated to ensuring that the technology that OSS will need is being developed. OSS has negotiated a
significant level of effort by OSAT, and the OSS Integrated Technology Strategy was developed with
help from OSAT's predecessor, OACT. Funds within OSS for ATD are limited, but the OSS ATD
program is organized, well-administered, and responsive to inputs from the external community.
In 1994 the Office of Mission to Planet Earth created a staff office for "Technology Innovation and
Advanced Planning." This office is responsible for determining technology readiness, identifying
infusion opportunities, and coordinating and prioritizing technology "push" and mission "pull" projects.
Before establishing this office, OMTPE did not have its own ATD program, but negotiated its generic
technology needs with OSAT's predecessors. OMTPE is evolving a process for identifying and
developing new technologies and infusing them into its flight projects. For example, where OMTPE
once focused primarily on sensor technologies for instruments, it is now a team member on the OSAT
Small Satellite Technology Initiative (SSTI) program, on the OSS Future Micro-Spacecraft Initiatives,
and on the New Millennium program. While progress is being made, OMTPE does not yet have an
agreement with OSAT concerning OMTPE technology needs. They have not yet resolved how needs are
to be identified and prioritized, how the technologies will transition from OSAT to OMTPE funding, or
how new technologies will be demonstrated.
8OSAT Associate Administrator J. Mansfield, briefing, April 26, 1995.
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The Office of Life and Microgravity Science and Applications has two divisions with responsibility
for carrying out scientific research in space: the Microgravity Science and Applications Division
(MSAD) and the Life and Biomedical Sciences and Applications Division (LBSAD). Most of OLMSA's
space-based research takes place on the Space Shuttle, and a transition to the Space Station is expected
later in the decade. Thus, OLMSA technologies for space science are not "spacecraft technologies," in
the sense of OSS and OMTPE technologies. The primary focus of OLMSA technologies is to enable the
study of physical phenomena that are unique to the space environment or that occur differently in space
than they do on the Earth's surface. Both MSAD and LBSAD have small, in-house, ATD programs
dedicated to near-term technology needs, and OLSMA has recently received from OS AT the responsibil-
ity, along with some funding, for advanced technologies in support of future human missions (e.g.,
advanced physicochemical life support systems and extravehicular activity suits). OSAT has traditional-
ly done little work based on OLMSA's stated needs and currently shows little interest in its needs for new
technology. While OLMSA and OSAT have had several draft technology development plans and
agreements, they did not have an approved plan for increasing technology development work for life and
microgravity sciences at the time of the current review.
THE BUDGET FOR SPACE SCIENCE AT NASA
Space Science Budgets
For the purpose of the present study, the space sciences are defined as the science elements of the
program of the Office of Space Science and Applications in the years leading up to the 1992-1993
reorganization. This includes the traditional space sciences in the present Office of Space Science
(astrophysics, space physics, and solar system exploration), the Earth sciences in the Office of Mission to
Planet Earth, and the life and microgravity sciences in the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and
Applications. Omitted are aerospace engineering sciences, which are managed in other program offices
and generally relate to the means for conducting spaceflight programs, rather than to their goals.
The NASA budget graphically demonstrates the importance accorded to space science. Figure 2.2
shows, in constant 1994 dollars, the actual NASA budget from 1982 to the present, and funding to the
year 2000 as projected in the President's budget submitted to the Congress for FY 1996. The funding
curves divide the NASA budget in three parts: Space Science R&D, Space Science Support, and Other
NASA. Space Science R&D funds are the R&D (budget category) funds allocated directly for space
science programs as defined for the present study, that is, traditional space science, Earth science, and life
and microgravity sciences. Space Science Support includes those costs from other budget categories that
may be attributed to support of space science; they include an appropriate portion of civil service
personnel, expendable vehicle launch, facilities, and tracking costs, as estimated by NASA. The category
Other NASA encompasses all the rest, from aeronautics to Space Station and the corresponding support
costs. Because the Shuttle is built and maintained for many national purposes, its costs are excluded from
Space Science Support budgets presented here and included in the category Other NASA.
In Figure 2.2, the NASA total is seen to rise essentially monotonically to just over $15 billion in
1992, after which it begins a decline to an expected level of $12.5 billion by 2000 (as projected in the FY
1996 budget submission). This decline reflects recent and continuing efforts to reduce the federal budget
deficit. Both Space Science R&D and Space Science Support climb correspondingly, with peaks around
1995 before they begin to decline. The FY 1996 President's Budget included a proposed "middle-class
tax cut," which required additional budget reductions for agencies relative to their earlier plans. The total
reduction for NASA came to about $5 billion for fiscal years 1997 through 2000, distributed over those
years as shown in Figure 2.2 for the total.
Funding for the elements of NASA's Space Science R&D program, Traditional Space Science R&D,
Mission to Planet Earth R&D, and Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications R&D, is shown in
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Figure 2.3. These data show the peak funding for the total reaching nearly $4 billion in FY 1995, with a
drop-off to just over $3 billion by FY 2000. However, the individual components show that the latter two
R&D elements remain roughly constant (at approximately $1.3 billion and $0.5 billion, respectively) for
the last half of the present decade while R&D funding for the Traditional Space Science R&D program
declines during the same period by about 35 percent, that is, from about $2 billion to about $1.3 billion.
This decline results largely from completion of the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility and the Cassini
spacecraft and does not include initiation of any new activities of comparable scale.
The components of Space Science Support are detailed for the same years in Figure 2.4. Figure 2.5
shows Space Science R&D and Total Space Sciences (defined as the sum of Space Sciences R&D and
Support) as a percentage of the total NASA budget for the same years as displayed in the other figures.
During this period, Space Science R&D averages 20 percent of the total NASA budget, a figure
frequently cited. In detail, it is seen here to have grown beyond that value by FY 1994, reaching a level
of about 25 percent at the present. It is projected to remain there through the year 2000.
Clearly, up to the present, the space science budget has reflected the importance ascribed to science
by the Space Act and subsequent reports cited above. However, the coming years will be a period of
transition for NASA science, with shifting priorities among the sciences and with great pressure on the
NASA budget as a whole.
Technology Budgets
The strategy of using new technologies to counter shrinking budgets will require that NASA invest
more, and with greater effectiveness, in acquiring or developing relevant technologies. Figure 2.6 shows
the funding levels at NASA in support of technology for the space sciences in FY 1992 and 1995. In the
last three years the NASA science and technology offices have responded unevenly. OSS has increased
its ATD investment, while OSAT's work on behalf of OSS has decreased. OMTPE's ATD investment
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has remained difficult to quantify, while work on behalf of OMTPE has increased. OLMSA's ATD
programs have remained small, but overall technology development spending at OLMSA has increased,
due partially to the transfer of some technology responsibilities from OS AT to OLMSA. OSAT's work
on OLMSA's stated science needs currently constitutes just a few selected efforts. Figure 2.7 shows that
during this same period OSAT has shifted its funding to near-term needs from far-term needs. The total
funding for FY 1995 devoted to advanced technology development, demonstration, and infusion related
to the space sciences is clearly increased over that in 1992, but is not convincingly adequate to support
NASA's current goals for rapidly developing and infusing new technologies into flight missions.
NASA SCIENCE RELATIONSHIPS
Throughout its 37 years, NASA has maintained a wide range of relationships with other parties, both
in the United States and abroad, in the conduct of its programs, including those in the space sciences. The
interactions between NASA and these other parties are of three general kinds: (1) cooperative partner-
ships with others to achieve direct scientific objectives; (2) arrangements in which NASA provides
scientific information, instruments, or equipment to others, on either a reimbursable or non-reimbursable
basis, for use in achieving scientific objectives; and (3) arrangements in which NASA obtains research
from others on either a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. The first two kinds and the non-
reimbursable arrangement of the third kind are generally established by international or interagency
agreements and are most often established (for NASA) at the Headquarters level. The following
discussion sketches their number and range. Reimbursable arrangements of the third kind consist of
awards of grants or contracts for the conduct of research, and these can be executed at either Headquarters
or a NASA field center.
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International Agreements
The largest number of agreements for cooperative activities are international agreements, either with
agencies of other nations or with one or more international agencies, such as the European Space Agency
(ESA). Some international agreements are of such importance that they are established by exchanges of
diplomatic notes or by govemment-to-government agreements, in some cases executed even by heads of
state. In cooperative agreements, each party agrees to certain actions toward a mutual end. Generally, no
funds or other resources change hands; that is, each party funds its own part of the cooperative activity,
and all the parts are coordinated to achieve the joint goal. However, some agreements include provisions
for the furnishing or loan of instruments or equipment by one party to the other.
Over the years, several thousand international agreements have been successfully concluded and
implemented. Many of these agreements, such as Helios, were made to accomplish Administration or
State Department goals and then jointly modified by OSSA and its foreign counterpart to maximize the
scientific results of the mission. At present, more than 400 are in place with about 140 national agencies
and other foreign bodies in more than 40 countries. A great many of the agreements are aimed at
achieving space science objectives, ranging in scope from the mundane (e.g., bilateral technical docu-
ment exchange programs) to the exotic (e.g., Solar Probe, a potential joint mission with Russia to explore
the Sun's corona). All of the space sciences are represented among these agreements, with particular
emphasis on cooperative endeavors in astrophysics, space physics, and solar system exploration with
ESA and its member nations, as well as with Russia and Japan. Life science is prominent in the
agreements with Russia, which has extensive experience in long-duration human spaceflight. Once
barriers obstructing access to these life science data are overcome and differences in objectives and
protocols are compensated for, these data could provide much information for research on the effects of
the space environment on humans and on countermeasures. Earth science agreements are in place among
many nations, including many of the smaller nations interested in environmental and resource surveys
(e.g., collection of environmental data with Mongolia).
While the great majority of the international agreements are for the achievement of scientific
objectives, some have been aimed at international—even global—policy issues. For example, an
international meeting in 1987 leaned heavily on the results of space research to develop the "Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer." That protocol and several revisions to it deal
with reduction of the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as a means to counter the reduction in
stratospheric ozone.
Interagency Agreements
Interagency agreements include agreements both with other agencies of the federal government and
with agencies of state and local governments. Approximately 600 such agreements are currently on the
books; the partners are the 11 cabinet departments, the military services, various other federal agencies,
and elements of the governments of 14 states and Puerto Rico. Science is widely represented among
these agreements, although many agreements, especially with the military services, relate to aeronautics
and to joint operations of space infrastructure elements. A number of agreements with the National
Science Foundation are aimed at astrophysics and space physics, and life science is the subject of a
number of research agreements with the Department of Health and Human Services. Earth science is a
key element of agreements with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce (NOAA), and the Interior
and with the Environmental Protection Agency.
The long NASA/NOAA relationship provides an excellent example of interagency partnership. For
the first 20 to 25 years of the U.S. civil space activities, NASA and NOAA worked cooperatively toward
the development of satellites to serve the weather forecasting responsibilities of NOAA. NASA
conducted most of the R&D related to NOAA requirements. It oversaw the construction, launch, and
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check-out of operational satellites and then turned their operation over to NOAA. With termination of the
Operational Satellite Improvement Program in 1982, NASA stopped its R&D for sensors and instruments
meeting NOAA requirements, except where NASA requirements were also met. Today, NASA, NOAA,
and DoD are cooperating in merging civil and military meteorology satellite systems. In the new
partnership, DoD will lead in systems acquisition, NOAA in system operations, and NASA in new
technology development. Although NASA will contribute four staff members to the integrated program
office, including the Assistant Director for Technology Transition, it will contribute no program funds.
Full convergence of the programs is expected by 2005, including a European component.
The Office of Mission to Planet Earth will employ the Earth Observing System (EOS)—an extensive
set of sensors on several platforms in low Earth orbit—to monitor, for 15 years, elements of the
atmosphere, oceans, and land for climate change research. Data from EOS will be archived and
disseminated by the EOS Data and Information Service (EOSDIS). While NOAA also pursues research
in climate change and has its own satellites and data and information system (the National Environmental
Satellite Data and Information System—NESDIS), there have not been serious attempts to converge
these programs where objectives or hardware could be shared. Although some of the EOS instruments
are thought of as precursors to NOAA operational instruments and a mature EOSDIS would be operated
by NESDIS, NOAA has expressed reservations about absorbing these technologies because it perceives
them to be unsuited to its operational program.9 An operational transition might have been easier if
NOAA and NASA had originally sought common ground through a technology planning process for
their sensors, satellites, and data management systems.
Management Considerations
The great majority of the agreements, whether international or interagency, are negotiated at the
NASA Headquarters level. On the NASA side, they involve the program office having responsibility for
the program or activity involved and an appropriate staff office having responsibility for facilitating
interactions with the partner. Field center staff may also be involved, but the lead in these agreements is
usually with Headquarters. International agreements are the responsibility of the International Relations
Division of the Office of External Relations, which also interfaces with the Department of State, the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and other agencies as needed for interagency review
and coordination purposes. Interagency agreements (both defense and civil sector) are the staff responsi-
bility of the Defense Affairs Division of the Office of External Relations.
Because of the policy nature of international and interagency agreements and the growing mandate
for international collaboration, responsibility for these agreements appears to be a necessary Headquar-
ters function. Adequate staff must be provided to support their establishment and successful implemen-
tation.
HOW OTHERS MANAGE SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGY
Appendix F describes research management approaches of four other government agencies—the
National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Energy
(DOE), and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of DoD. The approaches of NSF, NIH,
and DOE are compared here to those of NASA's science programs, while ARPA's approach is more
appropriately compared to that of NASA's advanced technology program.
9NRC, Committee on Earth Studies of the Space Studies Board, Earth Observations from Space: History, Promise, and Reality,
1995, in press.
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Science—NSF, NIH, DOE, and NASA
NSF broadly supports basic research in science and engineering, focusing on three general types of
research: support for individual investigators or small groups (the dominant type); support for large
groups, field operations, and centers (such as the Engineering Research Centers); and support for national
user facilities (such as telescopes, oceanographic research vessels, and particle accelerators). Unlike NIH
or DOE, NSF neither conducts research or development nor constructs or operates any research facilities
itself, that is, with NSF employees. Although NSF does own a number of major research facilities, it
operates them by using contractors, which are almost exclusively universities or university consortia.
With the mission to improve the health of the people of the United States and other nations, NIH is
the largest single supporter of basic and applied biomedical research in the world. The major structural
units of NIH are its 17 national institutes, each with its own authorizing legislation and appropriation.
Most have an "extramural program" component and an "intramural program" component, each reporting
to the institute director. The extramural programs provide support to the external community through a
variety of grant and contract instruments. The intramural program, included in all but one of the
institutes, supports scientists working in federal laboratories and accounts for 11 percent of the NIH
budget.
The DOE programs are basic and applied science and engineering in energy-related fields. DOE's
research is carried out in its national laboratories and in an extensive extramural program. Most of the
basic research efforts make use of large facilities at the laboratories, such as particle accelerators, nuclear
reactors, synchrotron light sources, and electron microscopes. Though located at the national laborato-
ries, these facilities are operated for the benefit of the entire user community—scientists at universities,
other laboratories, and industry, as well as the in-house staff. Applied research (energy programs,
environmental cleanup, and defense programs) work is generally carried out at the DOE laboratories.
NASA and these three organizations make extensive use of peer review in the selection of proposals
for funding. NIH employs a two-level "outside" review process for its extramural research program, the
bulk of its program. The first level is a scientific and technical review by outside scientists who are peers
of the proposers and who evaluate based solely on scientific merit. The second level is conducted by
National Advisory Councils, composed of both scientists and members of the general public, and
considers program relevance as well as scientific merit. Proposals surviving both rounds of review are
eligible for funding, although resource limitations preclude support of all eligible proposals. Although
NSF employs the peer review process for proposal ranking, NSF program managers have some flexibility
in making award decisions because the reviews and reviewer rankings and comments are considered
advisory. DOE has very extensive scientific research programs in both basic and applied areas. Peer
review is extensively used in evaluating the basic research, but less so in applied programs. Budget
decisions are made by program officers at DOE Headquarters.
NASA's peer review system, both for proposals responding to NASA research announcements
(NRAs—generally to conduct ground-based or suborbital flight research) and for those responding to
announcements of opportunity (AOs—to conduct investigations on a flight project), is similar to that of
the NSF. The peer review rankings are considered advisory, though given considerable weight. Funding
decisions are then made by program managers, at the division director level for NRA proposals and at the
associate administrator level for AO proposals. Prior to reaching the associate administrator for decision,
AO proposals must also be reviewed by an internal NASA program review panel, which considers not
only scientific merit but also programmatic factors.
NASA's science program involves one feature, major flight projects, not present in the programs of
the other three agencies. Although the NASA ground-based, suborbital, Explorer, and Discovery
programs are largely determined by the peer review process outlined above, the larger flight projects
require separate Administration and congressional approval and are subjected to separate internal review
and approval processes. Individual flight investigations to be carried on these missions are selected by
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peer review, but approval of the project itself involves many other factors (e.g., economic, national, and
international policy) as well. These major flight projects are somewhat analogous to major NSF and
DOE facility projects.
In NASA the scientists at its field centers generally compete with scientists from the outside, both for
flight investigations and for ground-based research, and their proposals face the same peer review.
(Recently, this principle has been expanded within the agency's life sciences programs.) NASA
scientists also carry out institutional service functions, being responsible at Headquarters for the scientif-
ic aspects of Headquarters-managed programs and at the centers for an analogous role in flight projects
and missions.
As noted, NSF does not itself conduct research and development. NTH does conduct in-house
research (its intramural program) at federal laboratories, but the great majority of its research is
extramural. Of the agencies considered, DOE comes closest to resembling the NASA model of having
major in-house institutions while sponsoring extensive out-of-house research. DOE differs from NASA
in that the national laboratories (its "field centers") are all government-owned, contractor-operated
(GOCO) facilities like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. There are no civil service employees at DOE
laboratories. The laboratories that emphasize basic research in their missions are generally operated by
universities or by university consortia. Others are operated by industrial organizations. This has been a
strength of the DOE research effort and is one of the reasons for the interest shown by other agencies in
the GOCO mode of operation.
Advanced Technology—ARPA and NASA
By design, the program of ARPA addresses science and technology at the high-risk, high-payoff
frontier of defense research science and engineering. When it was created, ARPA did not establish a
research institution to conduct its activities, choosing instead to seek out the most able investigators
wherever they could be found. Because of the national importance of its projects and the frontier nature
of their scientific content, ARPA has been able to attract the most capable scientists, engineers, and
project managers to participate. A typical project lifetime is three or four years, after which its team may
be disbanded, leaving ARPA no further obligation to fund it. Thus ARPA avoids the burden and
inflexibility of maintaining a captive scientific workforce in a dynamic research environment.
ARPA policy has been to provide term appointments to its program management staff, which is
composed of discipline scientists and engineers from the research environments in which ARPA works
and of technically trained military officers. Typically, terms are for three years, with the option of up to
two one-year extensions at the ARPA director's discretion. Motivation to serve in these positions is high
because of the dynamic research setting, minimal bureaucracy, and the significant discretion given the
managers in spending $10 million to $20 million per year on projects agreed upon with the director.
ARPA projects are selected for their relevance to DoD's mission, overall national importance, and
potential for order-of-magnitude performance improvements. Program managers have considerable
autonomy in selecting projects, and peer review is not employed because of the belief that it would lead
to incremental, rather than revolutionary, advances. The processes employed by ARPA in supporting
such research are less formal than those of other agencies. The success of the ARPA program in such
areas as space surveillance, high-energy laser weaponry, and computer network communications testifies
to the success of this approach and suggests that an optimal scientific research program could employ
elements of both peer-reviewed research and exploratory research outside of conventional thinking.
As outlined above, advanced technology in NASA is the responsibility of both the mission program
offices (OSS, OLMSA, and OMTPE for space science) and the Office of Space Access and Technology
(OSAT). The mission offices typically focus on technologies for instruments and sensors and technolo-
gies for projects in development and those likely to be initiated in the near future. OSAT generally
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addresses technologies that cut across the responsibilities of the mission offices (e.g., spacecraft system
and subsystem technologies, launch technologies) and exploratory technologies potentially applicable to
missions of the more distant future. In both areas, NASA exercises field center capabilities in carrying
out technology projects, either as in-house projects or through contracts with outside sources. The
exploratory technology program of OSAT most nearly resembles the ARPA program in purpose—
advancement of potentially high payoff technologies for future space missions. But the way it is
conducted is quite different, relying, as it does, on an essentially permanent management staff in
Headquarters and a large, also permanent, research establishment at the field centers.
The Changing Environment for Science at NASA
The conditions under which NASA now operates are vastly different from those that existed when it
was founded and under which many of its ground rules and traditions were established. Recognizing
these differences is essential to deriving a new set of operating maxims. Addressed below are the
changes in the environment that are especially relevant to the sciences.
RATIONALE FOR SPACE SCIENCE
Space science began with the use of sounding rockets immediately after World War II and rapidly
evolved with the advent of satellites—indeed, the first satellite was scientific, conceived in conjunction
with the International Geophysical Year. A major boost came with the creation of NASA and with the
"space race," leading to a vigorous exploration program consisting of planetary, space physics, and
astronomical missions. Initially, most scientific investigations were carried out primarily for science's
sake. Later, when NASA was a major player in space applications programs and especially in those years
when science and applications resided in the same program office, Earth science was conducted with an
eye toward useful applications as well as for science's sake. Nevertheless, even there science was the
dominant rationale.
Today there is an increased interest in applications of scientific advancements for direct public and
commercial benefit and in transfer to the larger technical communities of technological innovations
stimulated by science missions. Ironically, when space applications programs were turned over to the
mission agencies (e.g., NOAA), some of the more effective linkages between science and technology
were lost, so that the utility of space applications programs has diminished, counter to prevailing policy.
BUDGET ISSUES
Much of the planning for space science in the late 1980s assumed continued real total budget growth
and maintenance of science at the level of 20 percent of the total NASA budget. Now it has become clear
that the best that can be expected is a level budget in current ("then-year") dollars, and thus a declining
budget in real terms. Indeed, in the President's Budget for FY 1996 submitted to the Congress in
February 1995, the budget for NASA is projected to fall by about 8 percent by the year 2000 in current
dollars, almost 20 percent in real terms. The corresponding decrease in the real science budget is almost
as large, about 16 percent for science R&D and science support, taken together (see Figure 2.2). While
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the budget plan for the next five years seems to reflect a continued high priority for science, the fencing-
off of the International Space Station at a fixed annual level of $2.1 billion and the Space Station's
essential need for Shuttle support potentially expose NASA's science programs to further budget
reductions.
The space technology budget is equally vulnerable. New spacecraft and instrument technologies
offer the potential for more productive science missions at lower cost, yet this potential may not be
realized without adequate investment in the development of those technologies. Further, the space
technology program includes the NASA part of advanced launch vehicle development. Though that
program offers to eventually lower costs for transportation to space, it will, for the near future, compete
for already limited technology funds.
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF MISSIONS AND TECHNOLOGY
Missions
The early NASA spacecraft programs were implemented relatively rapidly and inexpensively, two-
to three-year developments being the norm. As the space sciences matured during the 1970s and 1980s,
the expanding knowledge base exerted pressure for more sophisticated measurements and more capable
missions. These demands, along with administrative delays, led to greater expense and to longer
projects. Where most cradle-to-grave project lifetimes during the Apollo era were a few years, major
projects started in the late 1970s through the early 1990s often extended over a decade. By the 1980s,
with "flagship" missions costing a billion dollars or more, it became evident that very few such missions
could be mounted; that if they were, there would be no room for complementary missions; and that if they
failed, their loss would be highly damaging. Higher costs and longer projects meant that individual
investigators had fewer flight opportunities. Principal investigators of large projects became less willing
to risk compromising quality, capability, or reliability to reduce mission costs. Because new technolo-
gies often appear risky, managers were wary of using them on very large space science projects,
dampening the infusion of new technologies. Figure 3.1 shows schematically the large mission approach
that prevailed at NASA until recently, an approach that led to sporadic, but often ground-breaking or
astounding scientific results.
Ultimately, the evolution toward ever larger and longer projects became unsustainable and led to a
backlash toward "smaller, faster, cheaper" missions. When combined with today's diminishing budgets,
the 25-year ratcheting growth of mission cost and duration has reduced flight opportunities in many
disciplines to the point where it has become difficult to maintain scientific vigor. While in some
disciplines big missions may be necessary to produce seminal science, small projects are the seed corn in
many others. Small projects are incubators of new ideas and of new scientific talent, and the exposure of
student scientists and engineers to NASA technologies through small projects is a very effective
mechanism for technology transfer.
One early response was the creation of the Planetary Observer concept for a series of somewhat
smaller planetary exploration missions to be funded annually at about a constant level, analogous to the
Earth-orbital Explorer family. (This concept for an annually funded series was never developed
according to original precepts, and only the ill-fated Mars Observer mission was implemented.) Later,
advisory groups also concluded that, while some objectives might only be achievable through large
missions, a larger number of small missions could offer significant scientific advancements in reasonable
time scales while encouraging technological innovation.1'2
'Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, December 1990.
2
 Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board, The Future of the U.S. Industrial Base, November 1992.
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To get new scientific results
more sophisticated
measurements are needed
Missions produce
new scientific results
Missions get larger,
more expensive, and
take longer to develop
Pis on missions are less willing
to risk compromising capability
or reliability to cut costs
Total Elapsed Time: —10 years
FIGURE 3.1 The past approach to space science missions.
When budget constraints became even tighter, the need for still smaller missions was recognized for
FY 1992 planning in space physics, where a series of "intermediate missions," missions costing on the
order of $200 million, was proposed. Solar system exploration joined the trend to smaller missions with
the Discovery program; restructuring of the Explorer program (astrophysics and space physics) to focus
on small and medium Explorer missions was also begun. Not only fiscal constraints, but also the
occurrence of cost overruns, delays, and failures of the larger missions, with the attendant high cost
penalty (e.g., Mars Observer, Hubble Space Telescope corrective optics), contributed to the trend toward
smaller missions at a higher flight rate. Upon his arrival at NASA in spring 1992, Administrator Daniel
S. Goldin accelerated the trend toward "smaller, faster, cheaper" missions employing advanced technol-
ogies, carefully focused mission objectives, lower-cost launch vehicles, simpler management techniques,
and, where appropriate, reduced management oversight.
The foregoing discussion of the trend from large missions to "smaller-faster-cheaper" in space
science does not answer the important question of whether the approach now being taken will yield more
or less "science per dollar." In spite of the many obvious advantages of a frequent flight rate, this is a
complex issue and outside the scope of the present study. Rather, the changing mix of mission sizes was
taken as a given for the purposes of analyzing management options for NASA's space science program.
Technology for Space Science
During the heyday of the large missions, one consequence of the intense competition for costly flight
projects was to encourage the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) to build up in-house science and engineering competence that could conceive, develop, and fly
flagship missions. Unwelcome by-products of this apparent self-sufficiency were isolation of the flight
centers from outside technologies and domination of flight projects by in-house perspectives on technol-
ogy. Such insularity is counter to the premise that science is strengthened by open access to ideas and
technology. It is also counter to the premise that NASA scientists enable science in space for the broader
scientific community.
NASA has recognized these problems and is using technology to encourage industry and university
participation in new programs such as Discovery, Small Explorer (SMEX), mid-size Explorer (MidEX),
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To get new scientific results
more sophisticated
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new scientific results
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Total Elapsed Time: ~3 years
FIGURE 3.2 The current approach to space science missions.
Small Satellite Technology Initiative (SSTI—the Lewis and Clark projects), and New Millennium. To
achieve higher flight rates at lower costs, NASA proposes across-the-board efforts to incorporate new
technologies in flight and ground hardware and in processes for managing flight projects. NASA
management has gone so far as to reject proposed flight projects that would achieve their scientific goals
but did not include proposals for significant new technologies. The agency is also exploring innovative
ways to accomplish significant science with smaller spacecraft. For example, it is investigating the
feasibility of satisfying the need for large apertures and simultaneous observations with a constellation of
small spacecraft. Not only would this avoid the cost and risk of large and complex platforms, but
distributed observing systems offer the possibility of large synthetic apertures and their greater spatial
resolution.
Figure 3.2 shows the new approach that NASA is now adopting to create an ongoing stream of
scientific results by increasing the number of flight missions and increasing the use of new technologies.
THE GROWTH OF CAPABILITIES OUTSIDE OF NASA
NASA was formed in response to a political situation in which the United States was perceived as
ominously lagging the Soviet Union in space capability. Space science became a major component of the
emerging space program soon after. At that time, there was little expertise in either space science per se
or in spacecraft or launch vehicle development anywhere but in government laboratories (e.g., the U.S.
Army Redstone Arsenal, the Naval Research Laboratory, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronau-
tics, and JPL). During the next several decades, capability in the space sciences was successfully fostered
by NASA in the university community, resulting in a capability that in most areas of the space sciences
equals or exceeds that present in government laboratories. Similarly, in spacecraft design and construc-
tion there are a number of competitive major aerospace contractors that have the capability to design,
build, and operate major spacecraft. Recently, a number of smaller companies have been formed to
concentrate on the small end of the spacecraft market. NASA no longer has a monopoly on technical
competence; the balance of work between in-house and contracted effort must be reexamined.
A part of NASA's charter has been to transfer its technologies to U.S. industry to improve
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international competitiveness and to U.S. universities to improve science and engineering education.
NASA has been extremely successful in both of these areas. This transfer, when combined with the large
investments in industrial space technology by DoD over the past quarter-century, has shifted leadership
in many cutting-edge technologies from NASA toward industry and academia. NASA now possesses
centers of excellence in particular technologies, but none of the NASA field centers is a world leader in
every space technology.
NASA's culture has not evolved with these realities. The flight centers are insular, and flight projects
are overly dominated by resident technologies and methodologies. The ethos of "not invented here" can
go so far that technologies are not shared between GSFC and JPL and these flight centers do not seek
technologies from NASA's research centers such as Lewis or Ames. When centers do not voluntarily
communicate and work with each other, contractors with jobs at two or more centers often provide the
only effective transfer of technologies among centers. The NASA Administrator is attempting to move
this insular culture toward a recognition that NASA is now part of a larger technology community, that
NASA is obligated to contribute to that community, and that it is wise to draw from it for its own
programs.
Because NASA has not had an agency-wide technology planning effort since the 1991 Integrated
Technology Plan, there has been no forum to involve industry or academia in global technology planning
for the agency. In the past, NASA has tended to place its far-term technology investments in-house while
allocating specific tasks associated with near-term development to industry and to the universities. The
University Space Engineering Research Center program was an exception to placing far-term technology
development in-house, but that program was mandated by Congress and ceased after only five years.
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
The management of science at NASA presents several challenges in today's environment. With the
recent downsizing of Headquarters and the relocation of program management to the field centers, the
potential exists to diminish both Headquarters' knowledge about the status of programs and its ability to
defend them in the political arena. A second potential problem is conflict of interest, where centers could
favor in-house capability over that existing in universities and industry. Assurances must be built into the
evolving system that the entire procurement and selection process will be conducted without bias.
Another potential problem is that the crisper organizational division that now exists between
NASA's strategic enterprises increases the possibility of greater fragmentation of the overall NASA
program, leading to inadequate cross-enterprise cooperation and coordination. This would be especially
detrimental to the relationship between the space science enterprise and the human exploration and space
transportation enterprises, both of which have direct connections to the space sciences but could evolve in
directions less supportive of the conduct of science.
The NASA strategic plan, which was updated in February 1995, provides important information on
the agency's place in the nation's R&D environment and its planned contributions to national goals; it
also explains the enterprise-based strategic planning framework that NASA has adopted. More recently,
the office of the Chief Scientist has released a draft for comment of a new science policy document.3 This
guide gives an overview of agency policy on a number of topics that are also discussed in the following
chapters of this report, including the roles of the various participants in NASA's science programs and the
agency's approach to assessing and maintaining quality.
3NASA, Science in Air and Space: NASA's Science Policy Guide (Draft for Public Comment), July 1995.
Alternative Organizations: Analysis and Findings
PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE ORGANIZATION
In addressing the issue of alternative organizations for the management of science in NASA, the
committee's task group on alternative organizations focused on organizational structures that would
produce the best possible quality of science given the present and likely future budget constraints. It
identified a number of fundamental principles, or axioms, and goals, that characterize successful science
management.
Axioms
1. Accountability for Performance—Science management must be accountable to higher manage-
ment for achievement of programmatic or mission goals. Such a goal in the case of exploratory basic
research may be a reasoned effort to understand nature. For research in support of a program or project,
the timely (i.e., schedule-driven) completion of specific measurements or calculations may be required.
Accountability must be accompanied by authority to make programmatic and budgetary decisions in
pursuit of the goals.
2. Separation of Program Approval from Program Execution—The responsibility for program
approval, including especially determination of whether the research is to be conducted in-house or out-
of-house, should not be delegated to performing organizations, which might bias that selection toward in-
house sources. If source selection must be so delegated for other reasons, controls to counter any such
bias must be put in place.
3. Involvement of Scientists in Management—Scientific expertise is required for the effective
management of scientific projects whether conducted in-house or procured under a contract arrangement
(the "smart buyer" concept). Effective coordination of scientific goals with technical and engineering
requirements is one of the prerequisites for the successful completion of technically complex scientific
projects. Scientific expertise is needed to monitor the progress of projects, to evaluate their adherence to
program goals, and to participate in trade studies necessitated by conflicts in budget, schedule, and
science requirements.
4. Maintaining Effective Relationships—Successful science management requires effective rela-
tionships among science partners, performers, and eventual users of the scientific output.
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5. Single Line of Authority—All direction, both program/project direction and ancillary functional
direction, should come down to performing organizations from higher management levels through a
single management chain. Decision making must be consistent with budget allocation, lest conflicts
arise.
Goals
1. Quality of Science Output—A fundamental principle of successful science management must be
that high-quality science be produced. Factors that contribute to high quality include informed and
unbiased selection of the best performers and openness of the program to involvement by the scientific
community in program planning and execution. As a corollary to achieving high-quality science,
systems to evaluate that quality must be in place and must be used to constructively influence program
activities. Evaluation systems include peer review for selection; visiting committees of scientific
authorities to evaluate programs, projects, and institutions; performance reviews of individual perform-
ers; and such statistics as number of refereed publications.
2. Cost-effectiveness—Not only must the absolute quality of the science be high, but quality must be
high in relation to program cost. High quality is achieved by the factors cited above. Low cost follows
from reducing infrastructure costs (both workforce and facilities) to the minimum and eliminating
excessive oversight of performers. Careful planning and management on the part of both managers and
investigators are crucial to achieving high cost-effectiveness.
3. Responsibilities of a National Capability in Space Science—Science programs of an agency like
NASA do not exist in isolation but must relate to the corresponding national interest in promoting
national security, economic health, and societal well-being. NASA's programs must address mainte-
nance of key national space science competences and capabilities, including those of the universities
(research and education) and industry, as well as government. Planning and decision making must
therefore address national—and perhaps even international—interests and capabilities along with nar-
rower programmatic factors.
MANAGEMENT OF THE NASA SCIENCE ORGANIZATION
Chapter 2 briefly describes the way that space science is currently organized and managed in NASA.
A number of changes have been or are being introduced concurrently with this study. Because of this, the
recommendations that follow are stated so as to be broadly applicable and transcend the specific details of
the organization.
The major imperatives for the recent and coming changes are the continuing pressure for budget
reductions and the Administration initiative to reinvent government. These imperatives have led to a
significant downsizing of NASA, now under way. An internal "Zero Base Review,"1 the subject of
briefings to Congress on May 19, 1995, concluded that the budget targets of the Administration can be
achieved by reducing infrastructure costs (streamlining operations, reducing overlap, and so forth)
without cutting programs or closing any of NASA's 10 major field centers.2 Cuts beyond those in the
budget submission are likely to threaten program content.
The NASA civil service workforce has already been reduced through buyouts and attrition. Actions
are being taken to further reduce the NASA Headquarters infrastructure, both civil service and support
'"Review Team Proposes Sweeping Management, Organizational Changes at NASA," NASA News Release, May 19, 1995.
"NASA Zero Base Review and FY 1997 Budget Process," briefings to Congress, May 1995.
2The House Committee on Appropriations report (104-201, p. 85) subsequently questioned whether it would be possible to
continue to fund all of the centers in future years, however.
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contractor, including the transfer of functions and personnel to the field centers. In the view of the "new
NASA," Headquarters would be based on a "corporate management" model and concentrate on policy
development and implementation, external relations and liaison, and agency-level and enterprise-level
management. Program management would be shifted to the field centers, where project management
already generally resides. By this shift, NASA intends to eliminate a layer of management with its
attendant personnel.
Changes at the field centers are also under study. One involves consolidating similar activities at a
single center and thus eliminating duplicative activities. Another is to establish certain specialized center
activities as "institutes" affiliated with a nongovernment organization (e.g., a university). Many of the
proposed changes are consistent with the recommendations of the NASA Federal Laboratory Review.3
At present, transforming entire civil service centers to contract operation (as is already the case at JPL) is
not under consideration.
In assessing organizational alternatives for NASA, the committee first addressed the issue of
fundamental responsibilities of the various major elements of the NASA science establishment: NASA
Headquarters, the field centers, and the large and diverse outside industrial and academic research
community. Management of NASA's scientific research must, of course, remain within NASA.
Management functions will be exercised at various organizational levels, depending on scope and
function. The following are the committee's findings:
1. NASA's strategic enterprises are evolving as the basic business units of the agency at the highest
strategic level,4 including within each enterprise one or more programs. Clearly, enterprise management
must be located at Headquarters. At this level, NASA addresses goals, objectives, policy, and budget
allocation and thus provides the overall direction, guidance, and constraints to individual programs.
2. Program management (see NASA's definition of "program" in Appendix D) may be either at
Headquarters or at a center. Cautions with respect to the assignment of program management are as
follows:
a. Programs with extensive and complex elements at more than one NASA center should be
managed from Headquarters. While day-to-day program support might be delegated to a center, program
definition, resource allocation, and project review should be Headquarters' responsibilities. The man-
agement of space science technology is an example of a complex, multicenter program that should not be
managed by a field center (see Recommendation 6-4).
b. Programs whose elements reside primarily within a single center or that have simple interfaces
between participating field centers may be managed by a field center if there is clear separation of the
program function from project management. Project management is narrowly focused on project
execution, while program management considers more broadly all elements of the program. The
authorities, accountabilities, objectives, and motivations of the respective management groups are
different, and separation is required. The New Millennium program is an example of a relatively simple,
multicenter program that is currently managed by a field center (JPL).
c. The program management center must rigorously enforce a policy that mandates fairness to
program.elements outside the center vis-a-vis program elements within.
d. Any decisions on out-sourcing (make-buy decisions) that may involve the center as performer
must be made at Headquarters. This principle applies both for in-house/out-of-house decisions on
spacecraft development and for selection of investigations (both for flight projects and for the Research
and Analysis program), including oversight of the peer review process.
3Federal Laboratory Review Task Force, NASA Advisory Council, NASA Federal Laboratory Review, February 1995.
"NASA, NASA Strategic Plan, February 1995.
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3. Project management (see the definition in Appendix D) is properly located at a center, even if a
center is operated under a contract. Again, some limitations are necessary:
a. Major make-buy decisions should be approved at higher levels.
b. Any delegation of project management responsibilities to contract centers must adhere to procure-
ment law and regulations.
4. Because of the existence outside the agency of larger and more diverse industrial and academic
research communities and the importance of maintaining that national capability, scientific research
should, for the most part, be conducted outside the agency. The committee believes this to be true for
flight projects, for the scientific experiments that fly on them, and for the supporting work conducted in
ground-based laboratories. There are important exceptions to this rule, and these are discussed under
"Balance Between In-House and Out-of-House Research" at the end of this chapter.
In summary, Headquarters should be responsible for enterprise management, including establish-
ment of scientific vision, goals, and objectives; guidance on program content; cost guidelines and
constraints; requesting program plans; integrating and approving submitted plans; source selection;
scientific discipline support; oversight; and cross-discipline integration. Centers should be responsible
for creating program plans in response to Headquarters requests; executing programs and projects;
providing program and project oversight; and possibly managing the solicitation process (with selection
controlled by Headquarters). Scientific research should be conducted primarily by the academic and
industrial communities. The NASA Federal Laboratory Review report5 reaches similar conclusions and
recommendations with respect to Headquarters and center roles and missions.
NASA HEADQUARTERS SCIENCE ORGANIZATION
The committee followed closely the charge given it and looked at three alternatives for the Headquar-
ters science organization: an institute approach to science management, following the NIH model,
distributed management among the three science offices as exists today, and centralized science manage-
ment as existed prior to the 1993 reorganization. The committee assumed that a degree of program
management would be retained at Headquarters in any of the models. Thus, for example, the Headquar-
ters Office of Space Science (which is responsible for the Space Science Enterprise in its entirety) is
assumed to retain a broad management function for the three science programs, Astrophysics, Space
Physics, and Solar System Exploration, as well as for the Space Science Enterprise as a whole.
1. Institute for Space Science—Responding to direction in the FY 1994 Senate appropriations report,
the committee considered a space science "umbrella organization within NASA to coordinate and
oversee all space science activities," functioning "just as the National Institutes of Health now does
within the Department of Health and Human Services." This was taken to mean an institute constituted
with all the science programs of the pre-1993 OSSA, funded separately from the rest of NASA and
operating much as does NIH and the many individual institutes coming under its umbrella. The operation
of NIH is described in Chapter 2 and Appendix F. (Let it be clear that this model is not what NASA has
recently proposed as "science institutes," which are discussed below.)
The advantages of such an approach are
• relative independence of science and
• relative budgetary autonomy.
5Federal Laboratory Review Task Force, NASA Advisory Council, NASA Federal Laboratory Review, February 1995.
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The disadvantages are
• possible disconnection from other elements of NASA that support science (e.g., launches, track-
ing, facilities operations) and
• budgetary vulnerability.
The committee concluded that the NIH model, while quite effective in its own arena of research with
a heavy emphasis on fundamental or basic research leading to the understanding of disease processes, the
development of new drugs and treatment protocols, and their clinical evaluation, is not appropriate for the
space sciences. NASA space sciences depend on close coordination with other elements of NASA, for
example, hardware development, launch services, and tracking and data operations. There are no
obvious counterparts in the NIH model, which instead involves primarily self-contained research
endeavors. Although NIH research projects are conducted in laboratories, hospitals, and the like, the
basically stable infrastructure of these facilities is dealt with simply as "overhead" for the investigation.
With a few exceptions, such as establishment of cancer, eye research, and AIDS vaccine development
centers, NIH researchers do not generally have to build hospitals or new laboratories from the ground up
to carry out their work.
While ground-based laboratory research supporting science conducted in space may resemble
NIH research, NASA research carried out on space missions does not. Of necessity, space science
proceeds incrementally, flight project by flight project, whereas most other scientific programs proceed
by the steady interplay between discovery, new questions, new concepts, new technology, and the
changing research interests of scientists. Only creation of a major new particle accelerator, for example,
approaches the long lead times, engineering teams, costly and complex infrastructure, and need for
schedule management inherent in spaceflight projects.
It also is not clear how such an institute model would deal with budgetary issues. Presumably, an
institute could be funded separately from the rest of NASA, perhaps within the same appropriation, but
otherwise independently. The committee was concerned about possible mismatches in science funding
and related infrastructure funding. Even if science support infrastructure funding were joined to science
program funding for the institute, the resulting "fences" between fund sources could constrain trade-offs
and thus severely hamper management of the overall NASA endeavor.
Much of the remarkable success of the space sciences since the dawn of the space age has resulted
from a tight link between science and space technology. The inspiring goals of scientific discovery and
exploration spurred new capabilities in space access and technology, which in turn pushed the scientific
goals still further into the unknown. While some technology came from the science programs them-
selves, much of it came from other parts of NASA. Separating the space sciences from critical space
technologies within the agency by forming an independent institute for space science would break this
symbiotic link. The committee found the downside risks of breaking this link too large to accept.
In summary, the committee does not favor establishment of an institute for space science or other
entity that might be separate or "semiseparate" from NASA as a whole.
2. Distributed Management (current organization) Versus Centralized Management (pre-1993 orga-
nization)—In the current organization, three program offices manage elements of the science program—
OSS (traditional space science), OMTPE (Earth science), and OLMSA (life and microgravity sciences).
They are directly aligned with the respective enterprises, OSS and OMTPE uniquely, with OLMSA
sharing the Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise with the Office of Space Flight.
The pre-1993 science organization was wholly contained within the Office of Space Science and
Applications (OSSA), which consisted of program divisions for Astrophysics, Space Physics, Solar
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System Exploration, Earth Science, Life Science (both Space Medicine and Space Biology), and
Microgravity Science.
The advantages of the distributed management model over the centralized management model are
• more focused management to achieve enterprise goals (or to implement strategic enterprises),
• simpler management interactions with centers, particularly if centers are realigned as proposed to
achieve greater program focus,
• for life science and microgravity communities, the possibility of greater funding attracted through
their Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise connection, and
• simpler strategic planning because of tighter focus of programs.
Conversely, the disadvantages are
• reduction of budgetary and scientific flexibility for the respective science leaders,
• greater vulnerability of science quality because of program trade-offs necessitated by budget
reductions or policy changes independent of the science programs,
• greater vulnerability of smaller programs through their increased "visibility" in the budget
process,
• greater difficulty in integrating related science programs, such as life science experiments with
planetary spacecraft,
• weaker advocacy for science within NASA (three voices, not necessarily in agreement, heard by
the Chief Scientist and the Administrator), and
• larger Headquarters staff overhead.
In conclusion, from a pure science perspective, a centralized-management-type organization appears
to be preferable. But NASA is not a pure science organization. Science activities must be closely
integrated into the other parts of the space program. The enterprise concept now in place provides a solid
basis for that integration in the context of program rationale. In addition, the advantages offered by
tighter focus for planning and simplicity of center interactions were given positive weight by the
committee. It is also true that the science programs have changed dramatically since the days of the
previous organization (for example, the advent of the Space Station and the great expansion of the Earth
observation program). The committee therefore endorses the present approach, which distributes science
among three separate enterprises.
Recommendation 4-1: The committee found no compelling reason to establish an independent institute
for space science modeled on the National Institutes of Health. Rather, NASA should retain its science
programs in the present three-enterprise distributed form, but also take action to provide the necessary
integration among the programs (see Recommendation 4-2).
With this distributed management model, the three science associate administrators must coordinate
and integrate their respective programs into a single, coherent NASA science program. The Chief
Scientist can exercise the strong, central coordinating function that is required to ensure that this
integration occurs, but the current authorities and responsibilities of the Chief Scientist position are not,
in the view of the committee, explicitly sufficient. In addition to its advisory, coordination, and interface
responsibilities, the position should include a formal concurrence on planning, programming, and budget
matters of all the sciences and authority to resolve conflicts among the science offices. The NASA
Science Council, currently chaired by the Chief Scientist and including as members the science associate
administrators, would provide a mechanism for the Chief Scientist to use in meeting these expanded
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Proposed Functional Statement for the Chief Scientist
The Chief Scientist exercises NASA-wide leadership for the space sciences and serves as the
principal scientific advisor to the NASA Administrator. He or she should be a person of strong standing in the
scientific community with significant accomplishment in his or her own field. The individual filling this position
should have a breadth of interest and understanding transcending the space sciences to encompass
technology and the interaction of science and technology with elements of society. This person should also
have management experience, preferably in large organizations. Understanding of government processes is
highly desirable. Specific functions of the position are as follows:
• Serves as primary advisor to the NASA Administrator.
• Provides formal concurrence on planning, programs, budgets, and so forth, for the NASA science
programs.
• Acts to resolve conflicts among the science programs and between science programs and other NASA
programs.
• Chairs the NASA Science Council.
• Maintains oversight of science quality across the agency, recommending corrective action where
necessary.
• Maintains oversight of the integration of advanced technology into science programs across the
agency, recommending corrective action where necessary.
• Provides for coordination among the sciences at many levels: programs, advisory groups, other
agencies, the scientific community.
• Serves as representative of NASA science to the outside world and represents the scientific commu-
nity to NASA.
Proposed Functional Statement for the NASA Science Council
The NASA Science Council, chaired by the Chief Scientist, is the internal NASA body responsible for
coordination and integration of science programs and activities.
Specific functions are as follows:
• Sets principles and policies for scientific aspects of strategic planning.
• Reviews and integrates resulting strategic plans for consistency with policies and agency-level
guidance.
• Provides a forum for coordinating programs.
• Provides a forum for conflict resolution.
• Reviews and makes recommendations to help ensure the health of the intellectual and physical
infrastructure.
Membership of the NASA Science Council consists of the Chief Scientist (chair), the Associate
Administrators for the space science programs (OSS, OLMSA, OMTPE), and the Associate Administrator for
Space Access and Technology.
responsibilities. The responsibility for formal concurrence on planning, conflict resolution, oversight of
science quality, and representation of NASA to the outside world exceeds the capabilities of any one
individual. For this reason, recommendations for strengthening the role of the Chief Scientist will require
creation of a small office staff of experienced and technically astute personnel to support the Chief
Scientist.
In NASA, as in other R&D organizations, the strongest control of prioritization lies with officials
who control budgetary decisions, in this case the science associate administrators. If the Chief Scientist
were given general budgetary authority over these offices, the effect would be tantamount to re-creation
of a single science office, like OSSA. What is being recommended here instead is the establishment of a
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formal planning and budgeting concurrence by the Chief Scientist; in practice, the coordinating influence
of the Chief Scientist would be enforced by the location of that position within the office of the
Administrator. The budget development and advocacy process would continue to reside with the line
associate administrators.
Recommendation 4-2: The position of Chief Scientist should be strengthened to ensure full integration
of the space sciences. A proposed functional statement that encompasses the necessary authority is
provided, followed by a proposed functional statement for the NASA Science Council (see box).
With the establishment of enterprise management, NASA seems to have created another manage-
ment layer to add to those already in existence. There is an overlap in the functions of enterprise
management and program management. The committee recommends that program management func-
tions be subsumed by the enterprises and appropriate elements then delegated to the centers.
Recommendation 4-3: NASA should eliminate the separate "program management" layer, assign to the
enterprises the program management functions properly located at Headquarters, and delegate to the field
centers those program management functions properly located there.
NASA CENTER SCIENCE ORGANIZATION
With enterprise management at Headquarters, the major functions of field centers will be manage-
ment of out-of-house projects and execution of in-house program elements (i.e., projects and investiga-
tions).
The committee considered two primary alternative organizational arrangements for a science-
oriented field center: (1) the current civil service arrangement for centers (except JPL) and (2) centers
wholly operated by an appropriate university, consortium, or joint university/industry partnership as a
government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) installation (the JPL model). Because only GSFC and
JPL are primarily science centers, the first alternative is equivalent to making no change and the second
corresponds to converting Goddard to a GOCO; the committee considered the latter option even though
it was not recommended by the Zero Base Review report. No consideration was given to converting JPL
to the civil service.
The committee also considered establishment of "institutes," defined as university- (or consortium-
or university/industry partnership-) staffed and operated organizations to conduct certain specific science
operations now residing at a nonscience center.6 This approach was considered not as an alternative to
the two preceding options for a whole center, but in the more limited sense considered by the Zero Base
Review for collecting the scientific activities of a center that are not closely aligned to the primary
mission of that center. Examples currently under consideration are a life science institute at Ames
Research Center, primarily an aeronautical research center, and biomedical and planetary science
institute(s) at Johnson Space Center, primarily a human spaceflight center. (Advantages and disadvan-
tages for such focused "institutes" for discrete scientific activities in a predominantly nonscience-
oriented center are discussed below.)
Table 4.1 displays the advantages and disadvantages of the two organizational concepts for entire
centers.
Current Civil Service Arrangement—Perhaps the principal advantage to retaining the present civil
6NRC, Space Studies Board, letter to NASA Chief Scientist France A. Cordova, August 11, 1995.
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TABLE 4.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternative Science Center Organizations
Civil Service Center (Present Approach) GOCO (University-, Consortium-, Partnership-Operated)
Advantages:
• No action required; no transition
• Civil servants fully authorized to perform
government functions
• Priorities of center match those of NASA
• Stability of staffing during short-term budget
fluctuations
Disadvantages:
• Possible detrimental impact on staff quality
• Inflexibility of civil service regulations
• Split accountability; Headquarters institutional
authority possibly different from program authority
Advantages:
• Flexibility in personnel management in the private sector:
hiring, firing, and enhancement of staff quality
• Synergy of center science and that of parent university
• Better responsiveness and accountability of center
to NASA via contract
Disadvantages:
• Difficulty of transition
• Cost of transition
• Vulnerability of staff to short-term budget fluctuations
• Somewhat restricted ability of contractor to perform
government functions
• Possible conflict of center and operating university priorities
service system for GSFC is that no action is required; there would be no change to the present system and
thus no lengthy transition to undergo. The last advantage, stability of staffing, results from the present
NASA budgeting system, which provides funds for civil service staff from one account (Research and
Program Management—R&PM) and program funds (contract costs and in-house project costs other than
staff salary) from another account (R&D). The R&PM account has been relatively stable over time,
linked closely to staff size for the agency as a whole. Thus staff can be maintained during short-term gaps
in program funding (such as deferral of new project starts) and a center director has the discretionary
authority to assign staff to high-priority activities.
The chief disadvantage of retaining the present system at GSFC is the inflexibility associated with the
civil service system, such as hiring, firing, and salary rigidity. This may negatively affect staff quality
over the long term, especially in a period of downsizing, as is the case at present. The committee
considered this the principal reason for favoring a change.
Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) Centers (the JPL model)—This alternative
envisions converting GSFC into a university-operated GOCO center like JPL. If this could be accom-
plished, the principal advantage would be the flexibility in personnel management inherent in the private
sector. Through this mechanism, staff quality in the long run could be enhanced. Further, increased
flexibility in personnel management would facilitate adjustments in staff capabilities to meet changing
requirements, such as infrastructure reduction.
The principal disadvantage of converting GSFC to a GOCO center would be the difficulty of the
transition itself. Conceptually, conversion would be quite straightforward: disestablishing the center as
an organization of federal employees and establishing the GOCO under federally funded research and
development center (FFRDC) rules, establishing a competition for the operation of the center as a
GOCO, and closing out the civil service complement effective the date the contractor assumes responsi-
bility. The difficulties focus on the conversion of civil servants to private sector employees, particularly
with respect to retirement programs, but also involving other facets of personnel management, such as
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salary scale, seniority, union representation, and benefit programs. The committee believes it is feasible
but recognizes the potential for upheaval. Indeed, the committee was briefed on a similar plan prepared
for the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) some years ago. Though the Navy has not implemented the
plan, it appears feasible.
A second disadvantage of conversion is the transition cost and duration; cost was estimated for NRL
to be in the range of $137 to $162 million, depending on the generosity of severance and other payouts,
and three years was the estimated time required, provided no legislation was necessary. Corresponding
cost and time for NASA conversion of GSFC would likely be of the same order of magnitude. Finally, as
a contract organization, the center could not be responsible for certain inherently governmental functions
(e.g., fundamental make-buy decisions), and these would therefore have to be retained in Headquarters.
The committee does not list recurring costs as either an advantage or disadvantage in comparing the
present civil service system with a GOCO system. At first look, one might conclude that total costs for
the GOCO might be higher because of a higher salary scale and the contract fee. But other efficiencies
inherent in a contract arrangement might compensate, and which system has greater cost is not clear.
Given the likelihood of little difference, the committee concluded that cost was not a decisive factor.
However, it is important to recognize that any long-term cost comparisons between in-house and out-of-
house alternatives must include all program costs, both R&D and R&PM. Considering only R&D costs
would make the civil service in-house alternative look far lower in cost, because in-house R&PM costs
are not currently charged to R&D programs.
Later in this chapter, the committee recommends the adoption by NASA of an industrial funding
approach for its field centers, whereby all costs of executing a program, including the cost of civil service
staff, would be charged to that program. This full-cost accounting, toward which NASA is already
moving, would considerably reduce any advantage in responsiveness and accountability held by a GOCO
management approach.
The flexibility in personnel management and attendant positive impact on staff quality drive the
committee to the conclusion that the GOCO approach offers the greatest long-term benefit. There has
been concern7 that the technical competence of government laboratories employing civil servants erodes
over time; this possibility provided some of the motivation for the proposal to convert NRL. Despite the
formidable difficulties of conversion to GOCO status, a decline of personnel quality at GSFC would
favor such a move. However, even within the present civil service system, GSFC has been able to
maintain a high staff quality. The committee concluded that GSFC should be left as is for the present, but
that this conclusion should be reexamined periodically.
Recommendation 4-4: The Goddard Space Flight Center should remain a civil service center for the
time being. However, NASA should establish periodic external reviews of GSFC to determine whether
new consideration should be given to conversion to a GOCO arrangement.
As remarked above, NASA is also considering establishment of a class of university-, consortium-,
or partnership-operated institutes. Not an alternative for operation of an entire center, this institute
concept is being considered for a focused science activity within a center having broader, and generally
nonscientific, responsibilities. Such institutes would be operated by a nongovernmental entity (e.g., a
university) under contract. A number of such arrangements have been proposed in the Zero Base Review
plan.
Some advantages and disadvantages of this scheme are displayed in Table 4.2. NASA's stated intent
in creating such institutes is to upgrade the quality of the science programs concerned, bringing them to a
1
 Report of the White House Science Council Federal Laboratory Review Board, May 1983, David Packwood, chairman.
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TABLE 4.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Focused University-,
Consortium-, and Partnership-Operated Science Institutes
Advantages:
• Essentially the same as for GOCO (Table 4.1)
• Enhanced visibility and stature of activity
• Ability to focus research
• Readily assessed quality of work and staff
Disadvantages:
• Essentially the same as for GOCO (Table 4.1)
• Possibly self-perpetuating
• Creation of two classes of employees at the center
• Possibly greater infrastructure expense
• Possibility that focus could restrict initiatives in new areas
level from which they can compete successfully for support, and then to reduce the "guaranteed" or
"base" NASA funding level. The institutes would then have to survive (or shrink and "sunset") on the
basis of merit competition for funding.
Synergy of an institute's science with that of its adoptive parent is an especially important feature of
the concept. In most similar current arrangements, both at NASA and elsewhere (e.g., DOE and NSF),
the contractor is a nonprofit entity, usually a university or a consortium of universities, and that is the
arrangement assumed here. It is further assumed that the institute's scientific staff are contractor
employees, hired by the university or consortium, either after conversion from civil service or based on
criteria established in the contract. There are several especially positive features to this approach:
• If the scientific and geographical match is carefully chosen, the staff of the institute and the faculty
and research staff of the university or consortium will have overlapping scientific interests that should
result in scientific collaboration, benefiting both parties. The university should contribute something of
value (e.g., facilities, faculty participation, or student involvement) to enhance the focus on common
goals and problems.
• The institute staff will be an additional resource for, and will benefit from, the interaction with
graduate students.
• By retaining the institute, with its economic and cultural benefits to the community, it might be
possible to secure some support from the state government(s).
• As noted for a GOCO-type center, establishment of a personnel system that is outside the civil
service should increase the flexibility of NASA in establishing and retaining a high-quality staff that can
adapt to fit a NASA mission that evolves in size, scope, and focus.
Some negative features of such institutes exist, as well:
• Funding will be problematical; first, the institute will have to compete successfully for NASA
program funds. Then, if not fully successful, the institute will need to seek outside funding to maintain
itself, and, because of limited outside interest in its research areas, such outside funding might be difficult
to attract.
• The host NASA center is likely to be less motivated to provide support to the institute than to
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support its own elements. Of particular concern is the danger that the institute might lose the coupling
between its scientific research and NASA engineering support.
• There will be a need for a somewhat increased NASA infrastructure to see to the "care and
feeding" of the institute.
• The tendency for such institutes to proliferate, sometimes in response to political pressures, must
be controlled. Similar pressures will exist to maintain individual institutes indefinitely, irrespective of
merit.
The committee believes that the institute model for NASA scientific staff can, in appropriate cases,
help to preserve and improve the quality of some focused science activities, while providing other
potential benefits in flexibility and NASA-university collaboration. However, success of these institutes
will depend, in large measure, on the not-yet-developed specific agreements between NASA and the
operator. In the long run, if budgets continue to decline, quality will be maintained only if the less-
competitive institutes are reduced in size or terminated as a consequence of a continuing process of peer-
reviewed scientific competition.
Recommendation 4-5: Creation of contractor-operated institutes (a focused science activity operated
under contract within a center having broader, possibly nonscientific, responsibilities) may be advanta-
geous for specific science functions or facilities. The selection and creation of such institutes should be
limited to special circumstances, specifically,
• to be responsible for a narrow, bounded area of science,
• to operate a special facility for the scientific community, and
• to maintain a unique national facility or staff capability,
but
• NOT just to lower civil service headcount and
• NOT if the entity is an integral part of the larger organization (the host center).
The committee recommends that, if NASA proceeds to establish pilot science institutes, it give due
attention to the out-years process by which these institutes will have their guaranteed base budgets
ramped down, and to the competitive process under which they will be expected to compete successfully
and maintain or increase their size, or to compete less successfully and shrink or terminate in an orderly
fashion. The committee recommends that other institute initiatives be deferred until the success of initial
pilots can be evaluated.
OTHER ISSUES
A number of management issues that bear directly on one or another of the center alternatives were
identified and are discussed in the following sections.
Balance Between In-House and Out-of-House Research
NASA requires in-house scientists for its space research, exploration, and technology programs.
These scientists coordinate science and operations on larger missions, guide development and utilization
of unique research facilities, assist outside scientists and technologists to effectively use NASA facilities
or flight opportunities, and enable NASA to act as a "smart buyer." The number of in-house scientists
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should be determined by the extent of these support functions and not by a desire to exploit perceived
flight opportunities. Space science leadership and the generation and testing of new ideas should be the
domain of the broader scientific community, of which the NASA scientists are only a part. As noted
earlier, the committee believes that scientific research should, for the most part, be conducted outside the
agency.
The in-house scientists should be of the highest quality. To maintain that quality, they should be
encouraged to practice their science at the cutting edge of research and instrument development.
However, their research should be thought of as being "derived" from the NASA mission and not their
sole duty. For the most part, NASA scientists should be expected to devote a significant fraction of their
time to support functions (e.g., as project scientist) and a commensurate fraction of their funds should
come from the programs and projects that benefit from these efforts. Additional research funds should be
earned through open competition among the broader scientific community. By linking the responsibili-
ties of the scientific staff directly to programs and projects, NASA can establish and maintain a positive
feedback between the size of its programs and the size of its scientific staff.
Recommendation 4-6: NASA should conduct scientific research activities in-house only to the extent
required to compete successfully for high-quality staff, to maintain capability to manage and interface
with corresponding activities on the outside (e.g., as a "smart buyer"), or to maintain and operate an in-
house capability that is unique in the nation. Otherwise, if a valid out-of-house capability exists, the work
should be done there.
Industrial Versus Institutional Funding
In discussing the two alternatives for a science field center, civil service versus GOCO, it was noted
that NASA funds operation of the institution (personnel, facilities, and so forth) from the R&PM budget,
determined chiefly by staff size and operations costs of the installation, while program costs (primarily
procurement costs) are funded by the relevant program's R&D budget. This is termed "institutional"
funding. Conversely, "industrial" funding provides that all costs of a specific program (including
personnel) be charged to the sponsor of that program. Although all the NASA civil service centers are
institutionally funded, JPL, as a contract center, is essentially industrially funded, with personnel as well
as program costs charged to the responsible program office.
Advantages of employing institutional funding, rather than industrial funding, are
• flexibility in assigning people,
• ability to maintain a stable workforce, and
• ability to conduct possibly high-payoff, speculative research.
Disadvantages of institutional funding, compared to industrial funding, are
• less accountability,
• tendency for workforce factors to drive program decisions,
• disincentive for detailed workforce planning,
• greater difficulty in managing staff size, quality, and skill mix, and
• distorted make-buy decisions.
An additional disadvantage of industrial funding is that research sponsors may tend to use it as a
management tool, that is, "buying" research in little bits and pieces, thus creating a paper problem and
stimulating researchers to spend excessive time seeking funding.
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Overall, the committee strongly favors the concept of industrial funding because it reflects total
program costs and permits ready assessment of comparative costs that might otherwise be hidden by an
institutional funding approach. The committee recognizes as a potential problem the assignment of
responsibility for maintenance of agency infrastructure but believes that higher priority must be given to
applying the budget discipline of industrial funding. The committee expects that senior management will
be able to resolve these infrastructure issues even under the discipline of industrial funding. The
committee endorses NASA's decision (stated in the Zero Base Review briefing to the Congress) to
identify, budget, and manage by total program costs, including the costs of civil servants.
Recommendation 4-7: NASA should adopt an industrial funding model for field centers. Decisions on
program priorities and budget would be more rational if based on full-cost accounting, and program
accountability and discipline in personnel management would be thereby enhanced. The principal
objective is that cost accounting should be based on full program costs, including civil service salaries, to
achieve the advantageous features cited above. A similar recommendation was made in the NASA
Federal Laboratory Review report.8
Reporting Relationship of the Centers to Headquarters
Currently, each NASA field center reports institutionally to a NASA Headquarters program office
that has major, but not necessarily exclusive, program responsibility at that center. Center institutional
costs (salaries and other personnel costs, facility operations, and other nonprogram specific support
costs) are funded from the R&PM budget. Program direction and funding, however, come to the center
from Headquarters program offices. For example, although the Office of Space Science funds a large
fraction of the programs located at GSFC, institutional management is provided by OMTPE, the
institutional "parent" of GSFC, and institutional costs are charged to the R&PM account. Likewise,
institutional management of the atmospheric research program of OMTPE at the Langley Research
Center is provided by the Office of Aeronautics, Langley's "parent" institutional office, with institutional
costs again charged to R&PM. Thus programs at a center "owned" by a different institutional office
operate in a dual (in some cases multiple) management and funding environment. If the respective office
priorities are significantly different, programs may be impaired.
An alternative institutional reporting arrangement, that is, with all centers reporting to one Headquar-
ters institutional manager, has been employed by NASA in the past9 (see Table 2.2). Under this
arrangement, all programs executed by field centers would face split funding, as all institutional costs
would be provided by this separate office. An advantage of this system is that institutional resource
priorities would be established for the agency as a whole and would presumably directly reflect overall
program priorities of the Administrator, to whom the single institutional director would report. A
disadvantage is that it would be difficult for a program associate administrator to redirect institutional
resources within his or her program area even at a center that dominantly supports that program.
Three different kinds of requirements can be imposed on a program, that is, programmatic, institu-
tional, and regulatory (e.g., environmental, safety, procurement). Neither of the alternatives for institu-
tional management can completely eliminate this complexity. Therefore, whatever the system, it is
important that all potentially competing requirements and directions flow down to center program/
project management through a single channel. Given the trend toward concentration of center capabili-
ties toward a primary mission for that center, coupled with more focused enterprise management, the
committee concluded that center reporting arrangements should remain as they currently are, with each
8Federal Laboratory Review Task Force, NASA Advisory Council, NASA Federal Laboratory Review, February 1995.
9NASA, The Evolution of the NASA Organization, March 1985.
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center reporting to an appropriate enterprise and all direction channeled through that enterprise. Some
split reporting will result, but the alternative of having centers report to a central office would exacerbate
that split. If some form of industrial funding is put in place (by R&PM allocation, budget structure
change, or center GOCO transition), the problems resulting from split reporting will be further reduced
because program budgets would then include staff and other institutional costs. In those cases where a
significant split in center responsibilities exists (e.g., at GSFC, where astrophysics and space physics
programs constitute a major part of the center's activities, though it reports institutionally to OMTPE),
NASA must actively work to ensure that program and institutional needs are well served.
Recommendation 4-8: Center reporting arrangements should remain as they currently are, with each
center reporting to an appropriate enterprise. All requirements and directions addressed to a center from
any source should be directed through that enterprise.
Role of the Project Scientist
Successful execution of a project, whether in-house or through a contract, depends on meeting
simultaneously the established schedule, budget, and scientific requirements. These three sets of
requirements will come into conflict repeatedly during the course of any project. Therefore, it is essential
that the management structure permit trade-offs throughout the life of the project. Science advocacy is
usually embodied in the position of the NASA "project scientist," who specifies scientific performance,
leads the science working group, and provides an ongoing assessment of whether or not the project will
achieve that performance. This function is independent of whether the center is a civil service or GOCO
center and applies both for projects executed in-house and those procured under contract.
The project scientist is responsible for documenting the scientific requirements and for evaluating
engineering designs and other documentation in order to determine whether the requirements will be met.
In order to fulfill this responsibility, he or she must normally be co-located with the project team and must
be given the opportunity to concur in all significant project decisions that will affect scientific perfor-
mance. The project scientist should participate in all major project reviews, including preliminary and
critical design reviews. While the project scientist is responsible for scientific performance, the project
manager is responsible for overall mission performance, including keeping the project on schedule and
within budget. When they cannot agree on a course of action, resolution must be sought at a higher level.
Committee members involved with NASA science projects have observed instances of what appears
to be a diminished role of the project scientist in science project management. Fundamental decisions
bearing on the ability of the project to meet its scientific objectives have sometimes been made without
adequate project scientist (or investigator) input and involvement.
Recommendation 4-9: Renewed emphasis should be given to the essential role and responsibility of the
project scientist in project trade-offs and decisions through the life of the project.
Oversight
A recurring theme heard from interviewees from other organizations and from some committee
members was that NASA imposes an excessive degree of oversight on its contractors. While the
discussion centered on anecdotal evidence, the committee was struck by the high frequency with which
the subject was raised. The issue arose regarding oversight of contractors by field centers, of investiga-
tors by Headquarters scientific staff, and of field centers by Headquarters. This heavy oversight has two
important detrimental effects: performers may be required to devote unwarranted time.to satisfying
oversight requirements at the expense of project performance, and managers spend excessive time in
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questionable oversight, including heavy attendance of monitoring staff at project meetings. Redundant
oversight in a period of constrained budgets can impose especially severe penalties.
Historically, a hallmark of NASA management has been rigorous engineering oversight and penetra-
tion into all high-value space flight projects extending well beyond the safety-critical human flight
programs. This management practice was established early in the Apollo Program and grew in intensity
with mission complexity, becoming identified within NASA as a key component and major contributor
to early agency success. High-visibility accidents such as the Apollo Command Module launchpad fire,
Skylab meteoroid shield failure, and the 1986 Challenger accident only reinforced the belief that active
independent program oversight was necessary for success. The Rogers Commission Challenger report10
was particularly critical of decentralized NASA management, so that attention was further focused on
strong Headquarters oversight, short rein on center authority, and an independent review process to
balance the decision-making process. Delegation of program execution exclusively to project managers
at field centers was not viewed as compatible with the oversight requirement, and program management
was-centralized at NASA Headquarters with a Levels 0, 1,2, 3, and 4 chain-of-command architecture
(Administrator's Office, associate administrator, lead center, center project office, and contractor man-
agement, respectively). A strong argument can be made that this heightened oversight worked, but not
without costs. The practice has penetrated most of NASA's programs, bringing with it the bureaucracy
necessary for its implementation. The Space Shuttle and Space Station programs have clearly been
subject to this renewed management style fashioned during the Apollo era; however, science programs
within the agency have also seen tighter control and oversight from Headquarters, especially since the
Hubble Space Telescope mirror problem.
For a number of reasons, management decisions being made at NASA over the past several years are
reversing this trend. Reasons include declining budgets, substantial NASA staff reductions, and an
emphasis on shorter development cycles and smaller-scale projects. Greater responsibility and account-
ability for project execution are being given to contractors. The large human space flight programs, the
Space Shuttle and Space Station, have also seen decreased centralization and delegation of authority to
the. field sites. These delegations are consistent with the movement of Total Quality Management
principles to the forefront of both government and industry, where the intent is to build in quality from the
beginning, rather than try to achieve it through intensive oversight.
Recommendation 4-10: NASA should maximize delegation of project responsibility to the executing
agents of its space science programs (center, laboratory, university, or industry) and minimize redundant
NASA oversight. This practice can yield excellent results at an affordable cost. High-value, one-of-a-
kind space science missions may justify increased independent oversight. If necessary, this increased
oversight should be clearly established in the program definition stage and should not be permitted to
creep or evolve with program maturity. The committee makes no recommendation regarding oversight,
delegation of responsibility, or privatization in the human spaceflight program.
1
 °Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, Washington, D.C., 1986 (5 volumes).
Research Prioritization: Analysis and Findings
As a mission agency with numerous objectives and a broad range of programs, NASA presents a
complex multidimensional prioritization problem with its research programs. Not only are diverse
scientific disciplines represented within the agency's research portfolio, but planning and execution are
strongly affected by the challenging and costly space environment in which the research is done,
institutional imperatives for technology innovation, and the distributed field center network.
Several studies on the space research priority-setting problem have been carried out with varying
degrees of success. The Space and Earth Sciences Advisory Committee of the NASA Advisory Council
released an influential report1 in 1986 that outlined a framework of factors to be considered in prioritizing
missions. In 1992 the NRC Space Studies Board Task Group on Priorities in Space Research laid out the
rationale2 for a more general cross-disciplinary prioritization of scientific objectives and broad initia-
tives. The arguments presented therein for an active role by scientists in the priority-setting process were
generally well received. A specific implementing methodology proposed in a second report3 for
effecting this broadened prioritization, on the other hand, was not as well accepted as the underlying
principles laid out in the predecessor report.
The present committee's task group on research prioritization therefore set out to reexamine the
existing process of priority setting for science programs within NASA, with special attention to the roles
of advisory groups and the agency's management organization. The central thrust was to reexamine
these roles and to clarify the necessary functions on the basis of the following fundamental premises and
overall goals.
PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION
Axioms
The committee made the following assumptions in analyzing the priority-setting problem:
"Space and Earth Sciences Advisory Committee of the NASA Advisory Council, The Crisis in Space and Earth Sciences, 1986.
2NRC, Space Studies Board, Setting Priorities for Space Research: Opportunities and Imperatives, National Academy Press,
1992.
3NRC, Space Studies Board, Setting Priorities for Space Research: An Experiment in Methodology, National Academy Press,
1995.
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1. In conformance to the Space Act of 1958, science will continue to have a central role among
NASA activities.
2. Because of the rich return from earlier missions, there are more opportunities for new discovery
than there are resources available to exploit them.
3. To fulfill its scientific mandate, NASA will continue to receive appropriated funds for scientific
research, and, as an agency, will have the responsibility of distributing and administering these science
funds. Because opportunities will outstrip these resources, this responsibility will entail priority setting.
4. Judgments about scientific merit will have a major role in the agency's administration of resources
allocated to it for scientific research.
5. Practicing scientists are the most qualified arbiters of scientific merit.
Goals
The following goals have been identified for priority setting in NASA's space research programs:
1. Conforming to its charter in the Space Act, the scientific research sponsored and managed by
NASA should vigorously advance knowledge in the areas in which it is undertaken.
2. Scientific efforts sponsored by NASA should be proposed and evaluated in the context of research
sponsored and conducted elsewhere and should be competitive with this other research in interest,
quality, and importance.
3. In order to optimize the return on expended resources for science while addressing other techno-
logical objectives for the agency laid out in the Space Act, NASA's scientific research program should
appropriately balance innovation with risk of failure. This will help set the directions for technological
development and ensure that benefits of new capabilities are realized for the science programs.
4. NASA's research portfolio should be opportunistic, not only in the technological sense (goal 3
above), but also in terms of focusing on areas most ripe for significant advances with the resources and
capabilities available. Prioritization should consider all relevant factors, including opportunities to
contribute to policymaking and other public needs, in optimizing scientific return for the resources
invested.
PRIORITIZATION OF SCIENCE AT NASA
Defining the Problem
The space sciences, like any natural science, begin with scientific ideas and goals that are trans-
formed into research programs4—the means of carrying out the necessary experimental or observational
research. In space science, though, the cost and complexity of many missions are much greater than in
most other areas of science. Therefore, the relative practical priority of the scientific goals, that is, the
strategy and timing of attacking them, might be more strongly determined by mission considerations than
is the case in other areas of science. This is especially true in light of the extraordinarily long lead times
that are associated with some of the large space science missions.
Figure 5.1 presents a schematic life cycle for the priority-setting process. Figure 5.2 shows
relationships between various key players in this process. As is seen below, the level of scientific and
technical detail involved in the inner feedback loop in Figure 5.1 will vary depending on where it is being
done in the flow diagram of Figure 5.2. In some instances, scientists on disciplinary committees can
4By "program" is meant the collective activities in a discipline or subdiscipline (or even across disciplines) that include both
missions and ground-based research—all the activities directed toward a goal or set of goals.
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complete the loop with a general knowledge of technology options and "ballpark" estimates of cost. But
before final decisions are made within the NASA program offices, this loop has to be closed in great
detail. The outer feedback loop recognizes the fact that the Administration or Congress sometimes
reduces outlays to the point where missions have to be rescoped or rethought entirely.
There are many participants, tasks, criteria, and processes involved in the life cycle in these diagrams.
The details vary from discipline to discipline. In microgravity, for example, the "space platforms,"
principally the Shuttle and Space Station, correspond to "missions" (Figure 5.1) and are responsive to
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national priorities outside of science; here, scientists focus almost entirely on prioritizing scientific goals
within these constraints. In the classical space sciences (astronomy, planetary science, space physics), on
the other hand, the scientific goals and the designs of missions are tightly bound, and the scientific
community must conduct at least the initial trade-offs all the way down to "Prioritize Missions." In the
case of the "Great Observatories," prioritization of some scientific goals takes place even after launch
when user time on the instruments is allocated. In all disciplines, after in-depth studies of design, cost,
and timing, the initial recommendations from the scientific community may repeat the cycle.
Thus, the disciplines present varying circumstances: a space platform built for other purposes that
can accommodate scientific experiments (e.g., Shuttle, Space Station); new launch vehicles and space
platforms being designed to accommodate a variety of science observations and experiments (e.g., the
New Millennium spacecraft); and space platforms that must be designed explicitly for the particular
scientific goal being pursued (e.g., larger observatories, planetary surface exploration systems). The
strength of the coupling between scientific goal, program, and mission (illustrated schematically in
Figure 5.3) must be recognized by the science prioritization process. For areas in which coupling is
strong, the process loop of Figure 5.1 must be traversed early in the prioritization process at least at the
level of conceptual design and ballpark cost estimates. For weak coupling, the loop is not traversed until
late in the process.
The entire process of establishing space science priorities is dependent on a number of parameters:
• disciplinary level at which priorities are established,
• organizational level at which priorities are set,
• participants in the process,
• criteria to be applied,
• approach or process to be used, and
• tasks to be performed.
Disciplines
The committee used the word "discipline" to signify the six areas so designated in the current NASA
program structure. These areas and the current NASA major offices having responsibility for each are as
follows:
• Office of Space Science (OSS)
Astrophysics
Space physics
Planetary science
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• Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications (OLMSA)
Life science
Microgravity science
• Office of Mission to Planet Earth (OMTPE)
Earth science
A discipline is an area, such as those represented in university hierarchies by academic departments,
in which there is a coherent, communicating body of scientists who understand the scientific and
technical aspects of one another's fields of research well enough to judge overall quality but who cannot
easily trade places in performing research. The disciplines have different characteristics that affect the
manner in which priorities are eventually established. Four (astrophysics, space physics, planetary
science, and Earth science) are observational disciplines,5 while two (life science and microgravity
science) are laboratory disciplines. Further, "microgravity" is, strictly speaking, a variable, not a
discipline; it addresses the question of what can be learned in a variety of disciplines by experimentation
in a low-gravity environment.
A few characteristics of NASA's six space science disciplines are as follows:
Astrophysics—Depends on remote-sensing techniques; NASA's program is a substantial part of the
whole field of astronomy (certainly in dollar terms), which is therefore heavily dependent on NASA; may
require large, expensive instruments.
Space Physics—Uses both remote-sensing and in situ techniques; field is strongly dependent on
NASA, although it varies somewhat by subdiscipline (e.g., small for atmospheric science, moderate for
solar physics, large for magnetospheric physics); can probably manage well with "smaller, faster,
cheaper" missions.
Planetary Science—Uses both remote-sensing and in situ techniques; almost entirely dependent on
NASA; requirements for interplanetary flight and planetary capture or landing lead to mission complex-
ity.
Life Science—Laboratory science; NASA supports only a very small part of the total resecjch field;
this small part includes operational support (e.g., long-term effects of spaceflight on human biology) and
operational (or strategic) research, as well as fundamental research. Operational (strategic) research in
the life sciences is research that addresses problems directly related to the presence of humans in space
and their short- and long-term ability to survive and function in that environment.6
Microgravity Science—Laboratory science; a loose collection of several disciplines (fluid mechanics
and transport, biology and biotechnology, materials, combustion, and physics), some of which are
phenomenological. The microgravity science portion of these disciplines is always a very small fraction
of the total reach of the discipline. Individual microgravity studies are relatively small in scope and
(relatively) small in incremental costs because the platform (Shuttle, Space Station) is presumed
available.
Earth Science—Mainly remote sensing of Earth, ocean, and atmosphere parameters best examined
from space; small part of the total field.
One of the most important effects of these differences is the degree to which the design of missions
influences a determination of priorities of scientific goals. For example, scientists concerned with
5The committee recognizes the laboratory and theory components of these four sciences and is here referring to those areas of these
sciences that are conducted in or from space by NASA. NASA will need to ensure that the ground-based research essential for
understanding space observations is carried out.
6NRC, Space Studies Board, Committee on Space Biology and Medicine, letter to NASA's Life and Biomedical Sciences and
Applications Division Director Joan Vemikos, July 27, 1995.
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microgravity studies come from a variety of different traditional disciplines. Therefore, at the discipline
advisory committee stage in the setting of priorities, scientists deliberating on scientific priorities within
the program will be judging the relative scientific merits of projects outside the traditional boundaries of
their personal disciplines. Although they cannot judge with the same precision as a corresponding panel
in other space disciplines, participants are expected to obtain necessary information from one another and
be able to make judgments regarding the relative importance of microgravity studies outside their own
discipline. They should be able to explain this judgment to one another and through such discussions
arrive at relative science priority rankings. A microgravity experiment of great significance to protein
crystal growth, for example, ought to have higher priority than an experiment in fluid flow of only modest
significance to that field. Competent scientists with adequate breadth of knowledge can have construc-
tive discussions, even arguments, about such issues and arrive at a conclusion if asked to do so.
In astronomy, on the other hand, the commonly agreed-on science frontiers or goals are often
expressed as new observational capabilities, that is, as a mission. This is because there is usually an array
of frontier science questions that share a common need for a new observational capability.
As the process of prioritization engages the organizational entities shown in Figure 5.2, it passes
through various levels of "disciplinarity":
Subdisciplinary level—A field in which there is a communicating body of scientists who regard each
other as active, working experts in the field, who believe that their own work can be adequately
understood and judged by one another, and who could do one another's research.
Disciplinary level—A field in which there is a communicating body of scientists who understand the
scientific and technical aspects of one another's fields of research, who could not necessarily easily trade
places in the research they perform, but who can readily understand one another's work and can easily
cooperate in joint research. (Note: In the NASA lexicon, the "discipline" of microgravity is, strictly
speaking, inconsistent with this definition, but it can be accommodated.)
Cross-disciplinary level—Fields in which there are communicating bodies of scientists with general
knowledge of one another's fields of expertise but (usually) having insufficient initial understanding to
collaborate closely without reciprocal education and tutelage. At this cross-disciplinary level, two new
elements arise in addressing priorities: (1) The need to "interleave" the priorities put forth by the
disciplines. An important new element enters at this level: the conventional notion of "peer review"
cannot be relied on exclusively, because areas with different sets of peers or expert constituencies are
being intercompared. (2) Factors outside of pure scientific merit become more important. In fact, some
of these, entering for the first time, may alter the order of priority established at the disciplinary level.
Agency level—Total scope of all research performed by NASA.
Structure and Participants
Figure 5.2 depicts the general context for setting science priorities for NASA. In the past, disciplin-
ary committees of the NRC's Space Studies Board (SSB), tapping into a broad constituency of scientists,
would issue reports describing the important scientific goals to be pursued in their fields. These reports
would be taken up by internal NASA groups, often working at the subdisciplinary level, and incorporated
into plans for various space missions. A number of these missions were very large—at the billion dollar
level or above—and required many years to be brought to fruition.
The expenditures on such a mission would include space vehicles and launch costs. Further, the
projects involved considerable expenditure on continuing data collection, research, and analysis. Not too
many of these large projects could be pursued concurrently, and so they would be ordered into a "mission
queue" designed to meet the needs of the various scientific disciplines sequentially. Within NASA, the
Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications orchestrated the process of transforming
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disciplinary scientific goals into this mission queue. The scientists in any discipline could be reasonably
certain that, periodically, "their time would come."
In establishing the priority and sequence of these projects, the OSS A associate administrator not only
used internal NASA resources, but also continued to tap into the broad community of scientists for advice
and counsel. Occasionally, as convened by NASA in 1991 at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, scientists
from internal and external committees in various fields assembled to discuss and argue about the entire
set of plans and priorities. In general, this system was perceived to work well. The various disciplines
felt that their arguments and suggestions had been heard even when their own programs did not head the
resulting queue. However, the environment was one of budgets more or less adequate to accommodate
much of what the scientific community thought important to do. While there were delays and occasional
mission failures, few projects were canceled in midstream for budgetary reasons.
The future will be different. It will likely be a future of decreasing budgets, smaller missions,
stronger emphasis on controlling costs, and greater competition between disciplines. Thus, the task of
establishing priorities and making choices will be more difficult, and possibly more contentious, than in
the past. In addition, NASA's science programs are now distributed among several organizations.
Subdisciplinary and disciplinary trade-offs are made in separate units before choices are presented to
each associate administrator for disciplinary and cross-disciplinary selection. Final decisions for major
initiatives are then made by the Administrator with advice from the Chief Scientist.
The process in the various disciplines is not managed uniformly. While this variation may be logical
from the point of view of the different national goals and purposes served by the major science offices, it
is not clear that an appropriate balance of science and other objectives results. Moreover, the process has
become less transparent to the scientific community at a time when its input may be more rather than less
useful. The scientific community has not had to choose the highest-priority scientific goals from among
many desirable goals, to participate actively in cross-disciplinary choices, or to help identify projects that
should be stopped. Yet all of these things are going to be part of the future scene. In addition, innovative
ways of conducting space science missions must be sought to enhance the ability to advance the space
sciences. These novel methods of doing space science will be ever more important as budgets become
tighter. The scientific community must find ways to help optimize these choices. Otherwise, decisions
will be made primarily on administrative or political grounds.
Thus, the scientific community and NASA each face a challenge: the scientific community must
address issues not addressed in the past, and NASA must establish and maintain a system of prioritization
that is transparent and open in the new and more challenging climate of today. Meeting these challenges
will be necessary if NASA's space science programs are to be strengthened and energized.
As NASA faces ever-increasing budgetary pressure, it is becoming increasingly important not only
to prioritize among science initiatives and missions, but also to address issues of efficiency and
productivity. The present NASA culture for accomplishing missions is sometimes inefficient, and many
aspects of mission design, oversight, quality assurance, and management need to be remodeled and
reduced. The top priority is to execute the highest-quality set of NASA science missions and initiatives
possible within whatever budget is available. As a consequence, the real work of prioritizing among
missions, both ongoing and new, must be done in an environment where an ever-increasing fraction of
the science budget is devoted to science rather than to supporting functions. More must be done for less,
rather than permitting an inefficient culture to squeeze out existing and future science initiatives.
The participants in this priority-setting process fall into three categories, as described below.
NRC Participants
Space Studies Board and its discipline committees—Mirroring NASA's historical administrative
structure, the Space Studies Board (SSB) has divided space science into six disciplines: astronomy and
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astrophysics, solar and space physics, planetary science, Earth science, microgravity, and life science.
Each of these disciplines is overseen by a committee reporting to the Board; in two cases (astronomy and
astrophysics, and solar and space physics) committee oversight is shared with another NRC board. The
committees are charged with identifying research opportunities, setting and prioritizing the overall
scientific goals within their discipline, and evaluating NASA's success in implementing these strategies.
NRC ad hoc committees—In the case of astronomy and astrophysics, the overall prioritization has
been done once per decade by an ad hoc NRC committee. Unlike the committees that oversee the other
five disciplines, the NRC astronomy and astrophysics survey committees prioritize missions and projects
from major to relatively modest sizes.
NASA Advisory Participants
NASA advisory committees—NASA has established an extensive advisory committee system that, in
the Office of Space Science at least, operates at both the associate administrator (cross-disciplinary) level
and the division (disciplinary) level. That is, at the major office level, each associate administrator has an
advisory committee (cross-disciplinary) that spans the fields in his office and reports directly to the
NASA Advisory Council. Likewise, each division director within the major office has a disciplinary
subcommittee that reports upward to the full committee as well as to the disciplinary division. Typically,
the chair of each panel sits on the next highest level body. The primary task of these internal committees
is advising NASA on science programs in their areas of competence. These programs are developed on
the basis of scientific merit, technical readiness, and programmatic factors operative at their levels.
Developing these programs entails prioritizing and integrating proposals submitted by their subordinate
panels. The panels also serve some of the review functions of a university visiting committee,
continually assessing the progress and status of their sponsoring NASA organizations.
The role of the NASA committees is primarily tactical and program planning, in contrast to the
strategic focus of NRC committees. The NASA committees are also subject to the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. As a result of these distinctions, meetings of the two groups of committees are quite
different. The NASA committee meetings and deliberations have a much stronger programmatic flavor
and typically address nearer-term and more specific planning issues. They are also always attended by a
senior NASA manager and have more direct access to agency scientists, engineers, and budget informa-
tion. The NASA advisory committees consist primarily of scientists drawn from the external community,
but may include NASA scientists with particularly relevant expertise. While individual external
community scientists may serve on the SSB (or its committees) and NASA committees (or their
subcommittees) serially, simultaneous participation in both SSB and NASA committee structures is
precluded by custom. This is to avoid the perception that any individual has excess influence or is serving
as an advisor to both strategic planning and program execution at the same time.
NASA ad hoc committees—In order to provide regular access to space, NASA has established the
Explorer program in astrophysics and space physics and the Discovery program in planetary science. In
these programs, missions are prioritized by ad hoc program peer review panels during investigator and
team selection. The degree to which SSB strategies are used in setting the priorities depends on details of
the proposals under review and the extent to which SSB science priorities are accepted by the members of
the ad hoc panel.
NASA Management Participants
Associate administrators—The associate administrators have the responsibility for managing the
entire scientific program within their purview. In the Office of Space Science and the Office of Life and
Microgravity Sciences and Applications, this involves setting priorities across disciplines. The associate
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administrators are also responsible for coordinating with other federal agencies working in related areas.
Finally, they serve as advocates for their programs to the Administrator in structuring funding priorities
for the agency.
Science Council—This group comprises the science associate administrators and the Chief Scientist,
is chaired by the latter, and acts as an advisory body to the Administrator.
Chief Scientist—The Chief Scientist provides advice to the Administrator on all issues relating to
science within the agency. This official chairs the Science Council. The Chief Scientist tracks the
choices made within the science programs of NASA and, with the Science Council, provides a forum for
their coordination and balance.
Administrator—The Administrator of NASA makes final decisions that not only incorporate the best
scientific and technical advice that has come up through the previous channels, but also reflect NASA
strategy, national goals, and policy direction provided by the Administration and Congress.
THE PRIORITIZATION PROCESS
Key Elements
The scientific community strongly supports the practice of peer review for selection of research
support and refereeing of results for publication. The scientific community regularly uses peer review to
render judgment about the relative scientific value of research projects. Peer review implies judgment by
others who are as expert in the field of inquiry as the one proposing work or reporting results. Scientists
are comfortable with judgments rendered by peers, and were this process fully adequate for establishing
priorities, the issue would be simple. But it is not.
The scientific community is uncomfortable with priority setting in which factors beyond pure
scientific merit come into play, partly because it implies judgment by people who are not experts.
Moreover, the degree of discomfort grows as the degree of scientific expertise of the decision makers
goes down. Nevertheless, in the real world, priorities are virtually synonymous with budgets, so they
cannot be escaped. Thus, if scientists are to play an expanded role in establishing priorities, they must
engage in deliberations outside their areas of primary scientific expertise. They must also become
accustomed to the intrusion of nonscientific factors.
Beginning with decision making within the narrowest boundaries, priority-setting mechanisms in use
include the following:
Peer review—Scientific peers (i.e., experts in a common subdiscipline) determine a project's
scientific merits, novelty, originality, importance, timeliness, methodologies, uncertainties, and concep-
tual reservations and reach agreement about a project's importance in relation to other projects.
Peer judgment—After peer review, projects must often be evaluated by a broader-based group, still
in the same general discipline, who understand one another's work. This evaluation involves interleaving
the recommendations of subdiscipline groups. The group's decisions are based primarily on scientific
merit, but technical feasibility and cost, if known in some degree, can enter this review.
Science advocacy and challenge—Any proposed scientific effort has advocates who can argue its
merits to the groups or authorities making priority decisions. Such advocacy provides informed support
in the face of critical evaluation so that the scientific community will consider the proposal to have had
fair representation.
Technical evaluation—At some level a decision has to be made not only on scientific merit, but also
on technical feasibility. This decision will involve cost, whether needed technology exists or can be
reasonably developed, and its effect on other projects. This decision process is not totally separable from
scientific merit, and there will be elements of technical evaluation at all decision levels.
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Management review—At the program and agency levels, if not at lower levels, there should be a
comprehensive and vigorous confrontation of competing proposals. It is here that all of the factors going
into priority setting must come together and the factors outside of science, technology, and cost (e.g.,
foreign policy, national needs, NASA strategies) must be considered by line management. Final review
must ensure that all prior evaluations were made competently and in accordance with the agency's
policies and procedures and that all significant criteria have been taken into account.
Analytic/algorithmic methods—The Space Studies Board has explored this type of process in the
past.7 The process involves specifying a set of criteria and a set of entities to be evaluated. Each entity is
evaluated or ranked by each criterion and the results combined by an agreed-upon method to obtain an
overall rank or priority. Obviously, there can be many alternative ways of doing this, ranging from hard
numbers assigned at every step to much "softer" rankings and combinations.
The main virtue of an algorithmic approach is that it forces an analysis of the substance and
importance of the criteria to be used in prioritization. The danger is that the process can degenerate into
an exercise in numerology. Anyone who wishes to use such a process should be careful to verify that the
final outcome is consistent with his or her overall judgment.
The committee developed the following specific recommendations for the prioritization process:
Recommendation 5-1: A clear set of criteria for prioritizing scientific goals and missions should be
established by NASA and adopted by all participants. Even though different subsets of the criteria may
be applied by the various parties in the system, all of these participants should know what the complete
set is, and, ideally, agree with it.
Recommendation 5-2: Goals and priorities within subdisciplines, and to some extent within disciplines,
have been set in the past by panels of scientists; feasibility is demonstrated by a number of NRC
committee reports. It is highly important that scientific criteria be applied by scientists.
Recommendation 5-3: Scientific goals need to be kept foremost in view at all times, even as NASA
establishes priorities across the disciplines. As the scientific goals and priorities get modified by
considerations of missions and/or broader national interests, including the priorities of other federal
agencies, the scientific community needs to be continually involved in formulating these compromises
and modifications.
Recommendation 5-4: Processes should be fair and sufficiently open and transparent to ensure
credibility among nonparticipants. Broad participation is desirable—a significant and respected part of
the scientific community should be involved in major priority-setting exercises. These characteristics
will also ensure credibility among the participants themselves. Some of the participants at lower levels of
priority setting should also participate at higher levels.
Recommendation 5-5: Processes and criteria at each priority-setting step must be able to identify new
initiatives and rank ongoing efforts. The task of identifying new initiatives will occur automatically
provided the formal exercise of priority setting is done periodically. Ongoing efforts must be rigorously
included in the processes to ensure their continued priority. Management must face the task of canceling
programs or projects that are failing or whose priority has dropped.
7NRC, Space Studies Board, Setting Priorities in Space Research: An Experiment in Methodology, National Academy Press, 1995.
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Recommendation 5-6: Participation by scientists should continue up the hierarchy as far as scientific
goals and criteria continue to play a role in priority setting. At each level, parties must have confidence
that they are dealing only with propositions that have "passed scientific muster" below. There are
separate and complementary roles for in-house NASA committees and for external advisors.
Recommendation 5-7: At each level in the hierarchy, priority-setting processes should incorporate (1)
appropriate criteria, (2) competent and forceful advocacy, (3) strong challenge by dispassionate adversar-
ies, and (4) involved discussion, all leading to consensus and/or concurrence. The processes should be
public and widely understood and should include knowledgeable but disinterested individuals. NASA
must buy in to the process, be a significant part of it, and accept the results. Interaction between NASA
and the groups engaged in the process is necessary.
A key element of the process is review of proposals for scientific investigation by peers of the
proposers. There are, however, two issues that must be dealt with in the proper management of peer
review. The first is that the process must be free of any taint of conflict of interest. The use of experts in
the same or related fields carries with it the risk that the reviewers may influence the outcome in ways that
are favorable either to their own programs or to their close collaborators. The second issue relates
specifically to NASA programs where NASA center scientists may compete for support with outside
scientists. It is essential that the review process, whether for flight missions or laboratory research, not
create real or perceived advantages for center scientists. If program management functions are moved
from Headquarters to field centers, it is particularly important that Headquarters retain responsibility for
the selection process in order to ensure that no bias is introduced into the evaluation.
Recommendation 5-8: Peer review for scientific investigations should be continued. Control of the
peer review process should remain with Headquarters, and adequate Headquarters staff should be
retained for this purpose. The process should be structured such that proposals from either outside or
inside the agency are not placed at a real or apparent disadvantage.
One of the charges to this committee is to ensure the preservation of funding opportunity for highly
innovative or high-risk research in an environment of budget constraints and well-entrenched existing
constituencies. An innovative proposal typically suggests a pilot project designed to explore a scientific
or technological idea that falls outside contemporary frameworks of inquiry or design. In principle,
applying a criterion for scientific merit such as "Potential for New Discoveries and Understanding, and
Uniqueness" in a rigorous, systematic way would ensure high rankings for highly innovative research.
However, innovative and high-risk research does not always enter the system by conventional means, and
even when it does, it may not be easy to rank against more conventional proposals during the peer review
process. The most effective way to ensure that innovative, high-risk proposals get due attention is to
build some flexibility and discretion into the system. Such a proposal, which might well be considered
"high risk" by peer-review panels, would be considered for funding if it meets two criteria:
• the possible payoff of a successful outcome would more than compensate for the perceived level
of risk; and
• the proposed experiments are well-designed and in the hands of competent investigators. Program
managers would announce the opportunity to submit such proposals to the scientific and technological
communities. Review panels would also be encouraged to forward to the relevant program manager
proposals that they perceive to fall into this category.
The funding of innovative research should be adequate to test and explore an idea but should not
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become a permanent source of funding for it. At some point, after appropriate seeding, the research either
should be terminated or should enter the normal channels of program definition and prioritization.
Because proposals for innovative research may arise from many different sources and because, by
definition, their precise nature is not easily anticipated, they need to be supported by an explicit budgetary
item. Thus NASA budgets should include a line devoted to small grants for innovative ideas in space
science, and the funds should not be used for any other purpose (e.g., for funding or "topping off
marginal projects in established budgets). The difficulty of maintaining room for innovative research
will be much greater in the future than in the past because of intensified budgetary pressures.
Recommendation 5-9: Innovative research that may lead to new and important scientific findings
should be fostered through allocation of limited discretionary funding for innovative, high-risk, high-
return ideas falling outside current frameworks of inquiry or design. This research is highly important
and deserves special management attention, including that of the Chief Scientist. This recommendation
is not intended to allow circumventing of peer review for the major parts of any science program.
As an aside, small initiatives play an extremely important role in providing the opportunity for
innovative ideas or unproved concepts to be included in the science enterprise. They should be judged
principally on scientific merit and potential payoff.
Tasks
The tasks that must be performed to arrive at a final set of prioritized scientific goals and missions are
suggested in Figure 5.1 and elaborated on below:
Identify scientific goals—In any advancing field of science, research participants are knowledgeable
about the most compelling unanswered questions. These questions lead to the definition of common
scientific goals that would be most likely to advance scientific understanding. Peer review is the proper
means of screening scientific goals to identify those items that are legitimate and important scientific
goals.
Prioritize scientific goals—Prioritization can take many forms. It may be a rigorous numerical
ranking of items under consideration, or it may be no more than the identification, without ranking, of
those items that exceed a defined threshold of importance. It is, basically, devising and using an
explainable method—of whatever nature—to discriminate between things that are more important and
those that are less important, and doing this to the extent necessary to make the decisions that must be
made. Part of the entire process is deciding what issues (criteria) need to be addressed in determining
importance.
Define programs—Given scientific goals and priorities, it is possible to structure the content of a
program, including both flight missions and ground-based research, appropriate to the prioritized
scientific goals. It is important that the science program not be warped excessively to conform to the
current high-priority flight missions, which, after all, address only certain of the priorities.
Identify technology options—In order to define the missions necessary to pursue scientific goals,
alternative technical approaches must be identified and judged. Space science projects must always be
alert to new technology that might make missions more effective scientifically and less expensive.
Define missions—With an understanding of science priorities, overall program structure, and tech-
nology options, it should be possible to devise an optimal set of missions to carry them out. In astronomy
the missions are essentially defined by the scientific goals as noted. In the microgravity sciences the
mission is set by nonscientific national priorities, and the science rides "piggyback" on them. In other
disciplines the coupling varies in depth and strength.
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Prioritize missions—The primary consideration in prioritizing missions should be the quantity of
high-quality science that can be achieved per dollar of expenditure.
Evaluate technology, feasibility, and cost—This task is represented by the inner feedback loop in
Figure 5.1. It is the means by which scientific goals and missions become integrated and, as noted earlier,
varies in intensity and depth from discipline to discipline.
Design payloads, platforms, vehicles—Conceptual versions of this task have to be performed as
missions are defined to deduce feasibility and cost; these are iterated with prioritization of scientific
goals. After the feedback loop in Figure 5.1 has been traversed enough to converge on science and
mission priorities, the final, detailed design of payloads, platforms, and vehicles is the last step in
planning the observational or experimental science. After collecting the data and observations, the
investigators must be able to carry out their analysis and evaluation.
SUMMARY OF PRIORITIZATION TASKS, TOOLS, AND PARTICIPANTS
Summary Matrix
Table 5.1 collects and summarizes the elements of prioritization. This matrix illustrates the
approximate distribution and relationship of the factors involved in priority setting and is not meant as a
hard prescription. The degree of scientific involvement from the subdiscipline to the agency level will
vary depending on discipline, and tasks duplicated from one level to the next will vary in style and depth.
During its analysis, the committee also considered the advisory functions traditionally carried out by
the boards and committees of the National Research Council (see box).
TABLE 5.1 Matrix of Factors Involved in Prioritization and Science Program Level
Level Tasks Participants Criteria Approach
Subdiscipline and
discipline
Cross-discipline
Agency
• Identify and prioritize
scientific goals
• Identify
technology
options
• Prioritize scientific
goals (interleave
disciplines)
• Define programs and
prioritize missions
• Evaluate technology
feasibility, costs
• Prioritize and select
missions
• SSB disciplinary
committees
• NRC ad hoc
committees
• NAC committees
• NASA program
associate
administrators
• NAC advisory
committees
• NASA program
associate
administrators
• NASA Chief Scientist
• NASA Science Council
• NASA Administrator
• NASA Chief Scientist
• NASA Science
Council
• Scientific merit
• Programmatic
merit (initial)
• Scientific merit
• Programmatic
merit
• Scientific merit
• Programmatic
merit
• Political and
social merit
• Peer review
• Peer judgment
• Science advocacy
• Initial technical
evaluation
• Science advocacy
and challenge
• Management review
• Science advocacy
and challenge
• Program advocacy
and challenge
• Management review
NOTE: At each level the process deals only with propositions that have the heritage of scientific merit from earlier reviews.
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Role of the National Research Council
• National Research Council committees, including the Space Studies Board, should continue to be
the channel and surrogate for participation by the broader scientific community and should be used by NASA
to solicit and draw on the best ideas and judgment of this community. These committees should be made up
of scientists not supported by NASA, as well as those who are. The establishment of space science priorities
should begin, as it has in the past, with the efforts of the scientific community through the NRC and the Space
Studies Board. This prioritization will address broad research thrusts, not individual proposals or technical
approaches. The disciplinary committees of the Board have been effective in the past in suggesting
important scientific goals for NASA to pursue. This process should be continued.
• Clear statements of priorities among suggested scientific goals should be made by all NRC
committees that address priorities.
• The disciplinary committees should give some weight, in the beginning, to costs and timing.
Scientists can often help in finding low- or lower-cost ways of addressing scientific goals. There is no reason
to leave this factor totally out of consideration, even at the early stages of formulating scientific goals.
• Information about mission constraints, to the extent known, should be obtained by NRC disciplinary
committees.
• An important output of the disciplinary committees should be a relatively small number of important
scientific goals, major or moderate-sized programs, and the scientific justification for them. Arguments in
support of their importance should be founded on defined criteria.
Recommendations for NASA Management
The committee offers the following additional prioritization-related management recommendations
for NASA.
Recommendation 5-10: The NASA Advisory Council and its committees should continue to play a
major advisory role in determining program priorities. The Council and committees should be composed
primarily of external members, with internal NASA scientists included as appropriate.
Recommendation 5-11: The Chief Scientist should attend all key internal NASA meetings concerned
with priorities and ensure that adequate scientific representation is maintained throughout the prioritiza-
tion process and that a properly balanced set of recommendations reaches the Administrator. The Chief
Scientist needs to be able to argue issues directly to the Administrator of NASA, independent of decisions
by committees or managers at lower levels.
Recommendation 5-12: Within NASA Headquarters, there must be a capable scientific staff to support
management priority setting in order to help ensure compatibility of program content and science
priorities. These scientists must also interface with field center managers and external investigators to
ensure science program integrity.
Technology: Analysis and Findings
The committee's task group on technology was charged to perform a broad analysis of the role of
technology in the space sciences. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, NASA is beginning to emphasize the
benefits of new technologies for ameliorating the effects of diminished budgets. NASA refers to these
new technologies as enabling both "faster, better, cheaper" missions and "smaller, faster, cheaper"
missions. The "smaller" and "faster" adjectives draw upon Freeman Dyson's observations about the
compelling scientific advantages of simple and rapid experimentation.1 The "cheaper" adjective is a
reflection of the current budget environment and was introduced to NASA by Administrator Goldin in
1992.
The slogan "faster, better, cheaper" is often misunderstood to mean that the new approach can be
expected to yield "better" science. In fact, NASA's prior emphasis on scientific performance over cost
often produced excellent science that may not be equaled by cost-limited missions. The "smaller, faster,
cheaper" technologies may, on the other hand, be "better" primarily in the sense that they enable vigorous
space science programs at an acceptable cost.
THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND THE SPACE SCIENCES
The development and utilization of "smaller, faster, cheaper" technologies offer many opportunities
to energize the space sciences. The vision of frequent launches of small probes is an appealing one for
rapid discovery, testing of hypotheses, and extension of understanding. While the laws of physics dictate
that large, capable spacecraft will be needed for some missions, the new technologies should restore the
balance between "large" and "small" science and lessen the cost of the remaining large missions.
Some new technologies will require adjustments in the practice of science. In addition to more
frequent launches, "smaller, faster, cheaper" flight projects will often employ new technologies in
sensors and for the interpretation of data. These new instruments may not measure everything that is
possible, but only what is necessary, and, in some cases, data from new instruments and systems will not
have the heritage of data from earlier instruments. Scientists will have to learn to use these new data, to
relate them to older data where appropriate, and to replace through insights enabled by improved analyses
what the new data may lack in desired breadth. In the process, accepted practices in the space sciences
will change and science will evolve.
'Dyson, F., Infinite in All Directions, Harper and Row, 1988.
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On the other hand, development of technologies for the space sciences should be driven by
significant science objectives. For new technologies to have the desired effect on the space sciences,
NASA must be sensitive to boundaries that cannot be crossed without exchanging valid science for mere
technology demonstrations. The identification, development, and utilization of new technologies must
be subject to the discipline of meeting high-priority science objectives. The criterion for judging new
technologies should be their potential for enabling more high-quality science within the constraints of
realistic budgets. This judgment should be made through reviews by scientists and engineers who
represent the best scientists and technologists in NASA and other agencies, in industry, and in academia.
The Integration of Science and Technology
If "smaller, faster, cheaper" missions are to yield high-quality science, scientists and engineers must
work more closely during design, development, integration, flight operations, and data archiving than has
been the general practice with large missions. The synergism of talents that is possible in team
environments has proven effective in industry and should prove equally effective with flight projects.
The necessary compromises and the mutual learning among scientists and engineers can best be realized
in these team settings where everyone understands the enabling value of new technologies and recognizes
that science and technology are mutually supportive in ensuring the future vitality of the space sciences.
A key to the success of integrated projects is balance between immediate scientific results and the
validation of technologies that not only enable these immediate results, but also improve scientific
capability for future missions. While that balance might lie anywhere between the extremes of "science
is supreme" to a "validation of technology," a moderation should be sought. The former does not help
achieve better or more affordable science later; the latter may ultimately prove of little or no value unless
the technologies selected for flight validation are based on real space science needs.
The development of new technologies for the space sciences should be coupled to current science
objectives. NASA will not have the resources to develop every technology in the anticipation that a few
will prove of eventual value to science. Nor will it have the resources to develop a broad range of
technologies in the belief that the process will significantly enhance the competitiveness of U.S. industry.
While many new technologies will have some commercial value, it would be unwise to distort space
science priorities in anticipation of large, but unspecified, benefits to industry or science.
Previous Studies
A wide-ranging study of the civil space program was delivered in December 1990 by the Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program2 (chaired by Norman Augustine). One recommen-
dation of this report that is relevant to the current study was "that an agency-wide technology plan be
developed [for NASA] with inputs from the Associate Administrators responsible for the major develop-
ment programs, and that NASA utilize an expert, outside review process, managed from headquarters, to
assist in the allocation of technology funds." The study also recommended "a two- to three-fold
enhancement of the current modest budget [for advanced technology development]."
NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) responded to the call for a technology
plan by developing the 1991 Integrated Technology Plan for the Civil Space Program (ITP)3 and by
having its Space Systems and Technology Advisory Committee (SSTAC) review that ITP.4
2
 Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, December 1990.
3NASA, Integrated Technology Plan for the Civil Space Program, 1991.
4NASA, Advanced Technology for America's Future in Space, 1991.
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In December 1991, NASA's OSSA and OAST suggested that the existing NRC Space Studies Board/
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board Joint Committee on Technology for Space Science and
Applications review NASA's plans for developing new technologies in support of future space science
and applications programs as described in the ITP. The NRC assembled a broadly representative group,
named the Committee on Space Science Technology Planning (CSSTP) and composed of 26 engineers
and scientists (including 7 members of the SSB/ASEB Joint Committee), to conduct the review. The
CSSTP convened a workshop in June 1992 and delivered its report, Improving NASA's Technology for
Space Science,5 in February 1993. This study and report formed the background and starting point for the
work of the present committee. Summary recommendations of the report are provided in Appendix C.
The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board Committee on Advanced Space Technology published a
relevant report on small spacecraft technology in 1994.6
TECHNOLOGY PLANNING
The present committee found that NASA lacks an agency-wide process for identifying, developing,
and using new technologies in its space science missions. While each of the science offices has
developed, or is in the process of developing, independent plans of varying quality, the lack of an
overarching strategy or process makes it difficult for the science offices to combine limited resources to
acquire relevant technologies that span the needs of more than one office, or for the agency to sustain
development of technologies over more than a few budgeting periods. Without a unifying plan, NASA
cannot be confident that it has identified critical weaknesses in space technology—particularly for those
technologies that are unique to the space environment. The planning process should foster closer
interaction between scientists and technology developers so that relevant scientific data can be used in
technology development and so that needed directed research is identified and done.
Principal recommendations of both the report of the Augustine Committee (Appendix C) and the
NRC's Improving NASA's Technology for Space Science (Appendix C) were that NASA develop an
agency-wide Integrated Technology Plan (ITP) and that the ITP undergo periodic external review. As
described above, NASA briefly had an ITP in 1991 (which was reviewed again in 1992), but because that
plan was tied to the extraordinary budget growth recommended by the report of the Augustine Committee
that never occurred, the ITP was never more than an extensive list of technologies that might be
developed if funds became available. There has not yet been a successor to the 1991 ITP. In the interim,
OSAT has funded candidate space science technologies without the benefit of explicit priorities. While
ad hoc decision making is often necessary within dynamic organizations, there is no virtue in the
permanent absence of a well-understood plan.
The agency planning process may encompass the needs of all NASA space technology stakeholders,
but the resulting plan must, at a minimum, incorporate the interests of all the science offices and the
relevant activities of OSAT. The planning process should consider the needs of the operational federal
agencies that use NASA technologies in their operational systems (e.g., the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and the U.S. Geological Survey). The plan should reflect realistic budgets
and indicate how each new technology will be validated, that is, whether through flight or though ground
demonstrations. It should include a strategy for ensuring an adequate systematic knowledge base for
designing systems that must operate efficiently and reliably in the space environment. While the details
of the plan will vary from year to year, the planning process should be stable.
5NRC, Committee on Space Science Technology Planning, Improving NASA's Technology for Space Science, National Academy
Press, 1993.
6NRC, Committee on Advanced Space Technology, Technology for Small Spacecraft, National Academy Press, 1994.
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The plan should be generated through project-level queries within the science offices to identify
desired near-term and far-term technologies and through queries among the scientific and technology-
developing communities to identify the far-term technologies that would enable important new science.
The aspects of the plan relevant to space science should be reviewed annually by a committee chaired by
the NASA Chief Scientist and made up of the NASA Science Council plus recognized scientists and
engineers from inside NASA, from industry, and from academia. The first recommendation of a 1993
NRC report, Improving NASA's Technology for Space Science, has gone unheeded: "The NASA
Administrator or OAST [now OSAT] Associate Administrator should act to establish a coordinating
position with the clear responsibility to ensure cooperation between technology development efforts
within different parts of NASA—from early research through the various stages of technology develop-
ment and readiness."
Recommendation 6-1: NASA should establish an agency-wide process for identifying, developing, and
using technologies for the benefit of the space sciences. The aspects of the plan relevant to space science
should be reviewed annually by a committee chaired by the NASA Chief Scientist and made up of the
NASA Science Council plus recognized scientists and engineers from inside NASA, from industry, and
from academia.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Technology development suffers from the paradox that if no new missions needing new technologies
are started, then no new technologies are needed; but if no new technologies are developed, then no new
missions requiring new technologies can be started. The cycle can be broken only if the risks and costs of
technology development are amortized over a number of missions. Therefore, the risk and cost of first
flight demonstrations of new technologies must be charged to a program rather than to a single specific
flight project. Unless NASA can uncouple the cost and risk of technology development from first flight
applications, the most innovative new technologies are unlikely ever to fly.
Near-term Technologies
At least four categories of near-term technology development (development times of less than five
years) can be identified:
1. Technologies that must be refined as part of a flight project. This category includes developments
such as the first use of well-understood, composite structures to accommodate weight growth in another
part of the spacecraft, or the incorporation of well-understood, autonomous operations to reduce mission
operations costs.
2. Advanced Technology Development (ATD) in support of anticipated flight projects within a
single space science office. This category includes projects such as the development of a new sensor
array or a more effective in situ soil analyzer.
3. Focused technology development in support of anticipated flight projects in more than one space
science office. This category includes projects such as the development of a smaller and more powerful
flight control computer or a lighter attitude control system—items that might be used in Earth orbit or on
missions to the planets.
4. Technology development in support of an approved program designed to validate technologies for
future space science missions. Examples include projects under way as part of the Small Satellite
Technology Initiative (SSTI) or New Millennium programs.
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Recommendation 6-2: The space science offices should have primary responsibility for identifying and
reviewing near-term technologies. This arrangement gives the science offices the greatest control of the
technologies that most immediately affect the success of their programs. Each science office should
allocate a significant fraction of its resources to ATD activities and should be willing to pool resources to
achieve shared objectives. Most importantly, the implementation of all categories of technology
development should be undertaken by the best-qualified individuals or teams within NASA, industry, or
academia, as determined by peer review. The overall processes for near-term development would be
coordinated by the Chief Scientist (or a designated representative of the Chief Scientist) through the
NASA Science Council.
Category (1) technologies (above) should be identified, funded, managed, and reviewed within their
associated flight projects. Category (2) technologies should be identified, funded, and reviewed by the
science offices, but management would be where the expertise can be found—either within a science
office or within OS AT. Category (3) technologies should be identified and reviewed jointly by the space
science offices and OSAT, but they should be funded and managed by OSAT. Category (4) projects
would be best funded by OSAT and the science offices and managed by OSAT, because they would
provide the platform and operations to serve more than one customer.
Far-term Technologies
Far-term technologies (those requiring more than five years to be ready for a flight demonstration)
should be selected for their potential to enhance performance significantly or lower the cost of undertak-
ing science in space. These should not be projects designed to yield a 10 percent improvement, but rather
they should attempt to double the cost-effectiveness or entirely change the way some aspect of science in
space is undertaken. Such technologies need not involve space flight; for example, they might include
high-altitude aircraft or new balloon technologies if these promise a significant improvement in quality or
reduction in cost of the space sciences. Currently, OSAT states that it allocates 20 percent of its space
science technology funds to primarily in-house, far-term technologies.
Recommendation 6-3: Promising far-term technologies should be identified, funded, and managed by
the Office of Space Access and Technology (OSAT). Projects should be reviewed jointly by the science
offices and OSAT. These far-term projects should be carried out by the best-qualified individuals or
teams within NASA, industry, or academia as determined by peer review. Tight budgets make it more
important than ever that a regular and rigorous review process be put in place to identify those projects
that ought to be terminated.
Note that the allocation of $31 million for FY 95 on far-term projects (as seen in Figure 2.7) at OSAT
seems small, especially because of the inherent risk in far-term projects.
The Role of NASA Headquarters
As part of NASA downsizing, OSAT plans to reduce its Headquarters staff and transfer some of its
functions to field centers. In one interpretation of this change, detailed management of the Spacecraft
Systems Division—the OSAT organization that is responsible for space science technology—might
move to the Engineering Directorate at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). In this scenario, by 1997,
an office within the GSFC Engineering Directorate would coordinate among all NASA centers the
identification and prioritization of needed technologies for future space science missions and would
manage issuance of announcements of opportunity, peer-reviewed selection, and performance reviews of
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technology development projects. The technology development projects would be competed among
industry, academia, and the NASA centers.
This GSFC-based function would encourage GSFC flight project managers and resident user
scientists to cooperate in identifying, developing, and using new technologies. This cooperation would
be particularly appropriate for near-term technologies seeking a flight opportunity. However, it is not
clear how outside scientists would be heard in this arena, how a GSFC-based function could achieve the
same coordination role for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), or why GSFC is the appropriate
environment for managing far-term technology development for the space sciences. The centers have an
obvious conflict of interest in make-or-buy decisions; they tend to out-source on the basis of critical path
decisions rather than the merit of proposed work, and they tend to use universities as low-cost alternatives
to industry for deliverables rather than as places best suited for the development of the scientific
underpinnings of far-term technologies.
Recommendation 6-4: NASA-wide oversight of technology for the space sciences belongs at Head-
quarters. While field centers might be asked to manage the day-to-day affairs of programs, it should be
Headquarters' role to maintain a comprehensive, formal technology plan and to manage announcement,
selection, and review of technology grants and contracts.
The Role of the Field Centers
As previously noted, NASA and the Department of Defense have been successful in building
technological competence within industry and academia, so that national leadership in many aspects of
space science technology development now resides outside of government laboratories. NASA field
centers continue to develop needed technologies, particularly those associated with unique facilities, but
they also invest in internal projects that are duplicative or below the standards of those now within
industry and academia. Whatever their merit, a characteristic of many of these internal projects is that
they are starved for resources to maintain and upgrade facilities.
Recommendation 6-5: NASA field centers should explicitly define those technological subdisciplines
that require in-house research and development, for example, those associated with mission develop-
ment, integration, testing, and operations; with a unique, national facility; or with "smart buying" of
external technologies. Field centers must rely on the research and development capabilities of other
NASA field centers and of laboratories of the Departments of Energy and Defense, industry, and
academia wherever it is reasonable to do so. The essential, in-house capabilities should be sufficiently
supported to ensure their quality as a national resource. Their effectiveness should be reviewed
periodically by experts from other NASA field centers, industry, and academia. Evidence of continued
excellence might include significant contributions to NASA technology development initiatives, key
contributions to the technological advancement of their subdiscipline, journal publications, presentations
at technical conferences, and patents.
The two science field centers—GSFC and JPL—have attempted to become largely self-sufficient by
acquiring in-house talent either through federal employment or through support contracts. Both science
centers take pride in the stability of their technology/engineering workforce. At the same time, they resist
constructive exchanges of technology or of responsibility for technology between themselves, between
themselves and NASA's research centers such as the Ames Research Center or the Lewis Research
Center, or between themselves and industry or academia. The consequent isolation of these centers has
led to a "not invented here" culture that distorts "make-or-buy" decisions and impedes technology
infusion. This field center behavior must be modified so that centers seek common cause among
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themselves and seek success through marshaling the broader science and technology communities to
achieve the most effective space science projects that are possible for the available budget. While the
current process of clarifying center responsibilities (essentially Earth orbit at GSFC and deep space at
JPL) should help reduce competition between centers for similar projects, their insular culture is so
deeply embedded that it may not be sufficient to achieve the desired cooperation.
Recommendation 6-6: NASA should develop aggressive programs for changing the insular culture of
the field centers. Among these should be programs for personnel exchanges among the centers, industry,
and academia. A fraction of the engineering/technology workforce should be viewed as transient.
Rotation of personnel might be achieved through increasing the participation of postdoctoral engi-
neers in the Resident Research Associateship Program (as "NRC Fellows") and in NASA-funded
Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) exchanges between the field centers and academia and by
coupling promotions to extended visits to other field centers or to industry. These exchanges should be
for a year or more so that the participants have opportunities to both teach and learn new technologies.
While scientists accept the need to publish and to present papers, engineers and technologists are slower
to do so. NASA should encourage these professional communications and the seeking of patents as
mechanisms for ensuring awareness of new technologies.
Participation of Industry and Academia
Competence in space science technology has successfully diffused through industry and the universi-
ties. NASA must increasingly view its role as marshaling these skills and building on them for the benefit
of the space science programs. While NASA has traditionally been willing to seek out-of-house talent to
develop near-term technologies, far-term technology development has generally been the province of the
field centers. This practice restricts the use of potentially useful technologies that reside in industry and
academia. Talent and innovation that can be found in industry and academia, and the technology transfer
and educational value of funding technology development outside NASA, should not be ignored.
Recommendation 6-7: NASA should use the nation's best talent to develop both near-term and far-term
space science technologies. Grants or contracts for space science technology development should be
awarded on the basis of peer-reviewed proposals, and progress should be critically reviewed annually.
Other funding from the agency should be provided on the basis of informed and conscious decisions by
NASA upper management (at Headquarters or a center) and not as an automatic allocation to support the
indefinite perpetuation of a laboratory or facility. Where NASA in-house capability is unable to compete
on the basis of quality, NASA should decide whether to abandon the activity or to improve its quality so
that it can compete.
TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION
While most levels of NASA recognize that the future of the space science programs requires
"smaller, faster, cheaper" technologies, the project managers who have to absorb these technologies are
not given sufficient incentives to do so. Because projects are driven by cost, schedule, and mission
success, and new technologies are perceived as a threat to all three, project managers resist incorporating
technologies that have never been used on a flight. There is also a tension between the desire to use new
technologies and the strong penalty provisions in new NASA contracts. There are several ways to
encourage the use of new technologies: JPL assigns a technology advocate to each major project; GSFC
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uses edicts from engineering management; and NASA Headquarters has created the SSTI and New
Millennium programs to fund flight demonstrations of new technologies.
Recommendation 6-8: NASA should make special efforts to ensure that the emphasis it has newly
placed on the incorporation of new technology in missions truly carries over to the processes for
evaluation and selection of proposals. If increased use of new technology on NASA missions is valued
by the agency, it should ensure that this value is explicit in the selection criteria for new projects.
Furthermore, there should be stronger incentives for project managers to incorporate new technologies.
First, project managers should participate in the selection and review of technology development
projects so that they are familiar with new technologies and, in some sense, have committed themselves
to their use. Second, the project's objectives should include references to the use of new technologies.
Third, the cost of incorporating a new technology in a flight project should be borne by the parent
program so that there is an incentive for the manager of an individual project to use the new technology.
While the committee concurs with the value of flight demonstration programs like New Millennium, it
urges that every technology demonstration flight that is to benefit the space sciences use the new
technology to accomplish valid science. Technology development that is divorced from its application is
much less likely to prove fruitful.
TECHNOLOGY BUDGETS
The prospect of decreasing budgets has forced NASA to recognize that the vitality of its science
programs depends on the infusion or development of new technologies and the incorporation of new
practices in the development, integration, and operation of flight projects. The New Millennium program
has been created to increase the demand for needed technologies and practices. However, the relevant
expenditures by the science offices and OSAT have not increased sufficiently to foster a level of
technology development appropriate to these new realities. While $30 million to $50 million per year is
to be available for technology demonstration flights, the committee was not apprised of a corresponding
allocation of resources to develop the technologies that could be meaningfully demonstrated.
Recommendation 6-9: While the committee endorses NASA's creation of programs like New Millen-
nium, such programs should be coordinated across the agency to ensure that their appetite for technology
is balanced by appropriate technology development budgets, that the new technologies truly serve the
space sciences, that validation flights test technologies through the incorporation of real science objec-
tives, and that there is an appropriate balance in the spectrum between flights that are dominated by the
immediate needs of science and flights that devote significant resources to the incorporation of technolo-
gies that enable better or lower-cost science in the future.
Collected Recommendations
In responding to the charge by the NASA Administrator and the Senate appropriations subcommittee
(Appendix A), the committee divided its task in terms of organizational, priority-setting, and technology
utilization issues. The resulting broad set of recommendations reveals a number of common themes. For
convenient reference, this chapter collects and reorders the major recommendations of the committee
grouped according to these overarching themes.
ESTABLISHMENT OF A "NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SPACE SCIENCE"
Recommendation 4-1: The committee found no compelling reason to establish an independent institute
for space science modeled on the National Institutes of Health. Rather, NASA should retain its science
programs in the present three-enterprise distributed form, but also take action to provide the necessary
integration among the programs (see Recommendation 4-2).
ROLE OF THE NASA CHIEF SCIENTIST
Recommendation 4-2: The position of Chief Scientist should be strengthened to ensure full integration
of the space sciences. A proposed functional statement that encompasses the necessary authority is
provided, followed by a proposed functional statement for the NASA Science Council (see box).
Recommendation 5-11: The Chief Scientist should attend all key internal NASA meetings concerned
with priorities and ensure that adequate scientific representation is maintained throughout the prioritiza-
tion process and that a properly balanced set of recommendations reaches the Administrator. The Chief
Scientist needs to be able to argue issues directly to the Administrator of NASA, independent of decisions
by committees or managers at lower levels.
Recommendation 6-1: NASA should establish an agency-wide process for identifying, developing, and
using technologies for the benefit of the space sciences. The aspects of the plan relevant to space science
should be reviewed annually by a committee chaired by the NASA Chief Scientist and made up of the
NASA Science Council plus recognized scientists and engineers from inside NASA, from industry, and
from academia.
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Proposed Functional Statement for the Chief Scientist
The Chief Scientist exercises NASA-wide leadership for the space sciences and serves as the
principal scientific advisor to the NASA Administrator. He or she should be a person of strong standing in the
scientific community with significant accomplishment in his or her own field. The individual filling this position
should have a breadth of interest and understanding transcending the space sciences to encompass
technology and the interaction of science and technology with elements of society. This person should also
have management experience, preferably in large organizations. Understanding of government processes is
highly desirable. Specific functions of the position are as follows:
• Serves as primary advisor to the NASA Administrator.
• Provides formal concurrence on planning, programs, budgets, and so forth, for the NASA science
programs.
• Acts to resolve conflicts among the science programs and between science programs and other NASA
programs.
• Chairs the NASA Science Council.
• Maintains oversight of science quality across the agency, recommending corrective action where
necessary.
• Maintains oversight of the integration of advanced technology into science programs across the
agency, recommending corrective action where necessary.
• Provides for coordination among the sciences at many levels: programs, advisory groups, other
agencies, the scientific community.
• Serves as representative of NASA science to the outside world and represents the scientific commu-
nity to NASA.
Proposed Functional Statement for the NASA Science Council
The NASA Science Council, chaired by the Chief Scientist, is the internal NASA body responsible for
coordination and integration of science programs and activities.
Specific functions are as follows:
• Sets principles and policies for scientific aspects of strategic planning.
• Reviews and integrates resulting strategic plans for consistency with policies and agency-level
guidance.
• Provides a forum for coordinating programs.
• Provides a forum for conflict resolution.
• Reviews and makes recommendations to help ensure the health of the intellectual and physical
infrastructure.
Membership of the NASA Science Council consists of the Chief Scientist (chair), the Associate
Administrators for the space science programs (OSS, OLMSA, OMTPE), and the Associate Administrator for
Space Access and Technology.
Recommendation 6-2: The space science offices should have primary responsibility for identifying and
reviewing near-term technologies. This arrangement gives the science offices the greatest control of the
technologies that most immediately affect the success of their programs. Each science office should
allocate a significant fraction of its resources to ATD activities and should be willing to pool resources to
achieve shared objectives. Most importantly, the implementation of all categories of technology
development should be undertaken by the best-qualified individuals or teams within NASA, industry, or
academia, as determined by peer review. The overall processes for near-term development would be
coordinated by the Chief Scientist (or a designated representative of the Chief Scientist) through the
NASA Science Council.
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THE ROLE OF HEADQUARTERS
Recommendation 4-3: NASA should eliminate the separate "program management" layer, assign to the
enterprises the program management functions properly located at Headquarters, and delegate to the field
centers those program management functions properly located there.
Recommendation 5-8: Peer review for scientific investigations should be continued. Control of the
peer review process should remain with Headquarters, and adequate Headquarters staff should be
retained for this purpose. The process should be structured such that proposals from either outside or
inside the agency are not placed at a real or apparent disadvantage.
Recommendation 5-12: Within NASA Headquarters, there must be a capable scientific staff to support
management priority setting in order to help ensure compatibility of program content and science
priorities. These scientists must also interface with field center managers and external investigators to
ensure science program integrity.
Recommendation 6-4: NASA-wide oversight of technology for the space sciences belongs at Head-
quarters. While field centers might be asked to manage the day-to-day affairs of programs, it should be
Headquarters' role to maintain a comprehensive, formal technology plan and to manage announcement,
selection, and review of technology grants and contracts.
NASA FIELD CENTER ISSUES
Recommendation 4-4: The Goddard Space Flight Center should remain a civil service center for the
time being. However, NASA should establish periodic external reviews of GSFC to determine whether
new consideration should be given to conversion to a GOCO arrangement.
Recommendation 4-5: Creation of contractor-operated institutes (a focused science activity operated
under contract within a center having broader, possibly nonscientific, responsibilities) may be advanta-
geous for specific science functions or facilities. The selection and creation of such institutes should be
limited to special circumstances, specifically,
• to be responsible for a narrow, bounded area of science,
• to operate a special facility for the scientific community, and
• to maintain a unique national facility or staff capability,
but
• NOT just to lower civil service headcount and
• NOT if the entity is an integral part of the larger organization (the host center).
The committee recommends that, if NASA proceeds to establish pilot science institutes, it give due
attention to the out-years process by which these institutes will have their guaranteed base budgets
ramped down, and to the competitive process under which they will be expected to compete successfully
and maintain or increase their size, or to compete less successfully and shrink or terminate in an orderly
fashion. The committee recommends that other institute initiatives be deferred until the success of initial
pilots can be evaluated.
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Recommendation 4-6: NASA should conduct scientific research activities in-house only to the extent
required to compete successfully for high-quality staff, to maintain capability to manage and interface
with corresponding activities on the outside (e.g., as a "smart buyer"), or to maintain and operate an in-
house capability that is unique in the nation. Otherwise, if a valid out-of-house capability exists, the work
should be done there.
Recommendation 4-7: NASA should adopt an industrial funding model for field centers. Decisions on
program priorities and budget would be more rational if based on full-cost accounting, and program
accountability and discipline in personnel management would be thereby enhanced. The principal
objective is that cost accounting should be based on full program costs, including civil service salaries, to
achieve the advantageous features cited above. A similar recommendation was made in the NASA
Federal Laboratory Review report.'
Recommendation 4-8: Center reporting arrangements should remain as they currently are, with each
center reporting to an appropriate enterprise. All requirements and directions addressed to a center from
any source should be directed through that enterprise.
Recommendation 4-9: Renewed emphasis should be given to the essential role and responsibility of the
project scientist in project trade-offs and decisions through the life of the project.
Recommendation 4-10: NASA should maximize delegation of project responsibility to the executing
agents of its space science programs (center, laboratory, university, or industry) and minimize redundant
NASA oversight. This practice can yield excellent results at an affordable cost. High-value, one-of-a-
kind space science missions may justify increased independent oversight. If necessary, this increased
oversight should be clearly established in the program definition stage and should not be permitted to
creep or evolve with program maturity. The committee makes no recommendation regarding oversight,
delegation of responsibility, nor privatization in the human space flight program.
Recommendation 6-4: NASA-wide oversight of technology for the space sciences belongs at Head-
quarters. While field centers might be asked to manage the day-to-day affairs of programs, it should be
Headquarters' role to maintain a comprehensive, formal technology plan and to manage announcement,
selection, and review of technology grants and contracts.
Recommendation 6-5: NASA field centers should explicitly define those technological subdisciplines
that require in-house research and development, for example, those associated with mission develop-
ment, integration, testing, and operations; with a unique, national facility; or with "smart buying" of
external technologies. Field centers must rely on the research and development capabilities of other
NASA field centers and of laboratories of the Departments of Energy and Defense, industry, and
academia wherever it is reasonable to do so. The essential, in-house capabilities should be sufficiently
supported to ensure their quality as a national resource. Their effectiveness should be reviewed
periodically by experts from other NASA field centers, industry, and academia. Evidence of continued
excellence might include significant contributions to NASA technology development initiatives, key
contributions to the technological advancement of their subdiscipline, journal publications, presentations
at technical conferences, and patents.
'Federal Laboratory Review Task Force, NASA Advisory Council, NASA Federal Laboratory Review, February 1995.
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Recommendation 6-6: NASA should develop aggressive programs for changing the insular culture of
the field centers. Among these should be programs for personnel exchanges among the centers, industry,
and academia. A fraction of the engineering/technology workforce should be viewed as transient.
THE SCIENCE PRIORITIZATION PROCESS
Recommendation 5-1: A clear set of criteria for prioritizing scientific goals and missions should be
established by NASA and adopted by all participants. Even though different subsets of the criteria may
be applied by the various parties in the system, all of these participants should know what the complete
set is, and, ideally, agree with it.
Recommendation 5-2: Goals and priorities within subdisciplines, and to some extent within disciplines,
have been set in the past by panels of scientists; feasibility is demonstrated by a number of NRC
committee reports. It is highly important that scientific criteria be applied by scientists.
Recommendation 5-3: Scientific goals need to be kept foremost in view at all times, even as NASA
establishes priorities across the disciplines. As the scientific goals and priorities get modified by
considerations of missions and/or broader national interests, including the priorities of other federal
agencies, the scientific community needs to be continually involved in formulating these compromises
and modifications.
Recommendation 5-4: Processes should be fair and sufficiently open and transparent to ensure
credibility among nonparticipants. Broad participation is desirable—a significant and respected part of
the scientific community should be involved in major priority-setting exercises. These characteristics
will also ensure credibility among the participants themselves. Some of the participants at lower levels of
priority setting should also participate at higher levels.
Recommendation 5-5: Processes and criteria at each priority-setting step must be able to identify new
initiatives and rank ongoing efforts. The task of identifying new initiatives will occur automatically
provided the formal exercise of priority setting is done periodically. Ongoing efforts must be rigorously
included in the processes to ensure their continued priority. Management must face the task of canceling
programs or projects that are failing or whose priority has dropped.
Recommendation 5-6: Participation by scientists should continue up the hierarchy as far as scientific
goals and criteria continue to play a role in priority setting. At each level, parties must have confidence
that they are dealing only with propositions that have "passed scientific muster" below. There are
separate and complementary roles for in-house NASA committees and for external advisors.
Recommendation 5-7: At each level in the hierarchy, priority-setting processes should incorporate (1)
appropriate criteria, (2) competent and forceful advocacy, (3) strong challenge by dispassionate adversar-
ies, and (4) involved discussion, all leading to consensus and/or concurrence. The processes should be
public and widely understood and should include knowledgeable but disinterested individuals. NASA
must buy in to the process, be a significant part of it, and accept the results. Interaction between NASA
and the groups engaged in the process is necessary.
Recommendation 5-8: Peer review for scientific investigations should be continued. Control of the
peer review process should remain with Headquarters, and adequate Headquarters staff should be
retained for this purpose. The process should be structured such that proposals from either outside or
inside the agency are not placed at a real or apparent disadvantage.
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Recommendation 5-9: Innovative research that may lead to new and important scientific findings
should be fostered through allocation of limited discretionary funding for innovative, high-risk, high-
return ideas falling outside current frameworks of inquiry or design. This research is highly important
and deserves special management attention, including that of the Chief Scientist. This recommendation
is not intended to allow circumventing of peer review for the major parts of any science program.
Recommendation 5-10: The NASA Advisory Council and its committees should continue to play a
major advisory role in determining program priorities. The Council and committees should be composed
primarily of external members, with internal NASA scientists included as appropriate.
Recommendation 5-11: The Chief Scientist should attend all key internal NASA meetings concerned
with priorities and ensure that adequate scientific representation is maintained throughout the prioritiza-
tion process and that a properly balanced set of recommendations reaches the Administrator. The Chief
Scientist needs to be able to argue issues directly to the Administrator of NASA, independent of decisions
by committees or managers at lower levels.
Recommendation 5-12: Within NASA Headquarters, there must be a capable scientific staff to support
management priority setting in order to help ensure compatibility of program content and science
priorities. These scientists must also interface with field center managers and external investigators to
ensure science program integrity.
TECHNOLOGY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Recommendation 6-1: NASA should establish an agency-wide process for identifying, developing, and
using technologies for the benefit of the space sciences. The aspects of the plan relevant to space science
should be reviewed annually by a committee chaired by the NASA Chief Scientist and made up of the
NASA Science Council plus recognized scientists and engineers from inside NASA, from industry, and
from academia.
Recommendation 6-2: The space science offices should have primary responsibility for identifying and
reviewing near-term technologies. This arrangement gives the science offices the greatest control of the
technologies that most immediately affect the success of their programs. Each science office should
allocate a significant fraction of its resources to ATD activities and should be willing to pool resources to
achieve shared objectives. Most importantly, the implementation of all categories of technology
development should be undertaken by the best-qualified individuals or teams within NASA, industry, or
academia, as determined by peer review. The overall processes for near-term development would be
coordinated by the Chief Scientist (or a designated representative of the Chief Scientist) through the
NASA Science Council.
Recommendation 6-3: Promising far-term technologies should be identified, funded, and managed by
the Office of Space Access and Technology (OSAT). Projects should be reviewed jointly by the science
offices and OSAT. These far-term projects should be carried out by the best-qualified individuals or
teams within NASA, industry, or academia as determined by peer review. Tight budgets make it more
important than ever that a regular and rigorous review process be put in place to identify those projects
that ought to be terminated.
Recommendation 6-4: NASA-wide oversight of technology for the space sciences belongs at Head-
quarters. While field centers might be asked to manage the day-to-day affairs of programs, it should be
Headquarters' role to maintain a comprehensive, formal technology plan and to manage announcement,
selection, and review of technology grants and contracts.
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Recommendation 6-5: NASA field centers should explicitly define those technological subdisci-
plines that require in-house research and development, for example, those associated with mission
development, integration, testing, and operations; with a unique, national facility; or with "smart buying"
of external technologies. Field centers must rely on the research and development capabilities of other
NASA field centers and of laboratories of the Departments of Energy and Defense, industry, and
academia wherever it is reasonable to do so. The essential, in-house capabilities should be sufficiently
supported to ensure their quality as a national resource. Their effectiveness should be reviewed
periodically by experts from other NASA field centers, industry, and academia. Evidence of continued
excellence might include significant contributions to NASA technology development initiatives, key
contributions to the technological advancement of their subdiscipline, journal publications, presentations
at technical conferences, and patents.
Recommendation 6-6: NASA should develop aggressive programs for changing the insular culture
of the field centers. Among these should be programs for personnel exchanges among the centers,
industry, and academia. A fraction of the engineering/technology workforce should be viewed as
transient.
Recommendation 6-7: NASA should use the nation's best talent to develop both near-term and far-
term space science technologies. Grants or contracts for space science technology development should
be awarded on the basis of peer-reviewed proposals, and progress should be critically reviewed annually.
Other funding from the agency should be provided on the basis of informed and conscious decisions by
NASA upper management (at Headquarters or a center) and not as an automatic allocation to support the
indefinite perpetuation of a laboratory or facility. Where NASA in-house capability is unable to compete
on the basis of quality, NASA should decide whether to abandon the activity or to improve its quality so
that it can compete.
Recommendation 6-8: NASA should make special efforts to ensure that the emphasis it has newly
placed on the incorporation of new technology in missions truly carries over to the processes for
evaluation and selection of proposals. If increased use of new technology on NASA missions is valued
by the agency, it should ensure that this value is explicit in the selection criteria for new projects.
Furthermore, there should be stronger incentives for project managers to incorporate new technologies.
Recommendation 6-9: While the committee endorses NASA's creation of programs like New
Millennium, such programs should be coordinated across the agency to ensure that their appetite for
technology is balanced by appropriate technology development budgets, that the new technologies truly
serve the space sciences, that validation flights test technologies through the incorporation of real science
objectives, and that there is an appropriate balance in the spectrum between flights that are dominated by
the immediate needs of science and flights that devote significant resources to the incorporation of
technologies that enable better or lower-cost science in the future.
Appendixes
APPENDIX
A
Requests for Study
U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Text of report accompanying NASA's FY 1994 appropriation:
The future of space science—The Committee has included $1,000,000 for the National Academy of
Sciences to undertake a comprehensive and independent review of the role and position of space science within
NASA. It will come as no surprise that the Committee did not support or recommend the dismantling of the
Office of Space Science and Applications. The contributions made by that office in strategic planning, cross
disciplinary priority setting, and management controls were among the best that the Federal Government has
ever undertaken in any of its many scientific components. Given the administration's desire to reinvent
Government, the Committee believes the time has come to seriously consider the creation of an institute for
space science that would serve as an umbrella organization within NASA to coordinate and oversee all space
science activities, not just those in physics, astronomy, and planetary exploration. Such an institute could
function just as the National Institutes of Health now does within the Department of Health and Human
Services. The Committee recognizes that there are certain tradeoffs in the creation of any new entity. The
Academy should look at mechanisms for priority setting across disciplines on the basis of scientific merit,
better means to include advanced technology in science missions, and ways to permit less developed scientific
disciplines to have a means of proving their value, despite skepticism about them in the more established
scientific fields.
Text of report accompanying NASA's FY 1995 appropriation:
The future of space science—The Committee is concerned that no new space science missions are now
planned to be launched by NASA after 1997 at this time. In addition, it is deeply troubled by reports that a
so-called wedge of funding in the 1996 budget for any new science flight projects may require one-half of the
funds to come from existing science budgets. Neither condition is acceptable, and the Committee will expect
whatever pool of funds to be used for future new starts to come from outside of the existing base of space
science funds. The Committee expects the National Academy of Sciences to factor this funding and mission
vacuum into its assessment for the need for a national institute for space science.
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LETTER FROM NASA ADMINISTRATOR DANIEL S. GOLDIN
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington. DC 2O546-OOO1
Dr. Bruce Alberts APR 7 I994
President
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue. N.W.
Washington. D.C. 2O418
Dear Dr. Alberts:
The Conference Report accompanying H.R. 2491, the FY 1994 VA-HUD-lndependent
Agencies appropriations bill, provides $1.0 million "for an assessment of whether a National
Institute of Space Science should be established within NASA." I request that the NAS's
Space Studies Board (SSB) initiate this study in accordance with Congressional guidelines.
Specific directions are provided In the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Report
103-127. In compliance with these directions, a task group should be formed to examine
alternative organizational approaches to coordinating and overseeing NASA's science
programs. In addition, the SSB should utilize existing task groups and/or subpanels to
evaluate possible mechanisms for establishing interdisciplinary science priorities based on
scientific merit and/or other pertinent criteria; improving utilization of advanced technologies
in future science missions; and ensuring opportunities for smaller, newer science disciplines
to successfully compete for limited resources against larger, more established ones. A
Statement of work outlining the specific study tasks has been mutually agreed upon by
NASA's Chief Scientist and the SSB Chair.
The NAS should incorporate Its findings into a report that addresses all issues specified
above. It Is essential that recommendations clearly define the pros and cons for any
proposed changes to the existing organization. Since this type of assessment is within the
scope of our current contract, funding for this activity will be provided through this channel. I
am grateful to NAS for its assistance in this endeavor, and I look forward to hearing from you
in the near future.
Sincerely,
Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
cc:
S/Dr. Huntress
APPENDIX
B
Statements of Task
COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF SPACE SCIENCE
The Project on the Future of Space Science (FOSS) will advise the Space Studies Board on assessing the
role and conduct of space science within NASA. This assessment will analyze specific areas identified by
FY95 Senate Appropriations report language and requested by the NASA Administrator: (1) organization of
civil space research programs within the agency; (2) merit-based cross-disciplinary prioritization, including
preservation of innovative initiatives; and (3) improvements in technology insertion into science missions.
The Board will charge two ad hoc task groups and its existing joint committee on technology to perform the
needed analyses. An ad hoc steering group will integrate the findings of the task groups and joint committee
into a single report, which will be approved by the Board and published in a NRC-reviewed report.
TASK GROUP ON ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
On behalf of the Space Studies Board, and working under the oversight of the Future of Space Science
(FOSS) Steering Group (FOSS-SG), the Task Group on Alternative Organizations (AO) will study issues and
options relating to the organization of NASA's science programs, as directed in FY1994 report language of
the Senate Subcommittee on VA-HUD-IA. Additional guidance is provided in the FY1995 Senate report
language. The work of the FOSS-AO will be combined with that of two other subpanels, the FOSS Task Group
on Research Prioritization (FOSS-RP) and the Board's standing Joint Committee on Technology (JCT) to
compose an integrated recommendation on the "role and position" of science within NASA and the nation's
research agenda.
This task group will consider alternative approaches to coordinating planning and management of
NASA's space science programs. One possible model recognized in the Senate Report is the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) within the Department of Health and Human Services. The task group will also
examine other relevant federal (e.g., NIST, DOD, and DOE) and quasi-government (FFRDC) research and
development institutions; private sector institutions and non-U.S. management models may be considered.
The study will be structured to facilitate input by space research communities.
Specific tasks of the FOSS-AO are:
(1) Interact with the FOSS-SG to finalize the FOSS-AO Statement of Task
(2) Schedule and conduct meetings as needed and budgeted
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(3) Examine alternative management and organizational structures and approaches that could be used
to conduct NASA's science programs, including:
• organization of research within federal agencies other than NASA, e.g., NOAA, NIST, DOE,
DOD, NSF; special consideration should be given to NIH as requested in the Senate language
• organizations external to the federal government, e.g., FFRDCs, industry, academic institutions,
and public, not-for-profit entities
(4) Consideration should be given to:
• intra-NASA interfaces
• roles and capabilities of government, universities, and industry in performing research (consid-
eration should be given to both applied and basic research, large- and small-scale programs, and long- and
short-term efforts)
• impact on graduate education and research community renewal
• role of international collaboration and impact on it
• transition issues
(5) Document its findings and recommendations in a report to the FOSS-SG
(6) As needed, support preparation by the Steering Group of an integrated report composed of FOSS-
AO, FOSS-RP, and JCT reports; also, support NRC review and publication of the integrated report
TASK GROUP ON RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION
On behalf of the Space Studies Board, and working under the oversight of the Future of Space Science
(FOSS) Steering Group (FOSS-SG), the Task Group on Research Prioritization (RP) will study issues and
options relating to the prioritization of space research as directed in FY1994 report language of the Senate
Subcommittee on VA-HUD-IA. Additional guidance is provided in the FY1995 Senate report language. The
work of the FOSS-RP will be combined with that of two other subpanels, the FOSS Task Group on Alternative
Organizations (FOSS-AO) and the Board's standing Joint Committee on Technology (JCT) to compose an
integrated recommendation on the "role and position" of space science within NASA and the nation's research
agenda.
Specific tasks of the FOSS-RP are:
(1) Interact with the FOSS-SG to finalize the FOSS-RP Statement of Task
(2) Schedule and conduct meetings as needed and budgeted
(3) Survey and evaluate candidate mechanisms for priority setting across disciplines on the basis of
scientific merit; the study should include consideration of the following issues:
• alternative interpretations and presentations of "priority setting"
• approaches to priority setting within the NIH, NSF, NOAA, and DoD (also former OSSA
approaches)
• role of criteria other than scientific merit in research priority setting
• relative roles of diverse participants in priority setting
• processes for culling and termination prioritization
• preservation of funding opportunity for highly innovative or high risk research in an environment
of budget constraints and well-entrenched existing constituencies
• appropriate role for international agreements
• transition issues
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(4) Document its findings and recommendations in a report to the FOSS-SG
(5) As needed, support preparation by the Steering Group of an integrated report composed of FOSS-
AO, FOSS-RP, and JCT reports; also, support NRC review and publication of the integrated report.
The task group should consider the draft final report of the Board's former Task Group on Priorities in
Space Research, as well as the same task group's published interim report, Setting Priorities in Space
Research—Opportunities and Imperatives (NAP, 1992).
TASK GROUP ON TECHNOLOGY
On behalf of the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council (NRC), and working under the
oversight of the Future of Space Science Steering Group (FOSS-SG), the Task Group on Technology (FOSS-
T) will study issues relating to better means to include advanced technology in science missions. The FOSS
study is being sponsored by NASA and conducted by the NRC in response to the FY 1994 report language
of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on VA-HUD-IA, and the FY 1995 report language of the U.S. Senate
Appropriations Committee which reaffirmed the request for a formal NAS [NRC] assessment of the need for
a national institute of space science.
In carrying out its duties in accordance with a written request from the NASA Administrator and authority
from the FOSS-SG, the FOSS-T will analyze opportunities and obstacles in the incorporation of advanced
technology into NASA's space sciences programs. The Task Group will specifically investigate the:
(1) Status of N AS A' s development, infusion, utilization, and transfer of advanced technology for space
sciences; and the processes used by NASA in planning, selecting, and evaluating and terminating relevant
technology development projects
(2) Effect of NASA's current organization and modes of internal communication (and potential
alternatives) on technology development, infusion, utilization, and transfer
(3) Current relationships among NASA, private industry, and universities in the development of
technology for space sciences
Consideration will also be given to the:
• interplay between innovation, risk management, and cost
• technology exchange with other government agencies (e.g., DOD and NOAA)
• effect of "smaller, faster, cheaper" on innovation
• effect of NASA's goal to foster technology transfer to U.S. industry on its technology development for
space sciences
• assurance of flexibility to explore unconventional ideas
• use of the Space Station in the development of technology for space sciences
• effect of extremely prolonged space program and mission development times on the development,
selection, and use of advanced technologies.
The FOSS-T will use as its starting point the NRC report prepared under its direction by the Committee
on Space Science Technology Planning, SSB/ASEB, Improving NASA's Technology for Space Science
(NAP, 1993). While advanced technology for spacecraft and other flight hardware should be the focus of the
Task Group, it should not rule out consideration of other relevant technologies, such as that for improved
ground-based user data access and distribution systems.
APPENDIX
c
Relevant Recommendations of Previous Studies
STUDY OF THE MISSION OF NASA
NASA ADVISORY COUNCIL
OCTOBER 12,1983
Recommendation
The Task Force recommends this "Mission of NASA" that rests on current statute and policy and provides
a framework for NASA's activities for the next 20 to 40 years.
Mankind has acquired the ability to move within and beyond the confines of the surface and the
atmosphere of Earth, creating apparently limitless opportunities for beneficial human activity. In
this regard, NASA has a dual mission—in space and the atmosphere—portions of which are
overlapping.
NASA's space mission is to conduct activities on behalf of the people of the United States in collaboration
with other nations, to:
• explore the solar system and study its planetary processes, including, as appropriate, those governing
the Earth, for the benefit of humankind
• pursue a program of fundamental scientific research in space to expand human knowledge
• plan and implement space technology programs and research into the use of the environment of space
in order to provide for the continued advance of the national space capability and its exploitation for public
and commercial purposes
• and, to achieve these ends, create the capability for an expanded human presence in space and develop
and assure the operation of launch and space vehicles.
The Task Force believes that it is inevitable that human habitation will eventually extend beyond the
confines of the Earth in many ways and on a scale far larger than is currently envisioned. Although it may
not now be productive to debate the specific nature or the timing of this most dramatic of all human ventures,
it is appropriate to use such a venture as a distant goal to guide our search for an understanding of the solar
system and to stimulate the further advance of humankind.
84
Appendix C 85
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM
WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 1990
From the Executive Summary:
A Balanced Space Program. It is our belief that the space science program warrants highest priority for
funding. It, in our judgement, ranks above space stations, aerospace planes, manned missions to the planets,
and many other major pursuits which often receive greater visibility. It is this endeavor in science that enables
basic discovery and understanding, that uncovers the fundamental knowledge of our own planet to improve
the quality of life for all people on Earth, and that stimulates the education of the scientists needed for the future.
Science gives vision, imagination, and direction to the space program, and as such should be vigorously
protected and permitted to grow, holding at or somewhat above its present fraction of NASA's budget even
as the overall space budget grows.
From the Principal Recommendations:
Principal Recommendations Concerning Space Goals
It is recommended that the United States' future civil space program consist of a balanced set of five
principal elements:
• a science program, which enjoys highest priority within the civil space program, and is maintained at
or above the current fraction of the NASA budget (Recommendations 1 and 2); .
• a Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) focusing on environmental measurements (Recommendation 3);
• a Mission from Planet Earth (MFPE), with the long-term goal of human exploration of Mars, preceded
by a modified Space Station which emphasizes life sciences, an exploration base on the Moon, and robotic
precursors to Mars (Recommendations 4, 5, 6 and 7);
• a significantly expanded technology development activity, closely coupled to space mission objec-
tives, with particular attention devoted to engines (Recommendation 8);
• a robust space transportation system (Recommendation 9).
Principal Recommendations Concerning Programs
With regard to program content, it is recommended that:
• the strategic plan for science currently under consideration be implemented (Recommendation 2);
• a revitalized technology plan be prepared with strong input from the mission offices, and that it be
funded (Recommendation 8);
• Space Station Freedom be revamped to emphasize life sciences and human space operations, and
include microgravity research, as appropriate. It should be reconfigured to reduce cost and complexity; and
the current 90-day time limit on redesign should be extended if a thorough reassessment is not possible in that
period (Recommendation 6).
Principal Recommendations Concerning Affordability
It is recommended that the NASA program be structured in scope so as not to exceed a funding profile
containing approximately 10 percent real growth per year throughout the remainder of the decade and then
remaining at that level, including but not limited to the following actions:
• place the Mission from Planet Earth on a go-as-you-pay basis, i.e., tailoring the schedule to match the
availability of funds (Recommendation 5).
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Principal Recommendations Concerning Management
With regard to management of the civil space program, it is recommended that:
• major reforms be made in the civil service regulations as they apply to specialty skills; or, if that is not
possible, exemptions be granted to NASA for at least 10 percent of its employees to operate under a tailored
personnel system; or, as a final alternative, that NASA begin selectively converting at least some of its centers
into university affiliated Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (Recommendations 14 and
15);
• NASA management review the mission of each center to consolidate and refocus centers of excellence
in currently relevant fields with minimum overlap among centers (Recommendation 13).
It is considered by the Committee that the internal organization of any institution should be the province
of, or at the discretion of, those bearing ultimate responsibility for the performance of that institution.
IMPROVING NASA'S TECHNOLOGY FOR SPACE SCIENCE
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPACE SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY PLANNING
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1993
Summary and Recommendations
1. The NASA Administrator [...] should act to establish a coordinating position with the clear responsibility
to ensure cooperation between technology development efforts within different parts of NASA—from early
research through the various stages of technology development and readiness.
2. As NASA acts to improve its programs through the use of new or improved technologies, an emphasis
should be placed on technologies with the potential to reduce end-to-end mission costs.
3. [NASA's technology development division—the Office of Space Access and Technology (OSAT)]
should bring increased rigor (including external review) to determining not only which projects should be
initiated or continued, but which should be canceled.
4. Each [science office] should endeavor to work closely with [OSAT] in order to be involved in, or cognizant
of, [OSAT's] projects relevant to their technology needs.
5. Since industry is heavily involved in the development of spacecraft and systems, and university scientists
are heavily involved in the development of space instruments and sensors, [OSAT] should increase the
inclusion of representatives who are external to NASA in the early evaluation of users' technology needs and
goals.
6. The [OSAT] base program projects in support of space science should be subjected to more visible external
review on a regular basis.
7. NASA should act to broaden the foundation of its research base by increasing the direct involvement of
university research laboratories in the development of technology for space science.
8. [The science offices] should consider earmarking a modest level of funding for use at OSAT on mutually
agreed-upon projects.
9. Each [science office] that has not yet done so should act to formalize technology planning responsibilities
to identify, coordinate, and report relevant work within the [office].
APPENDIX
D
NASA Definitions of Program and Project
Policies and detailed implementation procedures for program and project management in NASA are
given in NASA Handbook 7120.5, Management of Major System Programs and Projects Handbook,
dated November 1993. Included in the Handbook are definitions of program and project relevant to the
Future of Space Science Study. They are quoted in the following:
Project. A defined, time-limited activity with clearly established objectives and boundary conditions
executed to gain knowledge, create a capability, or provide a service as part of an overall development
program. A project typically encompasses design, development, fabrication, test, and as applicable,
operation of advanced hardware and software, including data collection, distribution, and analysis and
reporting of results.
Program. A related series of undertakings that continue over a period of time (normally years), which are
designed to pursue or are in support of a focused scientific or technical goal, and which are characterized by:
design, development and operations of systems; relatively high funding levels; firm schedules; and firm
technical and/or scientific objectives. Programs are typically planned and executed as a series of individual
projects or as a group of projects to provide a major system capability.
Major Program/Project. A program/project for system(s) development that:
(1) Is directed at and critical to fulfilling an agency mission;
(2) Entails the allocation of relatively large resources; or
(3) Warrants special management attention.
The above include but are not limited to:
(4) All programs/projects for which external agency reporting on a regular basis is required;
(5) All multiple field installation programs; and
(6) All projects whose DCC's (Development Cost Commitments) exceed $200 million.
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E
NASA Roles and Responsibilities in the Science Programs
Extracted from NASA Handbook 1101.3, The NASA Organization (September 1994), the following
is not intended to be a detailed accounting of NASA's planning, budgeting, and managing of its
programs, but it does describe some elements of that system as a context for identifying the roles and
responsibilities of the key officials associated with the science program. In the following, excerpts from
the formal responsibilities statements are employed, and in some cases, paraphrased.
The content of each science program is established by the Program Associate Administrator, who:
1. Develops strategic plans consistent with the NASA strategic plan to define program goals and
objectives and establish program priorities.
2. Plans the programmatic activities, including financial and technical plans, consistent with the
program strategic plan.
3. Manages the program, delegating authority as appropriate, to include establishing program
budgets and allocating resources, identifying and funding program facility requirements, overseeing and
controlling program performance schedules, and expending resources to meet program objectives.
4. Provides for full coordination with other NASA offices and program managers and with persons,
groups, and organizations external to NASA who have responsibilities related to the program.
5. Participates with other senior NASA officials to provide advice and counsel to the Administrator
in the development and administration of the overall NASA program and in the continual development of
NASA program policies and direction and the review of NASA programs.
The out-of-house science research program is carried out by universities, industry, other government
groups, and others, either managed directly from Headquarters by the staff of the Program Associate
Administrator or managed by field center staff. The in-house science research program is carried out by
personnel at the centers. Program funds are provided to the center, for either in-house or out-of-house
research, through center management by the Program Associate Administrator. However, other
resources (in-house research personnel, facilities, and other support) are provided by the Center Director.
Specifically, each Center Director:
1. Develops strategic plans consistent with the NASA strategic plan to define center goals and
objectives and establish center priorities.
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2. Allocates and reprograms resources as required to meet approved objectives in accordance with
delegated authority.
3. Manages the day-to-day operations of the Center in support of program roles and missions.
4. Assures the safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance for facilities, operations,
functions, and products of the Center.
5. Participates with Headquarters in the continual development of NASA policies and the review of
NASA programs.
Each NASA Center Director acquires his/her institutional resources (personnel, facilities, etc.) from
and reports to an Institutional Associate Administrator, who, because each center may work on many
different programs, may or may not be the same as the Program Associate Administrator. Each
Institutional Associate Administrator, in addition to any program responsibilities he or she might have:
1. Develops strategic plans consistent with the NASA strategic plan to define institutional goals and
objectives and establish institutional priorities.
2. Allocates and reprograms resources as required to meet approved objectives in accordance with
delegated authority.
3. Provides direction, leadership, and support to reporting Centers in order to maintain the infrastruc-
ture, as well as the technical and management capabilities commensurate with their roles and missions
within the Agency.
4. Provides leadership and policy guidance to reporting Centers regarding the assignment of projects
from all Program Offices, including the assurance of program-level documentation committing sufficient
institutional resources to adequately support the assigned projects.
The program, institutional, and center relationships most relevant to the science programs are:
1. The AA for MTPE is the Institutional AA for GSFC. GSFC has a major role in the Space Science
Program, as well as the MTPE Program.
2. The AA for SS is the Institutional AA for JPL (a contract "center"). JPL has a significant role in
the MTPE Program, as well as the Space Science Program.
3. Other centers having significant involvement with the indicated NASA science programs, and
their respective institutional AA's, are:
Center (science program) Institutional AA
MSFC (microgravity, space science) AA for Space Flight
JSC (life, space science) AA for Space Flight
ARC (life, Earth, space science) AA for Aeronautics
LaRC (Earth science) AA for Aeronautics
LeRC (microgravity science) AA for Aeronautics
The Program and Institutional Associate Administrators report to the NASA Administrator, who:
1. Serves as the Agency head in carrying out the mission of the Agency and conducting all of its
activities.
2. Represents NASA before the President, Congress, and the heads of Federal or other appropriate
governmental agencies, external organizations, and communities.
3. Serves as the final Agency decisionmaker concerning all NASA activities, except as may be
specified by law, regulation, Presidential directive, or delegated authority.
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4. Organizes the NASA workforce, delegating authority, and determining Agency priorities in
accomplishing its mission, activities, or goals.
The Administrator is supported, not only by the Program and Institutional Associate Administrators
and their staffs, but by a number of senior officials in the Office of the Administrator and by Officials-in-
Charge of staff offices. In the Office of the Administrator, the Chief Scientist is responsible for providing
the principal interface between NASA and the national and international science community to ensure
that NASA programs are universally regarded as scientifically and technologically well-founded and are
appropriate for their intended applications.
Two Officials-in-Charge of staff offices particularly closely involved with the science program are
the Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller and the Associate Administrator for Policy and Plans. The
former is the Administrator's principal advisor on financial and budgetary matters and plays a major role
in the budget decision process. Specifically, the Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller:
1. Provides for the overview and financial management of Agency resources relating to programs
and operations, including all resources aspects of the planning, programming, and budgeting process.
2. Reviews, assesses, and validates Agency resources requirements, including recommendations to
the Administrator for fiscal resources approvals and authorizations.
3. Performs economic and cost analyses for Agency assessments of program alternatives.
4. Develops and maintains an integrated Agency budgeting, accounting, and financial management
system, including financial reporting and financial management internal controls.
5. Monitors the financial execution of the Agency budget in relation to actual expenditures, and
prepares and submits to the Administrator timely performance reports.
Finally, the Associate Administrator for Policy and Plans is the Administrator's senior advisor on
policy and strategic planning and is responsible for providing executive leadership for Agency-level
policy and strategic-planning activities. Specifically, that official:
1. Directs, conducts, and coordinates analyses and activities to identify Agency policy needs;
investigates alternative policy strategies; and develops compelling rationales for Agency-level programs
and plans. Ensures coherence and consistency in the formulation, integration, and dissemination of
Agency-level policy and plans.
2. Evaluates, facilitates, and assures implementation and compliance of cross-cutting Administra-
tion, congressional, and Agency-level policies and directives.
3. Organizes and leads the strategic-management process, including the annual update of the
Agency's Strategic Plan.
4. Serves as the focal point for NASA interactions with Executive branch interagency forums,
advisory committees, commissions, and other external and internal committees and groups. Facilitates
and supports the activities of the NASA Advisory Council.
5. Facilitates NASA participation in interagency forums and communicates guidance and direction
from the Administrator for such participation.
APPENDIX
F
Science Management in Other Institutions
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
The National Science Foundation (NSF) has three general types of research programs: support for
individual investigators or small groups (the dominant type); support for large groups, field operations,
and centers (such as Engineering Research Centers); and support for national user facilities (such as
telescopes, oceanographic research vessels, and particle accelerators). The process NSF uses to select
awardees is fundamentally the same for all three modalities, with modifications as appropriate.
The type of proposals NSF receives varies greatly by field of research or education. In the research
programs, NSF receives mostly solicited proposals in response to program announcements, similar to
NASA Research Announcements (for laboratory research) and NASA Announcements of Opportunity
(for flight missions). In these programs, proposals tend to differ greatly from each other. In the case of
centers or user facilities and in Education and Human Resources, there are more targeted solicitations, so
the proposals tend to look fairly similar. Once received by NSF, proposals are assigned to the appropriate
program for review. Each program is headed by a program officer. Depending on their proposal volume
and complexity, programs may have one, two, or even three program officers. At least one of these
individuals is usually a "rotator," a scientist or engineer from the relevant disciplinary community
(usually from a university) who is serving a 1- to 3-year term at NSF. At any one time, about 40 percent
of NSF program officers and division (collections of related programs) directors are rotators. One of the
most important responsibilities of the program officer is to select knowledgeable reviewers for each
proposal. Reviewers are also scientists and engineers outside of NSF and who have expertise in the area
of the proposal or in a related area (in the case of multidisciplinary proposals). Anywhere from 6 to 10
reviewers are selected, with a minimum of 3 reviews needed to process a proposal further. Proposals
average 5.5 reviews. This "peer review" is the cornerstone of NSF's proposal review process.
Reviews are done in writing, and a numerical (1 to 5) or verbal ("excellent," "very good," "good,"
"fair," etc.) rating is assigned by each reviewer. In some programs, program officers use only reviews by
mail (or e-mail). In other programs, mail reviews are solicited, and then a standing panel of different
experts is convened on a regular basis to consider and rate the proposals yet again. The reviewers
consider scientific merit and the capacity of the investigator (track record and/or potential) as the
primary, but not exclusive, criteria for evaluation. In the case of centers or large user facilities, program
officers may stage a site visit by a team of external reviewers to each candidate on a "short list" of
competitors. The site visit is generally used to validate and assess more fully the plans and capabilities of
the proposers. Site visits are usually reserved for the largest, most complex proposals.
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The program officers do not formally review proposals, nor are they voting members of review
panels. However, reviews and reviewers' comments are viewed as advisory to the program officer, not
controlling. The reviews are given great weight, but, by design, the program officer is charged with
arriving at an independent recommendation based on his or her own analysis of the merits of the proposal
and taking into account broader NSF objectives. NSF program officers have considerable flexibility in
making award decisions, but that flexibility is used most often "at the margin," that is, among proposals
ranked in the middle of the averaged ratings. Program officers also work hard to "stretch" their available
resources by negotiating award levels for individual proposals.
The written mail reviews and summaries of the panel meetings are provided to investigators after the
award decision. This information is used by investigators to respond to criticisms or weak points in
rewriting and resubmitting proposals. Even successful awardees find the comments useful. Program
officers spend countless hours talking and visiting with applicants at every stage of the process,
particularly counseling unsuccessful applicants. There is also a well-established process whereby
unsuccessful investigators may ask in writing for reconsideration of their proposal by a higher NSF
official if the investigator believes he or she did not receive a fair evaluation.
Oversight of this process is accomplished in several ways. On a day-to-day level, no award action
may be taken without concurrence by at least one supervisor at least one level higher. Perhaps more
importantly, scientific approval is separate from "business" approval. The program officer cannot
actually commit money. This can be done only by a grant or contract officer (a nonscientist with
expertise in business and financial matters) in a separate part of NSF. Thus, scientific approval is
necessary but not sufficient for the actual award to occur. In the end, however, the most effective controls
are the program officer's own integrity and the openness of the entire process to external scrutiny.
In this rather loose management milieu, NSF program officers are much more independent than their
counterparts at the National Institutes of Health, for example, but do not have as strong a role in decision
making as program officers in U.S. military agencies.
In recent years, especially in the education programs and others where large numbers of proposals are
anticipated, NSF has instituted a two-tiered proposal process. The first tier consists of a relatively short
"preproposal," which is evaluated by a small number of reviewers selected by the program officer as to
whether it is in the competitive range. Investigators with successful preproposals are permitted to
continue to the second tier, a full proposal, which is then evaluated as above. Another strategy NSF uses
is the "planning grant." Planning grants are stand-alone competitions for modest sums (usually a total of
$50,000 or less for 1 to 2 years) to allow investigators to conduct preliminary studies or build a proposal
team in advance of submitting a full proposal for a much greater level of funding. The value of these
approaches is evident—proposals not in the competitive range can be weeded out without expending the
time and resources (on both the investigator's and NSF's part) that the preparation and review of a full
proposal entails. In addition, for the last 3 years, investigators have had the option of applying
specifically for a Small Grant for Exploratory Research (SGER). These are non-renewable, 1- to 2-year
awards of $50,000 or less for small-scale, high-risk research. The criteria cited most often for approval
were "untested or novel idea" or "severe time urgency with respect to collection of data." The proposals
are very short, and the program officers do not seek external reviews. This program was instituted to
counter criticisms of the traditional process as being too "picky," risk-averse, and conservative. On
average, program officers employ 1 to 3 percent of their budgets for SGER proposals (the upper limit is
5 percent).
NSF has two basic types of awards: standard grants and continuing grants. Standard grants are
generally used for individuals and small groups. They may be made for multiple years (usually 2), but the
total funding is essentially approved and committed at the beginning of the award. Continuing grants are
also made for multiple years (3 years or longer), but the funding is approved and committed annually and
is subject to satisfactory progress toward the stated goals of the project. For example, in the case of
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Engineering Research Centers, initial awards are made for 5 years with annual reviews and a major
review after 3 years that determines whether the award will be renewed noncompetitively for an
additional 3-year period.
Unlike virtually any other agency, NSF conducts no research or development and neither constructs
nor operates any research facilities itself, that is, with NSF employees. NSF does own a number of major
research facilities, but it operates them by using contractors, which are almost exclusively universities or
university consortia. NSF monitors and often manages the processes used by these contractors to provide
access to these facilities to the broader scientific and engineering communities. The performance of these
contractors is periodically reassessed, and the operations contracts are periodically subject to recompeti-
tion. NSF's approach to these contracts is performance-based. That is, goals, objectives, and perfor-
mance are specified in the proposal solicitation—the detailed methodology is up to the proposers. The
"science effectiveness," or scientific benefits for the dollar, of the proposer's approach is an important
criterion for evaluation.
As noted above, NSF relies heavily on the participation of external scientists and engineers in the
proposal review process. It is worth spending a moment to note the involvement of the external scientific
community in NSF priority setting and program planning. Program officers, especially rotators, play a
significant role in identifying areas of scientific opportunity (and, therefore, ripe for additional funding)
in their respective disciplines. The rotator system was specifically designed to accomplish this. All
Directorates, which are groups of programs covering broad areas of science, engineering, and education,
have advisory committees of external scientists and engineers. These advisory committees assist the
Directorate leadership in setting overall programmatic priorities and in reviewing the balance between
the three modalities of support. The advisory committees are also playing an increased role in the
evaluation of NSF programs—a key area of emphasis in recent years. At the highest level, the National
Science Board (NSB), a Presidentially-appointed group, meets several times a year to approve NSF
budget requests to the President, all major policies and new programs, and major (multimillion dollar)
awards. The NSB also works with the NSF Director to set the overall strategic direction of the agency.
NSF is the only federal agency governed by a board in the manner of a private grant-making organization.
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the largest single supporter of biomedical research in the
world. Its mission is to improve the health of the people of the United States and other nations through
the pursuit of fundamental knowledge about the behavior and nature of living systems and the application
of that knowledge to extend healthy life and reduce the burdens of illness and disability. The major
avenue through which NIH pursues this mission is through the support of more than 50,000 scientists
working at 1700 institutions in this country and abroad.
The major structural units of NIH are its 17 national institutes, each with its own authorizing
legislation and appropriation. They are referred to as "categorical institutes" because most are responsi-
ble for specific categories of disease. While there are some internal variations in the categorical
institutes, there is a typical organizational pattern. Most have an "extramural program" component and
an "intramural program" component, each reporting to the Institute Director. The extramural programs
provide support to the external community through awards for research project grants, training grants and
fellowships, specialized centers and program projects, construction and resources grants, special pro-
grams for the development and support of minority scientists, research and development contracts, and
cooperative agreements. The latter two instruments permit the agency to establish the plans, parameters,
and detailed requirements for the projects it wishes to support. In all programs, permanent extramural
staff are responsible for the oversight and management of scientific programs in each institute.
The NIH relies heavily on the national pool of scientists actively engaged in research to provide
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advice on research directions and opportunities, to evaluate the scientific and technical merit of proposed
research projects, and to select those meritorious projects that are likely to advance the goals of the
institutes. This evaluation and selection process is achieved through the "peer review system." Since
extramural awards constitute about 84 percent of the NIH budget, which in turn accounts for about one-
third of the nation's investment in biomedical and behavioral research, the impact of the peer review
system is fairly large in shaping scientific programs and progress for NIH and the nation.
The NIH Peer Review System is based on two sequential levels of review. The first level involves
the evaluation of the scientific and technical merit of applications by knowledgeable experts who are, for
the most part, nonfederal scientists. They are aggregated into legislatively mandated initial review
groups (IRGs) established according to scientific discipline or current research area. Most IRGs or study
sections are managed by the Division of Research Grants (DRG), reflecting a long-standing policy to
have organizational separation between the awarding institute and the initial review process. Each study
section is managed by a scientific review administrator (SRA) and meets three times each year to discuss
and evaluate the applications assigned to it. All members of a study section are sent applications by the
SRA well in advance of each meeting and are expected to read and become familiar with each
application. Two or more members are assigned to each application and prepare independent, detailed
reviews based on well-established criteria. Based on these evaluations, the study section may either not
recommend the application for further consideration, defer for additional information, or approve the
application for the time and amount requested or with appropriate reductions in these areas. Approved
applications are assigned a scientific merit rating ranging from 1.0 (outstanding) to 5.0 (acceptable).
Following the meeting of an IRG, the SRA prepares a summary statement for each application. These
summaries describe the proposed research, the reasons for the recommendations, and priority scores for
applications that are scored. These statements are forwarded to the appropriate institute or center for the
next level of review. The summary statement is automatically sent to the principal investigator of each
application.
The second level of review is conducted by National Advisory Councils composed of both scientists
and the general public. They not only assess the scientific merit of the applications but consider the
relevance of the proposal to the programs of the Institute or Center. Extramural program staff attend
study section meetings as program resource persons and present the applications for which they are
responsible to their institute's Advisory Council. SRAs attend Council meetings to provide information
needed in support of the recommendations of the IRG. Council members review the summary statements
received in advance of the three meetings held each year, and, in consideration of both the recommenda-
tion of the IRG and the programmatic priorities of the institute, may accept or modify the recommenda-
tion of the IRG. When there is disagreement with the IRG recommendation, the Council may recom-
mend that the application be returned for additional review by the same or another IRG. If upon re-
review the IRG recommendation remains the same, the action of the IRG stands. The NIH Councils are
unique in that, by legislative mandate, an award of a grant can be made only if approved by a Council.
This feature greatly reduces the likelihood that an award will be made on the basis of political or other
considerations.
Among the various instruments of support, research project grants representing investigator-initiated
research continue to receive NIH's highest priority. While they are not solicited, researchers are
informed about the program areas of special interest to an awarding institute through program announce-
ments or a request for applications in specific areas at a specified funding level. For the research grant
mechanism, NIH is essentially a patron providing assistance and encouragement. As an indication of the
magnitude of support for research project grants, $7.5 billion was expended for this mechanism in FY
1994, with most in the research project grant category. These grants support individual projects, each
with a senior principal investigator. A total of 24,964 awards were made in this category in FY 1994.
Initial Review Groups may be established by an institute to review certain types of grant applications,
such as those for large multifaceted program projects and centers, institutional fellowships, academic
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awards, conference grants, minority programs, and resource grants, among others. Contract proposals
are generally solicited to produce a specific service or product. Institutes also draw from the national pool
of scientists in constituting Program Advisory Committees to advise on specific programs and future
research needs and opportunities and to identify and evaluate future extramural initiatives.
All of the NIH institutes, except one, have "intramural research programs." These, collectively
called the NIH Intramural Research Program (IRP), constitute a federal laboratory and represent the
largest biomedical research enterprise in the world. They represent, however, only a small fraction of the
NIH budget, a little over 11 percent. A unique feature of the IRP is that its scientists do not have to
compete for grants in the same manner as extramural scientists. However, there is a parallel, retrospec-
tive review of accomplishments conducted by Boards of Scientific Counselors. Each laboratory and its
permanent investigators, including junior staff who are not "tenured," is reviewed at least every 4 years.
The results of this review are submitted to the Institute Scientific Director, the Institute Director, and the
NIH Deputy Director for Intramural Research for appropriate action. These recommendations are
discussed by a Board composed of all Scientific Directors at NIH. In addition to the possibility for long-
term and stable research support, intramural scientists have the availability of the NIH Clinical Center's
facilities for patient investigations. The passage of the Federal Technology Transfer Act has resulted in
the development of more than 200 Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs)
between intramural scientists and industry.
Organizationally, the Director of NIH presides over a large and complex organization in which major
authority resides in the Institute, Center, and Division (ICD) Directors. They manage their programs on
a day-to-day basis with significant autonomy, but within the framework of legislative mandates, regula-
tory requirements, corporate policies and procedures developed by NIH, and a very strong and effective
advisory system. The NIH Director has his or her own Advisory Committee, which advises him or her,
and ultimately the Secretary, DHHS, on policy matters pertinent to the NIH mission. The coordination
and management of the extramural and intramural programs of NIH are accomplished both at the level of
the Director, NIH, and at the individual institutes by means of an elaborate but highly effective matrix-
type organizational system.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The Department of Energy has very extensive scientific research programs in both basic and applied
areas. This research is carried out in the DOE's national laboratories as well as in the university
community. The assignment of these programs differs from area to area. Most of the basic research
efforts make use of large facilities at the national laboratories, such as particle accelerators, nuclear
reactors, synchrotron light sources, and electron microscopes. These facilities and a portion of the
research that utilizes them are located at the national laboratories. The facilities are, however, operated
for the benefit of the user community—scientists at universities, other laboratories, and industry. In
general, the laboratories carry out only a minimal research effort in "small science," which is the
provenance of the university scientists.
In applied research (energy programs, environmental cleanup, and defense programs), the work is
generally carried out at the laboratories, with a fraction increasing in the order of the above list. Peer
review is extensively used in evaluating the research in the basic areas, but less so in applied programs.
The budget decisions are made by the program officers in DOE headquarters:
DOE differs from NASA in that the national laboratories (the DOE equivalents -of the NASA
Centers) are all government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities like the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. There are no civil service employees at the laboratories. The laboratories that emphasize
basic research in their missions are generally operated by universities or by university consortia. Others
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are operated by industrial organizations. This has been a strength of the DOE research effort and is one of
the reasons for the interest shown by other agencies in the GOCO mode of operation.
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
The Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense was chartered in February
1958 largely as a response to the orbiting of Sputnik by the former Soviet Union. This occurred early in
the same year NASA was chartered by the Space Act of 1958. However, from the beginning ARPA
adopted a set of management principles, an organizational structure, and an approach to formulating and
carrying out its research projects and programs quite different from those of NASA. The principal
difference in approach was that ARPA chose not to create a large civil service and government facilities
infrastructure. Rather, it chose to operate with a small staff of entrepreneurial program managers and
through existing government and private scientific and engineering resources to execute its programs.
ARPA has maintained these initial approaches largely unchanged to this date and has had substantial
success in promoting significant research advances in many scientific and engineering disciplines. These
factors motivated the committee to examine the ARPA research management approach and to assess the
applicability of its principles to NASA space science management.
Explicitly, what are some of the principles and approaches that have apparently served ARPA so well
in research management for the past 37 years? How has it stayed in the forefront of U.S. research
accomplishments? How has it been able to renew its own internal intellectual capital? How has it been
able to accomplish so much with such modest financial resources by comparison, say, with those of the
military departments? How has it been able to capture the approbation of the research community, the
Congress, industry, U.S. allies and enemies, and even, grudgingly, the military departments it was
created to serve?
• Important Mission—The mission of DoD to provide for national security is the foremost responsi-
bility of the federal government. Within that context and by charter, ARPA has the DoD mandate to work
at the high-risk, high-payoff frontier of defense research science and engineering. Since risk taking is
accepted as part of the culture at ARPA to achieve high payoff, some failure of individual projects to
achieve their goals is expected and accepted. In contrast to the military departments, which have
traditionally structured their laboratory research programs to make steady, incremental improvements to
existing technologies and mission capabilities, ARPA seeks advanced concepts and technologies with
potential to achieve order-of-magnitude performance improvements and increased military capability.
Some of its early programs involved missile technology development, space surveillance, ballistic
missile defense, high-energy laser weaponry, nuclear weapon detonation detection, 'advanced digital
computation, computer network communications, and many other emerging technologies.
• Quality Science and Engineering—ARPA has been able to select projects of national importance
with crucial relevance to the DoD's mission and with extremely high military impact. Because of their
national importance and the frontier science they employ, these projects have attracted the most capable
scientists, engineers, and project managers in the nation to participate in their execution. Since ARPA
chose not to create and support institutions to pursue its objectives, its policy has been to seek out the
most competent investigators to carry out its programs wherever they could be found. Dedication to this
principle is probably the single most important factor in the record of success achieved in ARPA
programs and in the cost-effectiveness of those achievements. A typical ARPA project may span a three-
to four-year period, after which the project team may be disbanded and ARPA's obligation to support it
ceases. Through this mechanism it has avoided the burden and inflexibility of a captive scientific
workforce in a dynamic and changing research environment. ARPA has investigators located at
universities, defense laboratories, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, industrial
Appendix F 97
research and development organizations, national laboratories, foreign research establishments, and
private research centers, and it even relies on private individuals for some projects.
• Quality Research Management Staff—Historically, ARPA policy has been to provide term appoint-
ments for its staff members in order to ensure a rapid turnover of people and ideas. The staff is composed
of discipline scientists and engineers from the research environments in which ARPA executes its
programs as well as technically trained military officers. A typical term for an ARPA program manager
has been 3 years, with 1-year extensions at the director's discretion. Recently, ethics in government
legislation has made it increasingly difficult to recruit and retire ARPA program managers according to
this policy. Motivation for ARPA program managers to serve a term managing programs there is
threefold. First, there is little bureaucracy in this small organization, and dynamic technical entrepre-
neurs operate best in such a setting. Second, each program manager has an average of $10 million to $20
million per year during his or her term to pursue the programs agreed upon with the director. Most have
not had such large discretionary research funds available to them to achieve their goals in the past. Third,
there is a great deal of discretion given to the individual program manager as to how he or she will pursue
his or her program. Oversight is minimal, but accountability for achieving results is substantial.
• Program Selection Process—Military problems are selected in areas laid out by guidance from the
director. Counsel is sought with military combatant commands to determine and study the most pressing
military problems that may yield to technical advances. Concept studies are commissioned, and
discipline scientific and engineering advice is sought from highly qualified scientists and engineers both
through informal contacts and through workshops and public solicitations for ideas. From these raw
materials, research programs and projects are devised by the program manager for execution. Approval
is requested from the director with an abbreviated formal program description and an oral report.
Proposals are solicited using a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. Except on very large
programs, where the director takes a direct role in the procurement, the program manager is most often
the selecting authority. Selections can be competitive or often sole source. Although this process is often
much more informal than typical government procurements, it contains the essential ingredient of
substantial consultation with the technical community before a program is formulated. This results in a
high probability that the best ideas have been exposed to the program manager before he or she structures
the programs.
• Ingredients of Success—ARPA has been widely accepted as one of the nation's most successful
research and development organizations. It has a reputation both here and abroad as an instigator of some
of the country's most important achievements in advancing both military and commercial technologies.
Two features stand out as the ones most responsible for that measure of success. One is the importance of
its mission within the national security community and the willingness of Congress to fund its mission so
generously down through the years. The other is the high quality of the technical staff, which has been
engendered by ARPA personnel policies and the opportunity and excitement of the research environment
there.
APPENDIX
G
Request for Comments from the University Space
Research Association Member Institutions
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY FOR SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS
2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 204IS
SPACE STUDIES BOARD AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ENGINEERING BOARD
(202) 334-3477 (202) 334-3275
FAX: (202) 334-3701 FAX: (202) 334-2482
MSALLEN@NAS.EDU NELDRIDG@NAS.EDU
May 10, 1995
Dear :
Congress, through NASA, has requested that the National Research Council undertake an advisory study
on the Future of Space Science. "Space Science", in this context, includes not only the traditional space sciences
of astronomy, cosmology, planetology, and solar-terrestrial processes, but also includes Mission to Planet Earth
and NASA's life and microgravity sciences.
There are three elements of the study: Organization of the Space Science enterprise, prioritization in a
highly constrained budget environment, and the infusion of technology. This letter concerns the infusion of
technology.
It is widely believed that the innovative vitality of NASA's science enterprise will require the combined
creative engineering talents of NASA, industry, and the universities. We are seeking your thoughts about the
process of university involvement. There are several options. Among them are independent investigators
participating through competitively awarded grants, development of university centers of excellence, contracts to
universities for deliverables, and development of NASA centers of excellence populated by competitively selected
teams of government, industry, and university research engineers. Recognizing that most of NASA's technology
needs are highly focused and that pan of the process of technology infusion occurs in sharing the development
experience:
(a) Can you cite examples where the universities have successfully teamed with government and
industry to develop new technologies? Why were they successful?
(b) Can you cite examples where a government-university technology development process did not
work well? Why were they less than successful?
(c) How do these NASA technology programs affect your institution?
(d) Have you had difficulty supporting foreign students on NASA technology grants and what are
your thoughts about such limitations?
We respectfully request your comments by the end of May. Enclosed for your information are a short
description of the technology element of the Future of Space Science study and a list of panel members. We
apologize for the short lead time, but we are trying to be responsive to NASA's need to plan for downsizing in
the wake of budget reductions.
Sincerely,
The National Research Council is the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
Engineering to serve government and other organcaiKaa
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Meetings and Guest Presenters
STEERING GROUP
August 1-3, 1994, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. The Steering Group met with the Space Studies Board's
Executive Committee; no guest presenters.
January 4-5, 1995, Washington, D.C. Daniel Goldin, NASA Administrator; France Cordova, NASA
Chief Scientist.
June 9-10, 1995, Washington, D.C. Daniel Goldin, NASA Administrator.
August 7-8, 1995, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. The Steering Group met with the Space Studies Board's
Executive Committee; no guest presenters.
TASK GROUP ON ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONS
December 8-9, 1994, Washington, D.C. France Cordova, NASA Chief Scientist; Kevin Kelly, outgoing
Clerk for Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies; Harry Hollo-
way, Associate Administrator for NASA Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications; Charles
Kennel, Associate Administrator for NASA Mission to Planet Earth; and Wesley Huntress, Jr., Associate
Administrator for NASA Space Science.
February 2-3, 1995, Washington, D.C. Anita Jones, Director for DoD Defense Research and Engineer-
ing; Robert Winokur, Director for NOAA National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information
Service; Ruth Kirschstein, NIH Deputy Director; Stamatios (Tom) Krimigis, Applied Physics Laboratory
Space Science Director; Robert LaFande, Naval Research Laboratory; Ian Pryke, Head of European
Space Agency Washington Office; Harry Holloway, Associate Administrator for NASA Life and
Microgravity Sciences and Applications; John Klineberg, Director of NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center; and Alan Ladwig, Associate Administrator for NASA Policy and Plans.
March 10-11, 1995, Irvine, California. Ray Colladay, Lockheed Martin.
March 27-28, 1995, Washington, D.C. Edward Stone, Director of Jet Propulsion Laboratory; John
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Mansfield, Associate Administrator for NASA Space Access and Technology; Walter Morrow, Director
of MIT Lincoln Laboratory; William Miller, West Virginia University and formerly Director of the
Office of Naval Research; Lew Allen, Director of Draper Laboratory and formerly Director of Jet
Propulsion Laboratory; Lennard Fisk, University of Michigan and formerly Associate Administrator for
NASA Space Science and Applications; and John Dailey, NASA Deputy Administrator.
April 18-19, 1995, Washington, D.C. John Naugle, former NASA Chief Scientist; Timothy Coffey,
Director of Naval Research Laboratory.
May 24-25,1995, Washington, D. C. France Cordova, NASA Chief Scientist; Harry Holloway, Associate
Administrator for NASA Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications; and Charles Kennel, Associ-
ate Administrator for NASA Mission to Planet Earth.
TASK GROUP ON RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION
November 28-30, 1994, Washington, D.C. Kevin Kelly, outgoing Clerk for Senate Subcommittee on
VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies; Diana Josephson, Deputy Undersecretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmospheres; Judy Sunley, Assistant to the Director for NSF Science and Policy Planning;
France Cordova, NASA Chief Scientist; and Joseph Alexander, Deputy Assistant Administrator for EPA
Research and Development and formerly Assistant Associate Administrator for NASA Space Science
and Applications.
February 21-22, 1995, Washington, D.C. Alan Ladwig, Associate Administrator for NASA Policy and
Plans.
June 5-6, 1995, Washington, D.C. No guest presenters.
TASK GROUP ON TECHNOLOGY
August 23-24, 1994, Washington, D.C. Mary Kicza, Giulio Varsi, and Michael Kaplan, NASA Office of
Space Science; Bert Hansen and Gary Martin, NASA Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and
Applications; Robert Norwood and Wayne Hudson, NASA Office of Advanced Concepts and Technol-
ogy; Granville Paules, NASA Office of Mission to Planet Earth; and Wayne Littles, NASA Acting Chief
Engineer.
November 14-16, 1994, Washington, D.C. France Cordova, NASA Chief Scientist; Mary Kicza, NASA
Office of Space Science; Michael Kaplan, NASA Astrophysics Division; Miriam Forman, NASA Space
Physics Division; Giulio Varsi, NASA Solar System Exploration Division; Granville Paules and Mike
Luther, NASA Office of Mission to Planet Earth; Samuel Venneri, NASA Office of Space Access and
Technology; Bert Hansen, NASA Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications; Gary
Martin, NASA Microgravity Science and Applications Division; and Guy Fogleman, NASA Life and
Biomedical Sciences and Applications Division.
February 23-24, 1995, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California. Edward Stone (Direc-
tor), Garry Burdick, Richard Capps, E.K. Casani, Moustafa Chahine, Terry Cole, Esker Davis, Charles
Elachi, James Evans, David Linick, Robert Mackin, Arthur Murphy, Donna Shirley, William Spuck,
Barbara Wilson, Thomas Yunck.
March 30-31, 1995, NASA Lewis Research Center. Donald Campbell (Director), Henry Brandhorst,
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Marvin Goldstein, Donald Palac, Ronald Schertler, Raymond Burns, William Bifano, Jack Salzman, Joe
Sovie.
April 24, 1995, Washington, D.C. Samuel Venneri, Director of NASA Spacecraft Systems Division.
April 25, 1995, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. John Klineberg (Director), Joseph Rothenberg,
James Abshire, Mitch Brown, Michael Fitzmaurice, Dolly Perkins, Allan Sherman.
April 26, 1995, Washington, D.C.* Harry Holloway, Associate Administrator for NASA Life and
Microgravity Sciences and Applications; Wesley Huntress, Associate Administrator for NASA Space
Science; Charles Kennel, Associate Administrator for NASA Office of Mission to Planet Earth; John
Mansfield, Associate Administrator for NASA Office of Space Access and Technology.
June 5-6, 1995, Washington, D.C. * No guest presenters.
*Dr. F. Andrew Gaffney, a member of the Space Studies Board's Committee on Space Biology and Medicine, participated.
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Acronyms
AA Associate Administrator
AO Announcement of Opportunity
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASEB Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
ATD Advanced Technology Development
CSSTP Committee on Space Science Technology Planning
CFC Chlorofluorocarbon
CoF Construction of Facilities
CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreement
CSSTP Committee on Space Science Technology Planning
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DRG Division of Research Grants (NIH)
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle
EOS Earth Observing System
EOSDIS Earth Observing System Data and Information System
ESA European Space Agency
FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center
FOSS Future of Space Science
FOSS-AO FOSS Task Group on Alternative Organizations
FOSS-RP FOSS Task Group on Research Prioritization
FOSS-SG FOSS Steering Group
FOSS-T FSS Task Group on Technology
FY Fiscal Year (federal government)
GOCO Government-owned, contractor-operated
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
ICD Institute, Center, and Division
IPA Intergovernmental Personnel Act
IRG Initial review group
IRP Intramural research program
ITP Integrated Technology Plan (for the civil space program)
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JCT Joint Committee on Technology
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JSC Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
LaRC Langley Research Center
LBSAD Life and Biomedical Sciences and Applications Division
LeRC Lewis Research Center
LMScAAC Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications Advisory Committee
MFPE Mission from Planet Earth
MidEX Mid-size Explorer
MSAD Microgravity Science and Applications Division
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MTPEAC Mission to Planet Earth Advisory Committee
NAC NASA Advisory Council
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NESDIS National Environmental Satellite Data and Information System
NIH National Institutes of Health
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRA NASA research announcements
NRC National Research Council
NRL Naval Research Laboratory
NSB National Science Board
NSF National Science Foundation
OA Office of Aeronautics
OACT Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology
OART Office of Advanced Research and Technology
OAST Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology
OLMSA Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
OMSF Office of Manned Space Flight
OMTPE Office of Mission to Planet Earth
OSAT Office of Space Access and Technology
OSF Office of Space Flight
OSS Office of Space Science
OSSA Office of Space Science and Applications
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
R&D Research & Development
R&PM Research & Program Management
SGER Small grant for exploratory research
SMEX Small Explorer
SRA Scientific review administrator (NIH)
SScAC Space Science Advisory Committee
SSB Space Studies Board
SSTAC Space Systems and Technology Advisory Committee
SSTI Small Satellite Technology Initiative
VA Veterans Administration
VA-HUD-IA Veterans Administration/Housing and Urban Development/Independent Agencies
WFC Wallops Flight Center
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NASA Organization (May 1, 1995)
National Aeronautics And Space Administration
Aerospace Safety!
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NASA Advisory _J
Council
Administrator *
Daniel S. Goldin
Deputy Administrator
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